臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究主要檢視當公司處於不同的生命週期階段，CEO替換的機率以及替換後的績效表現，樣本期間為2006年至2013年。我們利用Anthony and Ramesh (1992)所發展出的分類方式將美國的上市公司區分為成長、成熟與衰退期三個群組。首先，我們的實證結果指出公司替換CEO的機率會隨著生命週期階段而上升，特別是股利發放率及成長率這兩個判斷因子，兩個比率越低，則CEO替換的機率上升。第二，本研究發現當公司處於成長期時宣告更換CEO，宣告後的異常報酬顯著增加，相反的，當公司處於成熟期和衰退期，短期報酬表現卻是負向且不顯著的。總體而言，我們發現隨著公司越來越成熟甚至進入衰退期，這些美國上市公司包含 NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ替換CEO的機率越來越高，但是實證卻告訴我們市場投資人對於成長期替換CEO是樂觀的，但對於成熟和衰退期替換CEO持著保守和觀望的態度。

This paper examine the incidence and the post-performance of CEO turnover under different stages of the corporate firm life-cycle from 2006 to 2013. We divided samples into various life cycle portfolios based on methods developed by Anthony and Ramesh (1992). First, our results indicate that the likelihood of management turnover increase through firm life stages. In particular, probability increase follow with lower dividend payout rate and lower growth rate. Second, the returns of firm increase significantly following turnover announcement in growth stage. We find that the short-term performance reaction after CEO change is negative but insignificant in mature and stagnant stages. Overall, Our findings suggest that although firms listed in NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ like to change CEO through firm life-cycle, the evidences tell us that investors tend to be optimistic about CEO turnover event when firms in growth stage, but more conservative while firms in mature and stagnant stages.

Table of Contents

I. Introduction 1
II. Literature Review & Hypotheses Development 4
A. Firm life-cycle 4
B. Studies of the performance-turnover relationship 5
C. Determinants of CEO turnover 8
D. Determinants of firm performance after CEO turnover 11
E. CEO turnover and firm performance in different firm life-cycle 12
III. Data and Methodology 17
A. Sample selection 17
B. Research design for hypotheses & Construction of variable 19
IV. Empirical Results 21
A. CEO turnover and firm performance in different firm life-cycle 21
B. Incidence of CEO turnover in different firm life-cycle 29
V. Conclusion 34
Appendix A 36
Reference 38

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