臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

薪酬為企業管理經理人重要的誘因機制，若企業提供給經理人的薪酬無法符合經理人的期待時會引發經理人做出不利於股東權益的決策，產生反效果。因此公司必須審慎考量經理人的薪酬設計。
企業處於不同的生命週期階段時對於各項決策的制定就會有不同的考量，本研究主要探討企業處在不同生命週期時，總經理現金薪酬和績效敏感性之間的關係是否有所不同，樣本取自2009年至2012年間中國大陸6725個觀察值，檢視企業生命週期和薪酬績效敏感性之間的關係。本文援用Anthony and Ramesh(1992)的方法選定資本支出率、營收成長率、股利支付率、公司成立年數等作為判斷企業生命週期的因子。本文的實證結果發現當公司處於成長期和衰退期時，公司現金薪酬績效敏感性較小，而衰退期的現金薪酬敏感性又明顯小於成熟期的公司。

Compensation is the most important incentive system for enterprise to manage CEO’s performance . If companies couldn't provide compensation which can meet the expectations of the managers, it would cause some opposite effects that managers might make unfavorable decisions in shareholders' equity. Therefore, the enterprise have to consider the CEO’s compensation carefully.Companies should give different considerations to each policy in different stages of a life cycle.
The objective of this paper is to investigate wheather the relationship between CEO compensation and performance sensitivity is different or not, samples taken from 2009 to 2012 between the Chinese mainland among 6725 observations .We use it to view the relationship between the enterprise life cycle and CEO’s pay-performance sensitivity. This article also availing Anthony and Ramesh (1992) method of capital expenditure ratio which is selected, revenue growth rate, dividend payout ratio, the company established to determine the number of years as a corporate life cycle and other factors. The empirical results we found that the degree of growth and maturity linked to the performance of the CEO compensation and related strong degree of maturity and more links than growing.

中文摘要..................................Ⅰ
英文摘要..................................Ⅱ
目錄......................................Ⅲ
表目錄....................................Ⅳ
圖目錄....................................Ⅴ
第一章 緒論............................... 1
第一節 研究動機與目的................ 1
第二節 研究貢獻...................... 4
第三節 研究架構與流程................ 5
第二章 文獻回顧與假說發展................. 7
第一節 薪酬設計相關文獻.................. 7
第二節 企業生命週期相關文獻......... 13
第三節 研究假說..................... 21
第三章 研究方法.......................... 23
第一節 變數衡量..................... 23
第二節 實證模型..................... 27
第三節 樣本資料與來源............... 28
第四章 實證結果.......................... 29
第一節 敘述性統計.................... 29
第二節 迴歸分析...................... 35
第五章 結論與建議......................... 39
第一節 研究結論..................... 39
第二節 研究建議..................... 41
參考文獻................................. 42

表目錄
表3 - 1 生命週期各階段之特性.....................24
表3 - 2 變數定義..................... 26
表4 - 1 生命週期判斷因子敘述性統計..................... 30
表4 - 2 主要變數敘述性統計..................... 31
表4 - 3 主要變數的相關分析..................... 32
表4 - 4 生命週期判斷因子分年度的平均值統計........ 33
表4 - 5 主要變數分年度的平均值統計..................... 34
表4 - 6 全部樣本迴歸..................... 38


圖目錄
圖 1 - 1 研究流程圖..................... 6

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蔡柳卿(2003)，總經理薪酬、非財務績效衡量指標
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