臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

新公司的進入及新產品的投放會影響現存產品的市場。高科技且資金需求高的產業會成為新進入公司的高門檻。玻璃基板產業也是屬於高門檻產業，兩間公司佔有大部分市場，因此兩間公司的策略對玻璃基板市場的影響比較大，而且兩間公司的策略會互相影響。
通常新公司的進入和公司新產品投放市場時，會利用新產品預告來引起消費者的興趣。如果新產品的品質讓消費者滿意的話，消費者會在新產品出來之前考慮暫時不進行購買現存產品。
本研究考慮兩個階段上現存產品與新產品的兩家公司之競爭。投放新產品的公司第一階段預告新產品的品質，第二階段推出新產品同時提供新產品的價格。需要高品質的消費者有傾向在第一階段的品質資訊出來後，等到第二階段的價格資訊出來，再考慮購買現存產品或新產品。在此以消費者的品質敏感度來決定此兩個階段現存產品與新產品的需求，利用此需求來建構現存產品和新產品的利潤函式。利用賽局理論方法求解每個階段現存產品和新產品的均衡價格和利潤。
數值分析後得到的結果為當新產品的品質提升幅度越大，會使現存產品和新產品的均衡價格隨之調整的越高。另外，消費者預測的新產品價格越高，現存產品和新產品的均衡價格就越低。而當消費者等到新產品出來的機會成本低，對現存產品和新產品的均衡價格影響很小，但消費者等到新產品出來的機會成本高時，兩個產品的均衡價格降低，尤其是新產品的均衡價格急劇降低。

New entry and new product releases have a major impact on incumbent products. An industry requires high technology and considerable capital, as these factors create a substantial barrier to entry into the market. In this situation, there are very few competing firms; therefore, each firm’s strategy has a profound effect on the other firms in the industry.
Generally, firms use new product preannouncements to engage consumer’ interest before new product entries or releases. If a new product’s quality, as perceived from the preannouncement, satisfies customer requirements, it is expected that consumers would delay buying existing products and wait for a new product launch.
In this thesis, we consider that the competition between two firms of incumbent and new products in a market involves two periods. The quality of the new product is preannounced in the first period, while the new product is launched in the second period. We determine the demand for incumbent and new products by using consumers’ product quality sensitivity and develop the firms’ profit functions using this demand. Finally, game theory is used to determine the equilibrium prices and profits of the two firms in each period.
Through numerical analysis, we find that the equilibrium prices of incumbent and new products increase with an increase in the quality of new products, and higher quality of new products reduces the profit of an incumbent firm.

摘要 i
Extended Abstract ii
誌謝 v
表目錄 viii
圖目錄 ix
第一章 緒論 1
1.1 研究背景與動機 1
1.2 研究目的 4
1.3 研究架構 4
第二章 文獻探討 7
2.1 新產品進入市場 7
2.2 新產品預告 9
2.3 價格和品質關係 12
2.4 賽局理論 14
2.5 小結 16
第三章 模式建構與發展 18
3.1 模式環境 18
3.1.1 情境描述 18
3.1.2 模式假設 19
3.1.3 參數以及變數之符號定義 20
3.2 需求與第二階段對公司i與e的利潤函式建立 21
3.3 均衡決策分析 24
第四章 數值分析與參數敏感度分析 30
4.1 參數設定 30
4.2 數值分析 31
4.2.1 均衡價格分析 33
4.2.2 對公司i與e的總利潤分析 36
4.2.3 各第一、二階段對公司i的利潤分析 39
4.3 小結 40
第五章 結論與未來研究方向 42
5.1 結論 42
5.2 未來研究方向 43
參考文獻 44

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