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研究生:黃珮華
研究生(外文):Pei-hua Huang
論文名稱:審計委員會設置對盈餘管理之研究
論文名稱(外文):Audit Committee Formation and Earnings Management
指導教授:林財印林財印引用關係
指導教授(外文):Tsai-Yin Lin
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立高雄第一科技大學
系所名稱:財務管理研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:財務金融學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2012
畢業學年度:100
語文別:中文
論文頁數:60
中文關鍵詞:應計基礎盈餘管理審計委員會實質盈餘管理盈餘管理
外文關鍵詞:real earnings managementearnings managementaccrual-based earnings managementaudit committee
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:4
  • 點閱點閱:342
  • 評分評分:
  • 下載下載:0
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:1
國內外財務報表舞弊案件層出不窮,使得公司治理機制備受重視,故我國設置審計委員會藉以強化公司治理機制。本研究旨在檢驗公司設置審計委員會後,對於應計基礎盈餘管理和實質盈餘管理的影響。研究結果發現,不論是使用應計基礎盈餘管理或是實質盈餘管理,審計委員會的設置能有效抑制管理當局操控盈餘的行為,另外公司的董事會規模和董事會獨立性也有相當程度的抑制效果。此外,本研究亦發現設置審計委員會的公司,較傾向以實質盈餘管理方式操弄盈餘。
Due to the occurrence several high-profile accounting scandals , Taiwan’s government focuses on the governance mechanism of a company and set up an audit committee by strengthen the company’s governance mechanism. This study aims to examine the impact of accrual-based management and real earnings management after setting audit committee. The empirical results indicate that no matter using accrual-based earnings management or real earnings management that setting audit committee can constrain the behavior of earnings management and the board of directors mechanism, too. In addition, this paper found that company setting audit committee tend to use real earnings management engaged in manipulating earnings.
摘要 I
ABSTRACT II
誌謝 III
目錄 IV
表目錄 VI
第壹章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機 1
第二節 研究目的 4
第三節 研究架構 5
第貳章 文獻回顧 6
第一節 審計委員會 6
第二節 應計項目盈餘管理之定義與相關文獻探討 10
第三節 實質盈餘管理之定義與相關文獻探討 13
第參章 研究方法 15
第一節 樣本選取 15
第二節 應計項目變數定義與模型建立 16
(一) 裁決性應計項目(DA): 16
(二) 實證模型 18
第三節 實質盈餘管理變數定義與模型建立 18
(一) 異常營運活動現金流量(Abnormal CFO) 19
(二) 異常生產成本(Abnormal PROD) 20
(三) 異常裁決性支出費用(Abnormal DISEXP) 21
(四) 解釋變數 22
(五) 控制變數 23
第肆章 實證結果與分析 25
第一節 敘述性統計分析 25
第二節 相關係數分析 26
第三節 迴歸分析結果 28
(一)應計項目盈餘管理實證結果 28
(二)實質盈餘管理實證結果 30
(三)應計項目與實質盈餘管理 32
第伍章 結論 33
參考文獻 34
附錄一 38
附錄二 42
附錄三 44
附錄四 48
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