臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

隨著安隆案的爆發，最受大眾爭議的就是查核人員的獨立性是否在某些情況下受到影響，尤其是當在他們所賺取的公費有大部分是來自於非審計公費時。本研究旨在重新檢驗查核公費與盈餘管理之間的關係。特別的是，本文以美國金控銀行為樣本，並以裁量性壞帳(discretionary provisions)來衡量盈餘管理及盈餘品質，藉以探討審計公費與非審計公司與盈餘管理之關係。
查核人員獨立性就像是個黑箱，而我們只能看得到黑箱外的產出─盈餘品質。然而，盈餘管理主要是操弄應計項目。因此本研究假設若查核人員獨立性受影響時，則盈餘品質較低，操弄的應計項目愈多，即盈餘管理的程度愈大。而銀行業最重要的應計項目就是壞帳(provisions)。本文將裁量性壞帳(DP)定義為總壞帳(TP)減非裁量性壞帳(NDP)。TP在資料庫中有現成的資料，因此只要估計出NDP，便可以得到裁量性壞帳的部分。由於研究盈餘管理的程度，故將DP加絕對值表示，只要所得出的裁量性壞帳不等於零即代表有盈餘管理發生。最後利用OLS迴歸模型來測試我們的假說。
從本研究的實証結果來看，我們可以下一個結論:利益衝突之防免焦點並不應只著重於非審計業務上，根據我們的研究結果可推論出非審計公費會影響查核人員獨立性沒錯，但審計公費也具有影響性。只要存有某方面依賴性，查核人員便無法對所查核的公司做到真正的獨立性。然而限制業務範圍也不能完全防免利益衝突，因為總公費也是使獨立性受影響的因素之一。

The Enron debacle has reopened the public debate on the role of auditors and whether their independence can be called into question in certain circumstances, particularly where they earn substantial fees for non-audit work. Any event that raises doubts about the quality and independence of audit services undermines confidence in the capital markets as a whole. The debate has tended to focus on non-audit services, which auditors perform for their clients, and this has been the target of the US SEC in recent years.
The fundamental tension in the statutory audit system is that auditors get hired by, fired by and must work side by side with the corporate client while legally required to take the interests of shareholders, creditors, and the public as their primary responsibility and allegiance. Audit and non-audit services can strengthen the auditor’s economic bond with the client, thereby increasing the auditor’s incentive to acquiesce to client pressure, including pressure to allow earnings management.
The purpose of this study is to reexamine relationship between the auditors’ fees and earnings management. Specifically, we investigate the relation between discretionary provisions, a measure of earnings management and earnings quality, and audit and non-audit fees from bank holding companies. Our results support a positive association between auditors’ fees and earnings management. There is a positive coefficient on audit fees. Non-audit fees and total fees also have the same result. In contrast, we find no association between fee ratio and the earnings management indicator. Positive coefficients on Total Fees, Audit Fees and Non-Audit Fees suggest that the provision of audit services to audit clients creates incentives for auditors to submit to client pressure.

Abstract .....................................................I
I : Introduction ............................................1
SEC Actions...............................................2
Audit and Non-Audit Services ..........................3
II :Prior Literature ...................................4
Lowballing and Non-Audit Service ..........................4
Empirical Studies of Audit Fees, Non-Audit Fees
and Earnings Management....................................5
III :Hypothesis Development ...................................6
Examples of Audit and Non-Audit Fees .................6
Non-Audit Fees and Audit Quality..........................7
Relationship between Audit and Non-Audit Fees and Earnings Management.........................................8
IV :Sources of Data and Sample Description.....................9
V : Research Design...........................................10
Model I: Provision Expectation
(Non-discretionary Provision) Model.......................10
Model II: Absolute value of discretionary provision model.12
VI :Empirical Results.........................................16
Descriptive statistics....................................16
Regression results........................................17
VII :Conclusions..............................................20
Appendix A....................................................38
Appendix B....................................................40

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