臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本文以2007年至2015年國內上市櫃公司為研究樣本，主要探討CEO權力與分析師報導之間的關係，並進一步解釋CEO權力如何影響分析師的報導。由於有權力的CEO會選擇性揭露公司資訊而影響資訊透明度，而分析師報導意願也會受到公司資訊透明度的影響。本研究發現，公司CEO權力愈大，分析師報導的頻率愈少，且CEO權力愈大的公司，揭露愈少的資訊，從而提高資訊不對稱，並降低資訊透明度。此外分析師報導會受到公司資訊環境的影響，當公司資訊透明度因受到有權力CEO的負面影響後，分析師會因公司資訊揭露有限或資訊品質較差而放棄報導該家公司。最後本研究發現，CEO權力確實會為分析師報導與公司資訊透明度造成負面影響，並使得公司的資訊不對稱問題更為嚴重。

This paper contains listed firms in Taiwan from 2007 to 2015 to investigate the relationship between CEO power and analyst coverage, and examine how CEO power influences the behavior of analyst coverage. As powerful CEO can selectively disclose their superior information in turn to influence information environment and the incentive of analyst coverage. The empirical results indicate that firms with powerful CEOs are covered by fewer analysts. In addition, the firms with more powerful CEOs disclose less information resulting in information asymmetry and less transparency. Therefore, the firm’s information environment affects the incentive of analyst coverage, while the powerful CEO lessens information transparency resulting in limited or low-quality corporate disclosure tends to discourage analysts from covering the firm. Our results show that CEO power inversely affects corporate transparency and analyst coverage resulting in serious information asymmetry.

中文摘要 i
英文摘要 ii
誌謝 iii
目錄 iv
表目錄 v
一、 緒論 1
二、 文獻探討 3
2.1分析師報導 3
2.2 CEO權力 4
2.3 CEO權力對企業決策之影響 5
2.4假說發展 7
三、 研究設計 10
3.1樣本選取與資料來源 10
3.2變數定義與衡量 13
四、 實證分析 16
4.1敘述性統計分析 16
4.2 Pearson相關分析 18
4.3 根據CEO權力分組之樣本敘述統計量 23
4.4 CEO權力與分析師報導 26
4.5 CEO權力與資訊透明度 30
五、 研究結論 34
參考文獻 35

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