臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究旨在探討當總經理認列停業單位損失時，董事會是否會降低損失佔薪酬之權重以保護總經理之現金薪酬。其次，分析董事會針對停業單位損失及繼續營業單位淨損對總經理現金薪酬之保護程度是否不同，並進一步比較停業單位利益及繼續營業單位淨利與總經理現金薪酬之敏感關聯性差異。最後，探討總經理存有建立企業王國的行為對現金薪酬保護程度之影響。

以1997年至2007年的總經理現金薪酬為研究樣本進行實證分析。結果發現董事會會調整停業單位損失佔總經理薪酬之權重，意即保護行為確實存在。然而，董事會針對停業單位損失及繼續營業單位淨損，對總經理薪酬之保護程度並無顯著差異。此外，總經理現金薪酬與停業單位利益之敏感關聯性小於與繼續營業單位淨利之敏感關聯性。最後，本研究發現相較於沒有建立企業王國行為之總經理，當建立企業王國行為之總經理認列停業單位損失時，董事會對其現金薪酬之保護程度較低。藉由替換公司規模衡量指標、增加薪酬績效關聯性控制變數、改變總經理現金薪酬之計算基準以及使用Tobit迴歸分析等敏感性分析，發現實證結論仍舊相同。

This study investigates whether the boards of directors shield CEO cash compensation from income-decreasing effects of loss from discontinued operations. Moreover, I analyse whether they shield loss from discontinued operations more than continuing operations. This paper also examines the different sensitivity of CEO cash compensation to income from discontinued operations and continuing operations. Finally, I inspect the effects of managerial empire building on the degree of shielding.

Using CEO cash compensation data from 1997 to 2007, the results indicate that the boards of directors do shield loss from discontinued operations. Whereas, I find no evidence that the shielding is significantly different between loss from discontinued operations and continuing operations. Furthermore, I identify that the sensitivity of CEO cash compensation to income from discontinued operations is smaller than continuing operations. Eventually, the findings suggest that in contrast to the CEO without managerial empire building, the compensation of the CEO with managerial empire building is less shielded from the effects of loss from discontinued operations. I conduct several sensitivity analyses by changing the measure of company size, adding controlling variables of pay-performance association, altering the measure basis of CEO cash compensation and applying Tobit regression models. These empirical results are still similar.

第壹章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與目的 1
第二節 研究架構 4
第貳章 文獻探討與假說發展 6
第一節 總經理薪酬契約相關文獻之彙整 6
第二節 總經理建立企業王國相關文獻探討 12
第三節 本研究之觀念性架構 15
第參章 研究方法 17
第一節 實證模型與變數衡量 17
第二節 樣本選取與資料來源 27
第肆章 實證結果與分析 30
第一節 敘述性統計分析 30
第二節 相關性分析 33
第三節 多元迴歸分析 36
第四節 敏感性分析 41
第伍章 結論與建議 57
第一節 研究結論 57
第二節 研究貢獻 57
第三節 研究限制與建議 58
參考文獻 59

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