臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究檢視外資對於薪酬績效敏感度是否有影響，在過去的文獻中顯少探討外資影響薪酬敏感度的議題，本研究以2005-2013台灣上市櫃公司為研究樣本發現當外資持股高薪酬績效敏感度愈高，外資持股低則不顯著，因此本研究認為外資扮演著很重要的監督效果。此外，本研究控制了自我選擇誤差，避免外資是因為企業的公司治理較好因此才投資而不是因為外資持股的企業公司治理較佳，本研究的結論是外資有能力改善公司治理的效果。

The objective of this study is to examine whether the relation between foreign in-vestors and pay-performance sensitivity. The extant literature has less examined the im-pact of foreign investors on pay-performance sensitivity. Our sample from Taiwan stock market from 2005 to 2013.We found that higher foreign investors reveal significant pay-performance sensitivity , however, lower foreign ownership do not. Our study infer that foreign investors is an important factor to monitor company. In addition, our study control self-selection model that foreign investors may only invest in firms that have exhibited good governance practices. Our results shows that foreign shareholders can improved corporate governance.

第一章 緒論 1
第一節　研究背景與動機 1
第二節　研究目的 1
第三節　研究架構 1
第二章 文獻回顧 3
第一節　經理人薪酬績效敏感度 3
第二節　外資對於公司治理 4
第三節　其他變數與薪酬關係 5
第三章 研究方法與資料 6
第一節　資料和樣本建構 6
第二節　薪酬績效敏感度 6
第三節　二階段迴歸 7
第四章 實證結果 9
第一節　樣本描述 9
第二節　迴歸分析 13
第三節　穩健度分析 20
第五章 結論與建議 21
第一節　結論 21
第二節　建議 21
參考文獻 22

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