臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究旨在探討實質盈餘管理與未來營運績效之關連性，並比較實質盈餘管理與應計盈餘管理對於未來營運績效之意涵是否相同。企業進行盈餘管理行為若在後續期間被投資人發現，將會遭受嚴重之懲罰，因此本研究推論，若企業選擇以盈餘管理行為達成盈餘門檻，則表示企業未來實質經營績效會有顯著之改善，方能隱藏本期盈餘管理反轉後對後續績效之負面影響。此外，若企業選擇進行成本較高、影響期間較長之實質盈餘管理行為，其後續實質績效改善相對於選擇進行應計盈餘管理企業，前者之程度應該較強，且改善期間應較長。本研究採用Dechow et al. (1995)之Modified Jones Model衡量應計項目之盈餘管理；並採用Roychowdhury (2006)作法估計實質盈餘管理行為。本研究實證發現透過實質盈餘管理達成盈餘門檻之企業，相對於未達成盈餘門檻之企業，後續期間有較佳之營運績效改善之現象，顯示示當公司管理階層會評估其成本及效益才會透過實質盈餘管理來達成盈餘門檻。本研究實證結果亦發現應計項目之盈餘管理與實質盈餘管理對於未來績效的影響趨勢是不同的，進行實質盈餘管理企業未來績效改善期間較長。

The purpose of this study is to examine the relation between real earnings management and future operating performance, and to compare the future performance implication of real earnings management with that of accrual earnings management. I hypothesize that the firms engaging in earnings management to meet earnings threshold will have better future operating performance compared to those miss the threshold, based on the belief that the investors will punish the earnings management behavior if they notice the negative earnings reversing effect. Firms can conduct earnings management by doing real transactions or using accrual adjustment. The former costs higher, and has longer-period effect compared to the latter. So based on cost-benefit effect, I hypothesize that the firms conducting real earnings management should have longer and better future performance improvement compare to those conducting accrual earnings management. This study adopts Modified Jones Model to measure the accrual-based earnings management, and Roychowdhury (2006) to measure real earnings management. The empirical results show that firms use real earnings management to meet earnings threshold have significantly better future operating performance compared to firms that miss the target. The finding also shows that firms conducting real earnings management have longer performance improvement than those doing accrual earnings management.

目錄
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 3
第三節 研究架構與流程 4
第二章 文獻探討 6
第一節 盈餘管理定義及動機 6
第二節 應計項目盈餘管理之相關文獻 7
第三節 實質盈餘管理相關文獻 11
第三章 研究方法 20
第一節 假說發展 20
第二節 變數衡量 21
第三節 實證模型 28
第四節 資料來源與研究期間 32
第四章 實證結果 34
第一節 單變量分析 34
第二節 假說檢驗 35
第三節 敏感性分析 41
第五章 結論與建議 43
參考文獻： 45
附錄： 48

Baber, W.R., P.M. Fairfield, and J.A. Haggard. 1991. The effect of concern about reported income on discretionary spending decisions: the case of research and development. Accounting Review 66: 818-829.

Balsam, S., E. Bartov, et al. 2002. Accruals management, investor sophistication, and equity valuation: Evidence from 10-Q filings. Journal of Accounting Research 40: 987-1012.

Bartov, E., 1993. The timing of asset sales and earnings manipulation. The Accounting Review 68: 840–855.

Bartov, E., 2003. Discussion of investor sophistication and the mispricing of accruals. Review of Accounting Studies 8: 277 – 281.

Bens, D., V. Nagar, D.J. Skinner, and M.H. Franco Wong. 2003. Employee stock options, EPS dilution and stock repurchases. Journal of Accounting and Economics 36: 51–90.

Bens, D., V. Nagar, and M.H. Franco Wong. 2002. Real investment implications of employee stock option exercises. Journal of Accounting Research 40: 359-393.

Cohen, D.A., A. Dey, and T.Z. Lys. 2008. Real and accrual-based earnings management in the pre-and post-Sarbanes Oxley periods. The Accounting Review 83: 757–787.

Cohen, D.A., and P. Zarowin. 2010. Accrual-based and real earnings management activities around seasoned equity offerings. Journal of Accounting and Economics 50: 2-19.

DeAngelo, L.E., 1986. Accounting Numbers as Market Valuation Substitutes: A Study of Management Buyouts of Public Stockholders. The Accounting Review 61: 400-421.

Dechow, P.M., R. Sloan. 1991. Executive incentives and the horizon problem: an empirical investigation. Journal of Accounting and Economics 14: 51-89.

Dechow, P.M., R. Sloan, and A. Sweeney. 1995. Detecting earnings management. The Accounting Review 70: 193-225.

Dechow, P. M., and D.J. Skinner. 2000. Earnings Management: Reconciling the Views of Accounting Academics, Practitioners and Regulators. Accounting Horizons 14: 235-250.

DeFond, M.L., and C.W. Park. 1997. Smoothing Income in Anticipation of Future Earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics: 115-139.

Ewert, R., and A. Wagenhofer. 2005. Economic effects of tightening accounting standards to restrict earnings management. The Accounting Review 80: 1101-1124.

Graham, J.R., C.R. Harvey, and C.R. Rajgopal. 2005. The economic implications of corporate financial reporting. Journal of Accounting and Economics 40: 3-73.

Gunny, K., 2005. What are the consequences of real earnings management? Working Paper, University of Colorado.

Gunny, K., 2010. The Relation Between Earnings Management Using Real Activities Manipulation and Future Performance: Evidence from Meeting Earnings Benchmarks. Contemporary Accounting Research 27(3): 855-888.

Healy, P., 1985. The impact of bonus schemes on the selection of accounting principles. Journal of Accounting and Economics: 85-107.

Healy, P.M., and K. Palepu. 1990. Effectiveness of accounting-based dividend covenants. Journal of Accounting and Economics 12(1-3): 97-124.

Healy, P.M., and J.M. Wahlen. 1999. A review of the earnings management literature and its implications for standard setting. Accounting Horizons 13: 365-383.

Herrmann, T., T. Inoue, and W.B. Thomas. 2003. The sale of assets to manage earnings in Japan. Journal of Accounting Research 41: 89-108.

Jones, J.J., 1991. Earnings Management during Import Relief Investigation. Journal of Accounting Research: 193-228.

Matsunaga, S.R., and C.W. Park. 2001. The Effect of Missing a Quarterly Earnings Benchmark on the CEO’s Annual Bonus. The Accounting Review 76: 313-332.

Murphy, K.J., and J.L. Zimmerman, 1993. Financial Performance Surrounding CEO Turnover. Journal of Accounting and Economics 16: 273-315.

Roychowdhury, S., 2003. Management of earnings through the manipulation of real activities that affect cash flow from operations. Working Paper, MIT.

Roychowdhury, S., 2006. Earnings management through real activities manipulation. Journal of Accounting and Economics 42: 335-370.

Schipper, K., 1989. Comentary on earnings management. Accounting Horizons 3(4): 91-102.

Skinner, D. J., and R.G. Sloan. 2002. Earnings Surprises, Growth Expectations and Stock Returns or Don’t Let An Earnings Torpedo Sink Your Portfolio. Review of Accounting Studies 7:289-312.

Trueman, B., and S. Titman. 1988. An Explanation for Accounting Income Smoothing. Journal of Accounting Research 26: 127-139.

Watts, R. L., and J.L. Zimmerman. 1978. Towards a positive theory of the determination of accounting standards. The Accounting Review 53 (1):112-134.

Zang, A., 2006. Evidence on the tradeoff between real manipulation and accrual manipulation. Working Paper, University of Rochester.