臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本文檢驗2008~2012年臺灣上市公司董事會董事成員忙碌程度(Busyness)與公司債務資金成本(Cost of Debt Capital)的關聯性。理論上，一家公司的董事若身兼多職，對於每一家公司所投入的努力與承諾將相形下降，其代表公司價值與風險有負面的影響；另一方面，一位身兼多職的董事有他的聲譽要維護、有他累積多家公司的專業、經驗與人脈，這些皆有助於提升他對於經理階層的監督並發揮影響力，對於降低公司風險與提升公司價值皆有正面助益。
本文搜集各家上市公司董事會的各個董事在其他上市公司同時擔任董事的數目來衡量董事的忙碌程度，檢驗公司董事會董事成員忙碌程度與公司債務資金成本的關聯性。大部分的實證結果顯示，董事會的忙碌程度與公司債務資金成本呈現負相關，較高的董事忙碌程度對應著較低的債務資金成本以及較佳的信用評等。

This study examines the relationship between director’s multiple board appointments (busyness) and cost of debt capital of listed companies on Taiwan Stock Exchange from 2008 to 2012. Theoretically, if a director with multiple board appointments, his/her efforts and commitment on managerial monitoring toward each company is decreased, thus the firm value is deteriorated and risk of company light up. On the other hand, thier reputation, professional skills, experience and interpersonal relationship have positive influence on company by reducing risk and enhence the value of company.
This study collects the number of directors of each listed company board that also serves as the director in other listed companies and relates this degree of director’s busyness to the firm’s cost of debt capital. Empirical findings show that there is negative correlation between director’s busyness and cost of debt capital in terms of lower interest expense to total interest-bearing debt and favorable credit ratings.

目錄
摘 要 I
Abstract II
謝詞 III
目錄 IV
圖目錄 VI
第壹章緒論 1
第一節 研究動機 1
第二節 研究目的 7
第貳章 文獻探討 13
第一節 制度背景 13
第二節 董事身兼數職的利益與成本 15
第三節 董事與公司之關聯性 18
第參章 變數資料與實證方法 24
第一節 變數 24
第二節 資料來源 35
第三節 實證方法 36
第肆章實證分析結果 39
第一節 公司產業忙碌程度、敘述統計量與相關係數 39
第二節 迴歸實證分析結果 48
第三節 兩階段迴歸分析結果 63
第四節 一階差分變動量分析結果 75
第五節 解釋變數落遲項對被解釋變數的分析結果 79
第伍章、結論與建議 84
參考文獻 88



圖目錄
圖1、研究流程圖 12
表目錄
表1、台積電董事兼任職務 5
表2、鴻海董事兼任職務 6
表3、變數定義與衡量彙總表 34
表4、樣本分配狀況(產業忙碌程度指標) 44
表5、樣本分配狀況(公司忙碌程度指標) 45
表6、實證變數之敘述統計值 46
表7、相關係數矩陣 47
表8、忙碌董事對債務資金成本之影響的階層迴歸實證結果(BUSY總數) 57
表9、忙碌董事對債務資金成本之影響的階層迴歸實證結果(BUSY平均 58
表10、忙碌董事對企業信用風險指標之影響的階層迴歸實證結果(BUSY總數) 59
表11、忙碌董事對企業信用風險指標之影響的階層迴歸實證結果(BUSY平均) 60
表12、高科技類股公司之忙碌董事對公司債務資金成本和企業信用風險指標的影響 61
表13、非高科技類股公司之忙碌董事對公司債務資金成本與企業信用風險指標的影響 62
表14、兩階段最小平方法分析之實證結果(COD) 69
表15、兩階段最小平方法分析之實證結果(COD) 70
表16、兩階段最小平方法分析之實證結果(COD) 71
表17、兩階段最小平方法分析之實證結果(TCRI) 72
表18、兩階段最小平方法分析之實證結果(TCRI) 73
表19、兩階段最小平方法分析之實證結果(TCRI) 74
表20、忙碌董事對債務資金成本之影響的變動量迴歸實證結果 77
表21、忙碌董事對企業信用風險指標之影響的變動量迴歸實證結果 78
表22、解釋變數落遲項對債務資金成本的分析結果 82
表23、解釋變數落遲項對企業信用評等的分析結果 83

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