臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究以2005年至2011年國內上市、上櫃公司為研究對象，探討發生財務危機可能性較高之公司是否越可能採取盈餘管理活動，並參照Cohen et al.(2008)將盈餘管理活動區分成應計基礎盈餘管理活動以及實質盈餘管理活動。利用裁決性應計項目衡量應計基礎盈餘管理活動；利用估計異常的營運現金流量、異常製造成本及異常裁決性支出來衡量實質盈餘管理活動；利用Z-Score衡量公司發生財務危機之可能性。
　　本研究實證結果顯示，（一）公司破產可能性越高越不會進行應計基礎盈餘管理，結果不支持假說一，可能的原因為：1.公司發生破產的可能性越高，管理階層將更有動機藉由盈餘效果更強大的方法來操縱盈餘，然而，應計基礎盈餘管理活動雖然操作成本較低，卻無法產生直接的現金流量，對盈餘並無實質影響，因此管理者可能選擇不採用。2.由於SOX法案之後爆發許多會計醜聞，因此審計人員與主管機關對於應計基礎盈餘管理之查核，較SOX法案之前嚴謹許多。然而當公司發生財務危機時，將受到外界更嚴格之監督，因此公司也較不會採取應計基礎盈餘管理。 (二)公司發生破產可能性越高越會透過折扣與延長客戶的繳款期限增加產品銷售數量的實質盈餘管理，結果支持假說二。(三) 公司發生破產可能性越高越會透過製造大量額外產品，使銷貨成本降低的實質盈餘管理，結果支持假說三。(四)公司發生破產可能性越高越會利用刪減裁決性費用的實質盈餘管理，結果支持假說四。

This thesis attempts to examine whether the companies occurring the higher possibility of financial distress are more likely to take the earnings management.
Based on the Cohen et al. (2008), we divided the earnings management activities into accrual-base earnings management activities and real earnings management activities.
We use the discretionary accrual to measure the accrual-based earnings management activities and use the estimated abnormal operating cash flow, abnormal production costs, and abnormal discretionary expenses to measure the real earnings management activities. The samples period is from 2005 to 2011, and they are the Listed and OTC Listed Companies
There are mainly four results in this paper. First of all, the companies occurring the higher possibility of bankrupt distress are not more likely to take the accrual-base earnings management. There are two following possible reasons in terms of this result. The first one is that the managerial level will manipulate earnings effectively by more powerful method of earnings effect. However, although the operating cost of the accrual- base earnings management activities are low, it cannot generate direct cash flow. Besides, it cannot work about the substantial effect. Accordingly, the managers may not choose to adopt it. Secondly, auditors and the competent authority are more rigorous to audit the accrual-base earnings management before SOX since many accounting scandals erupted after SOX Act. Nevertheless, when the companies occur financial distress, they will be subject to supervise stringently by the outside.
The second empirical result of real earnings management is that the companies which have higher possibility of bankrupt distress take advantages of increasing the discounts and extending the payment deadline. The third empirical result is that the companies having higher possibility of bankrupt distress take advantages of manufacturing a large number of extra products to decrease the cost of goods sold. Eventually, the last empirical result is that the companies having higher possibility of bankrupt distress utilize to delete the discretionary costs.

目錄
第一章　緒論 1
第一節　研究目的與動機 1
第二節　研究架構 5
第三節　研究流程 6
第二章　文獻探討 7
第一節　盈餘管理定義 7
第二節　應計基礎盈餘管理與實質盈餘管理 8
第三節　盈餘管理動 12
第四節　財務危機定義與盈餘管 16
第三章　研究設計 22
第一節　研究樣本與期間 22
第二節　研究假說 22
第三節 研究變數設計與實證模型 23
第四章　實證結果與分析 32
第一節　基本敘述性統計32
第二節　相關係數分析 34
第三節　迴歸結果分析 35
第四節　敏感性分析 37
第五章　結論與建議 38
第一節　實證結果與發現 38
第二節　研究限制與建議 40
參考文獻 41
表目錄
表 3-1 上市、上櫃公司之樣本選取過程 44
表 3-2 各年度樣本數 44
表 3-3 樣本產業分配圖 45
表 4-1 敍述性統計量 46
表 4-2 變數之Pearson相關係數 47
表 4-3 公司發生財務危機可能性對裁決性應計項目DA影響之迴歸分析 48
表 4-4 公司發生財務危機可能性對實質基礎盈餘管理R_CFO影響之迴歸分析 49
表 4-5 公司發生財務危機可能性對實質基礎盈餘管理R_PROD影響之迴歸分析50
表 4-6 公司發生財務危機可能性對實質基礎盈餘管理R_DISEX影響之迴歸分析51
表 4-7 公司有立即破產危機時對裁決性應計項目DA影響之迴歸分析 52
表 4-8 公司有立即破產危機時對實質基礎盈餘管理R_CFO影響之迴歸分析 53
表 4-9 公司有立即破產危機時對實質基礎盈餘管理R_PROD影響之迴歸分析 54
表 4-10公司有立即破產危機時對實質基礎盈餘管理R_DISEX影響之迴歸分析 55
圖目錄
表1-1 研究流程圖 6

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