臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究旨在審計委員會特性對於財務報導品質之影響，並以2008至2014年台灣上市櫃公司作為研究對象，將裁決性應計項目之幅度作為財務報導品質之衡量變數。
本研究將審計委員會成員若具備會計、財務或法律者區分為具備專業知識之審計委員會，實證結果發現，具備專業知識的審計委員會，愈能抑制公司當局不當的盈餘管理。另外本研究不同於以往文獻，將審計委員會成員兼任其他公開發行公司之獨立董事比例，作為公司治理能力的代理變數，結果發現，當獨立董事兼職家數愈多，基於聲譽效果的影響，會更嚴格監督公司的治理機制。不過本研究並未從審計委員會之開會頻率上獲得統計支持。
由此可說明，當審計委員會為具備專業知識者與成員的兼職比例愈高，愈能提升其品質，以有效監督公司管理階層並提升財務報導品質。

The purpose of the study is to examine the effect of audit committee characteristics on financial reporting quality proxied by the magnitude of discretionary accruals. The results, based on a sample of companies listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation and the GreTai Securities Market over the period 2008-2014, as expected, show that both the audit committee having at least one expert and the proportion of the number of audit committee members concurrently serve as an independent director of other public companies to the number of audit committee members are positively correlated to financial reporting quality. However, audit committee meeting frequency is insignificantly correlated to financial reporting quality.

目錄
摘要 I
ABSTRACT II
目錄 III
表目錄 IV
壹、緒論 1
貳、研究假說 4
一、審計委員會 4
二、財務報導品質 6
三、審計委員會之設置與財務報導品質 7
四、審計委員會之特性與財務報導品質 8
参、研究方法 13
一、樣本及資料來源 13
二、實證模型之建立 14
肆、實證結果 20
一、全體樣本迴歸分析 20
二、審計委員會特性迴歸分析 25
伍、敏感性分析 31
一、審計委員會成員之專長進一步測試 31
二、依裁決性應計項目正、負號分組測試 33
三、依公司資本額(普通股股本)分群測試 35
四、依業務性質(電子業)設置審計委員會 37
陸、結論 39
參考文獻 40

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