臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

在公司理財當中，創投是一個非常重要且迷人的主題。在本研究當中，我們有興趣的主題是企業價值，創投參與者的所得函數與創投參與者折現率比值的關係。在我們的模型當中，創投參與者既為主理人，亦為代理人；外加今天面對到的資訊不對稱問題，既包含了逆選擇的問題，也涵蓋了道德風險的問題，再再都使得想了解的主題變得非常深澀難懂。所幸前人的研究提供了一些方向，使得我們能夠在既有的方法當中，更進一步去解析與了解我們有興趣的主題 ；透過附加在可轉換證券上的買權與賣權，我們能夠進一步知道其背後所代表的經濟意義，以及其所形成的新均衡。

Venture capital is a charming issue. We explore the relative ratio of discount rates between the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur in a setting that the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur are both principals and agents. The verifiability of venture value leads us to know the efforts devotion and its respective impacts on discount rates better. The incentive behind the convertible preferred shares used for the venture finance has been considered as equivalent to the financing with some constraints imposed on the common shares. On the convertible incomplete contract, the putable/callable options enhance the incentives and reduce the uncertainty in the early stage of venture finance. A new equilibrium is brought when a lemon problem is faced with unexpected actions taken by both. The underinvestment/overinvestment problem has been considered from the private benefit and the value creation of venture of both sides. In our paper, the venture capitalist may be induced to overinvest by the NPV-like rule. The equilibrium leads us to know the interactive relationships and the distribution of venture value between two players well as proper strategies are applied.

口試委員會審定書………………………………………………………………
謝詞與感言……………………………………………………………………… i
中文摘要………………………………………………………………………… ii
英文摘要………………………………………………………………………… iii
Chapter 1. The Financial contracting of Venture finance -------------------- 1
1.1. Incentive ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 1
1.2. The Literature Review ------------------------------------------------------- 1
1.2.1. The mechanism of convertible preferred stock for venture financing 3
1.2.2. The incomplete contract theory of the firm for the renegotiation mechanism 8
1.2.3. The self-selection mechanism (the revelation principle) used as the incentive-compatibility condition imposed ------------------------------------- 13
1.2.4. The Exit decisions of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs ---------- 15
1.2.5. The Double moral hazard problem --------------------------------------- 18
1.3. The interesting issues --------------------------------------------------------- 20
1.3.1. Callable or Putable embedded options on the convertible preferred shares for the early stage venture capital financing ---------------------------------------- 20
1.3.2. The Coexistence of moral hazard and adverse selection for the early stage venture capital financing ---------------------------------------------------------- 23
Chapter 2. A perspective of entrepreneurial discount rate and its related issues 24
2.1. Introduction -------------------------------------------------------------------- 24
2.2. A Single-period Model ------------------------------------------------------- 33
Assumptions ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 36
2.2.1. Scenario 1 ------------------------------------------------------------------- 37
Scenario 1 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 37
Case 1-1. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 37
Case 1-2. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 41
Case 1-3. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 44
2.2.2. Scenario 2 ------------------------------------------------------------------- 66
Scenario 2 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 66
Case 2-1 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 66
Case 2-2 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 73
2.3. Some Extensions ------------------------------------------------------------- 76
2.4. Conclusions ------------------------------------------------------------------- 77
Appendix A ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 80
Appendix B ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 89
Chapter 3. Future research issues ---------------------------------------------- 92
Reference -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 93

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