跳到主要內容

臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

(216.73.216.81) 您好!臺灣時間:2025/10/05 10:40
字體大小: 字級放大   字級縮小   預設字形  
回查詢結果 :::

詳目顯示

我願授權國圖
: 
twitterline
研究生:楊竣惟
研究生(外文):Chun-Wei Yang
論文名稱:公司治理與管理當局盈餘預測之關聯性研究
論文名稱(外文):A Study of Association between Corporate Governance Structure and Voluntary Earnings Forecast
指導教授:黃瓊瑤黃瓊瑤引用關係
指導教授(外文):Chiung-Yao Huang
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立雲林科技大學
系所名稱:會計系碩士班
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2012
畢業學年度:100
語文別:中文
論文頁數:51
中文關鍵詞:董監質押比率自願性盈餘預測現金流量請求權董事兼任經理人
外文關鍵詞:Voluntary Earnings ForecastsCash Flow RightsExecutive DualityBoard Share Collateralization Ratio
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:1
  • 點閱點閱:174
  • 評分評分:
  • 下載下載:0
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:2
本文探討管理者同時兼具股東身分的公司治理特性下,是否會藉由提高盈餘預測準確度之途徑,用以緩和外界對公司可能存在的負面評價,以及降低對管理者在經營決策過程中可能存在的誠信疑慮。本研究以2005~2010年度中已發布自願性盈餘預測之台灣上市公司為樣本,並採用複迴歸工具以驗證本文所建構的研究假說。實證結果發現,控制股東的現金流量權、董事兼任經理人,以及董監質押比等三個公司治理特性,對管理當局盈餘預測準確度有顯著的正向影響。換言之,在前述公司治理之特性下,由於管理者本身亦是股東,此將導致其個人財富與公司價值產生連結,因此有採行降低外界對公司負面評價與未來營運不確定性疑慮之誘因。此意謂著管理者擁有公司營運的第一手資訊,透過盈餘預測資訊的發布與實際達成預測目標之成效,可發射其對公司營運發展之掌控程度與管理能力,此將有助於減緩內外部利害關係人間之資訊不對稱程度,並強化外部對公司產生正面評價之資訊利益。
This paper discusses the characteristics of corporate governance managers who are also shareholders to determine their impact on management earnings forecast accuracy and whether raising earnings forecast accuracy eases negative evaluations from sources outside the company. This study uses data from the listed companies in Taiwan that published voluntary earnings forecasts from 2005 to 2010, and uses multiple regression analysis tools to verify its hypotheses. The empirical results show that the three corporate governance characteristics of cash flow rights for controlling shareholders, executive duality, and board share collateralization ratio have a significant positive impact on management earnings forecast accuracy. In other words, among the characteristics of the aforementioned corporate governance managers is the fact that a given manager is also a shareholder, and this will link his personal wealth and the value of the company together, such that he has an incentive to reduce outside negative evaluations of the company and any uncertainty regarding future operations. This means that such managers have first-hand information about their companies operations through the release of earnings forecasts and the actual effectiveness of the objectives-related predictions that signal the degree of development in the company''s operations and management capabilities, and that this information will help lessen the extent of information asymmetry between interested internal and external parties, strengthening the information benefit of positive assessments of the company produced by the external sources.
中文摘要 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- i
英文摘要 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- ii
誌謝 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- iii
目錄 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- iv
表目錄 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- v
圖目錄 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- vi

一、 緒論----------------------------------------------------------------- 1
1.1 研究背景與動機-------------------------------------------------- 1
1.2 研究目的與研究問題-------------------------------------------- 2
1.3 論文架構----------------------------------------------------------- 3
二、 文獻探討與假說推論-------------------------------------------- 5
2.1 公司治理----------------------------------------------------------- 5
2.2 董事會特性-------------------------------------------------------- 8
2.3 股權結構特性----------------------------------------------------- 10
2.4 假說推論----------------------------------------------------------- 11
三、 研究設計----------------------------------------------------------- 20
3.1 研究樣本與研究期間-------------------------------------------- 20
3.2 資料來源與樣本篩選-------------------------------------------- 20
3.3 模型設計----------------------------------------------------------- 23
3.4 變數定義----------------------------------------------------------- 23
3.5 研究架構----------------------------------------------------------- 28
四、 實證結果----------------------------------------------------------- 29
4.1 敘述統計----------------------------------------------------------- 29
4.2 相關係數分析----------------------------------------------------- 31
4.3 迴歸分析----------------------------------------------------------- 34
五、 結論與建議-------------------------------------------------------- 37
5.1 結論----------------------------------------------------------------- 37
5.2 研究建議----------------------------------------------------------- 37
5.3 研究限制----------------------------------------------------------- 38
參考文獻 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 39
1.牛延苓,2001,股權結構、董事會組成與公司績效關係之研究─以高科技產業與傳統產業為例,國立中央大學,碩士論文。
2.江幸瑾,2010,管理當局預測與權益資金成本關係之研究,國立政治大學,碩士論文。
3.何里仁,2003,公司治理之資訊透明度與績效評核關聯性之研究,逢甲大學,碩士論文。
4.李建然,周俊德,2002,"管理當局信譽與自願性盈餘預測資訊內涵關係之研究",會計評論,34期,頁77~99,1月。
5.李馨蘋,莊宗憲,2007,"公司治理機制與公司績效之實證研究",東吳經濟商學學報,57期,頁1~27,6月。
6.杜玉振,黃荃,林容竹,2002,"董事會特性對經營績效、財務決策之影響研究-以台灣上市公司為例",管理與系統,9卷,3期,頁345~368。
7.周建新,林宗得,2005,"資訊透明度對企業價值增額解釋能力之研究",會計與公司治理,2卷,2期,頁25~46,12月。
8.林子軒,2008,董事長兼任總經理之影響因素及其對績效之影響,中原大學,碩士論文。
9.林秀柑,方文碩,王冠閔,2009,"集團核心企業董事會特性與經營績效之研究",臺灣企業績效學刊,3卷,1期,頁25~48。
10.林容竹,2001,董事會特性對財務決策、經營績效之影響,銘傳大學,碩士論文。
11.林淑莉,2004,"管理當局盈餘預測態度與自願性盈餘預測資訊內涵的關
係",當代會計,5卷,2期,頁175~206,11月。
12.林穎芬,劉維琪,2003, "從高階主管薪酬的研究探討代理理論在台灣的適用程度",管理學報,20卷,2期,頁365~395。
13.胡詩珮,2004,台灣上市公司盈餘分配權對策略與績效關係之研究─結構方程模式(SEM)之應用,國立中央大學,碩士論文。
14.高蘭芬,2002,董監事股權質押之代理問題對會計資訊與公司績效之影響,國立成功大學,博士論文。
15.張雅芸,2002,台灣上市(櫃)公司財務報表可靠性研究-隨機邊界模型之應用,中原大學,碩士論文。
16.張瑞當,方俊儒,朱正雄,2007,"代理成本對自願性盈餘預測揭露之影
響",交大管理學報,27卷,2期,頁29~53。
17.許美滿,吳壽山,鍾惠民,林怡群,2004,"控制股東代理問題對公司價值之影響與舉債之監督效果分析",會計與公司治理,1卷,2期,頁67~90,12月。
18.陳瑞斌,許崇源,2007,"公司治理結構與資訊揭露之關聯性研究",交大管理學報,27卷,2期,頁55~109。
19.楊慧玲,2000,董事會結構及其變動對股東財富與經營績效影響之研究,朝陽大學,碩士論文。
20.葉銀華,李存修,柯承恩,2002,公司治理與評等系統,商智文化出版社,臺北。
21.葉銀華,邱顯比,1996,"資本結構、股權結構與公司價值關聯性之實證研究:代理成本理論",台大管理論叢,7卷,2期,頁57~90。
22.葉銀華,柯承恩,李德冠,2002,"公司監理機制對於關係人交易的影響", 2002年財務學術研討會暨博士研究生論壇。
23.董珮珊,2004,公司治理、公司績效與高階主管薪酬關係之研究,真理大學,碩士論文。
24.廖秀梅,李建然,吳祥華,2006,"董事會結構特性與公司績效關係之研究─兼論台灣家族控制企業因素之影響",東吳經濟商學學報,54 期,頁117~160。
25.劉啟群,陳建樺,1998,"上市公司管理當局自願性盈餘預測揭露及揭露時點之影響因素-台灣地區之實證分析",中國財務學刊,6卷,1期,頁1~43。
26.劉淑琴,2008,公司發布自願性盈餘預測後的策略選擇,國立雲林科技大學,博士論文。
27.蔡其諭,2002,揭露程度與負債資金成本之關係,國立政治大學,碩士論文。
28.鍾宇軒,2008,財務盈餘預測精確度與外部監理機制:強制性與自願性財務預測制度之比較,逢甲大學,碩士論文。
29.Ahmed K., and Courtis J. K., 1999, "Associations between corporate characteristics and disclosure levels in annual reports: A meta analysis", British Accounting Review, vol.31, pp.35-61.
30.Akerlof, G. A., 1970, "The Market for ''Lemons'': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism", Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol.84, pp.488-500, August.
31.Ali, A., Chen T. Y., and Radhakrishnan S., 2007, "Corporate disclosure by family firms", Journal of Accounting and Economics, vol.44, pp.238-286.
32.Azofra V., and Santamaria M., 2011, "Ownership, control, and pyramids in Spanish commercial banks", Journal of Banking and Finance, vol.33, pp. 1464-1476.
33.Baginski, S. P., Hassell J. M., and Kimbrough M. D., 2004, "Why Do Managers Explain Their Earnings Forecasts?", Journal of Accounting Research, vol.42, pp.1-29.
34.Brickley J. A., Lease R.C., and Smith C.W., 1988, "Ownership Structure and Finance Economics", Journal of Finance Economics, pp.267-291.
35.Claessens S., Djankov S., Fan J. P. H., and Lang L. H. P., 2002, "Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholders", Journal of Finance, vol.57, pp.2741-2771.
36.Claessens, S., Djankov S., and Lang L. H. P., 2000, "The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 58, pp. 81-112.
37.Clement, M., Frankel R., and Miller J., 2003, "Confirming Management Earnings Forecasts, Earnings Uncertainty, and Stock Returns", Journal of Accounting Research, vol.41, pp.653-679.
38.Cyert R., Kang S., and Kuman P., 2002, "Corporate Governance, Takeovers, and Top Management Compensation: Theory and Evidence", Management Science, vol.48, pp.453-469.
39.Daily, C., and Dalton D., 1993, "Board of Directors Leadership and Structure: Control and Performance Implications", Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, vol.17, pp.65-81.
40.Davis J. H., Schoorman F. D., and Donaldson L., 1997, "Toward a stewardship theory of management", The Academy of Management Review, vol.22, pp.20-47.
41.Dechow P. M., Sloan R.G., and Sweeney A.P., 1996, "Cause and consequences of earnings manipulation: an analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC", Contemporary Accounting Research, vol.13, pp.1-36.
42.Diamond, D. W., and Verrecchia R. E., 1991, "Disclosure, liquidity, and the cost capital", The Journal of Finance, vol.46, pp.1325-1360.
43.Donaldson, L., and Davis J. H., 1991, "Stewardship theory of agency theory: CEO governmance and stareholder returns", Australian Journal of Management, vol.16, pp.49-64.
44.Eng, L. L., and Mak, Y. T., 2003, "Corporate Governance and Voluntary Disclosure", Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, vol.22, pp.325-345.
45.Fama, E. F., and Jensen, M. C., 1983, "Separation of Ownership and Control", Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 26, pp.301-325.
46.Francis J., Khurana I., and Pereira R., 2005, "Disclosure incentives and effects on cost of capital around the world", The Accounting Review, vol.80, pp.1125-1162.
47.Gillan S. L., 2006, "Recent Developments in Corporate Governance: An Overview", Journal of Corporate Finance, vol.12, pp.381-402.
48.Glosten, L., and Milgrom P., 1985, "Bid ask and transaction prices in specialist market with heterogeneously informed traders", Journal of Financial Economics, vol.14, pp.71-100.
49.Grossman S. J., 1981, “An Introduction to the Theory of Rational Expectations under Asymmetric Information”, Review of Economic studies, vol.48, pp.541-559.
50.Healy, P. M., and Palepu K. G., 2001, "Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature", Journal of Accounting and Economics, vol.31, pp.405-440.
51.Healy, P. M., Hutton A. P., and Palepu K. G., 1999, "Stock performance and intermediation changes surrounding sustained increases in disclosure", Contemporary Accounting Research, vol.16, pp.485-520.
52.Hill, C. W. L., and Snell S. A., 1989, "Effects of Ownership Structure and Control on Corporate Productivity", Academy of Management Journal, vol.32, pp.25-46.
53.Jensen M. C., and Ruback R. S., 1983, "The market for corporate control: the scientific evidence", Journal of Financial. Economics, vol.11, pp.5-50.
54.Jensen, M. C., and Meckling W. H., 1976, "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure", Journal of Financial Economics, vol.3, pp.305-360.
55.Kelton, A. S., and Yang Y. W., 2008, "The impact of corporate governance on internet financial reporting", Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, vol.27, pp.62-87.
56.La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes F., and Shleifer A., 1999, "Corporate ownership aroundthe world", Journal of Finance, vol. 54, pp.471-517.
57.Lang M. H., and Lundholm R. J., 1993,"Cross-Sectional Determinants of Analyst Ratings of Corporate Disclosures", Journal of Accounting Research, vol.31, pp. 246-271.
58.Mehran, H., 1995, "Executive Compensation Structure, Ownership and Firm Performance", Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 38, pp.163-184.
59.Morck, R., Shleifer A., and Vishny R.W., 1988, "Management Ownership and Marketing Valuation", Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 20, pp.293-315.
60.Oswald, S., and Jahera J., 1991, "The influence of ownership on performance: Anempirical study", Strategic Management Journal, vol.12, pp.321-326.
61.Partha S., 1998, "Corporate Disclosure Quality and the Cost of Debt", The Accounting Review, vol.73, pp.459-474.
62.Patton, A. and Baker J.C., 1987, "Why won''t directors rock the boat?", Harvard Business Review, vol.65, pp.10-18.
63.Rechner P. L., 1989, "Corporate Governance: Fact or Fiction", Business Horizons, vol.32, pp.11-15.
64.Sengupta, P., 1998, "Corporate disclosure quality and the cost of debt", The Accounting Review, vol. 73, pp. 459-474, October.
65.Shleifer, A., and Vishny R., 1997, "A Survey of Corporate Governance", Journal of Financial Economics, vol.52, pp.737-783.
66.Singhvi S., and Desai H., 1971, "An empirical analysis of the quality of corporate financial disclosure", The Accounting Review, vol.46, pp.129-138.
67.Stulz, R. M., 1999, "Globalization of Equity Markets and the Cost of Capital", Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, vol.12, pp.8-25.
68.Titman, S., and Trueman B., 1986, "Information Quality and the Offerings Common Stock", Journal of Accounting and Economics, vol.8, pp.159-172.
69.Verrecchia R. E., 1983, "Discretionary disclosure", Journal of Accounting and Economics, vol.5, pp.179-194.
70.Walsh J. P., and Seward J. K., 1990, "On the Efficiency of Internal and External Corporate Control Mechanisms", Academy of Management Review, vol.15, pp.421-458.
71.Welker, M, 1995, "Disclosure policy, information asymmetry, and liquidity in equity market", Contemporary Accounting Research, vol. 11, pp.801-828.
72.World Bank, 2000, Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries, Washington. DC, USA.
73.Yermack D., 1996, "Higher Market Valuation of Companies with a Small Board of Directors", Journal of Financial Economics, vol.40, pp.185-211.
74.OECD網站http://www.oecd.org/
75.全國法規資料庫http://law.moj.gov.tw/
76.自由時報電子報http://www.libertytimes.com.tw/2012/new/may/16/today-e6.htm
77.聯合理財網http://udn.com/NEWS/FINANCE/FIN3/7095416.shtml
QRCODE
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
第一頁 上一頁 下一頁 最後一頁 top
1. 4. 李建然,周俊德,2002,"管理當局信譽與自願性盈餘預測資訊內涵關係之研究",會計評論,34期,頁77~99,1月。
2. 5. 李馨蘋,莊宗憲,2007,"公司治理機制與公司績效之實證研究",東吳經濟商學學報,57期,頁1~27,6月。
3. 6. 杜玉振,黃荃,林容竹,2002,"董事會特性對經營績效、財務決策之影響研究-以台灣上市公司為例",管理與系統,9卷,3期,頁345~368。
4. 7. 周建新,林宗得,2005,"資訊透明度對企業價值增額解釋能力之研究",會計與公司治理,2卷,2期,頁25~46,12月。
5. 11. 林淑莉,2004,"管理當局盈餘預測態度與自願性盈餘預測資訊內涵的關
6. 12. 林穎芬,劉維琪,2003, "從高階主管薪酬的研究探討代理理論在台灣的適用程度",管理學報,20卷,2期,頁365~395。
7. 16. 張瑞當,方俊儒,朱正雄,2007,"代理成本對自願性盈餘預測揭露之影
8. 17. 許美滿,吳壽山,鍾惠民,林怡群,2004,"控制股東代理問題對公司價值之影響與舉債之監督效果分析",會計與公司治理,1卷,2期,頁67~90,12月。
9. 18. 陳瑞斌,許崇源,2007,"公司治理結構與資訊揭露之關聯性研究",交大管理學報,27卷,2期,頁55~109。
10. 21. 葉銀華,邱顯比,1996,"資本結構、股權結構與公司價值關聯性之實證研究:代理成本理論",台大管理論叢,7卷,2期,頁57~90。
11. 24. 廖秀梅,李建然,吳祥華,2006,"董事會結構特性與公司績效關係之研究─兼論台灣家族控制企業因素之影響",東吳經濟商學學報,54 期,頁117~160。
12. 25. 劉啟群,陳建樺,1998,"上市公司管理當局自願性盈餘預測揭露及揭露時點之影響因素-台灣地區之實證分析",中國財務學刊,6卷,1期,頁1~43。