臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究主要在探討高階管理團隊異動與財務報表重編之間的關聯性。以台灣上市公司為研究樣本，藉由探討高階管理團隊異動，來檢視財務報表品質之良窳(有無重編/重編原因與次數)。本研究先以logit regression驗證異動與有無重編之間關聯性，其結果顯示總經理和會計主管異動與有無重編為顯著的。並再將財務報表重編原因與次數，以ordinal regression進行驗證。而至於重編原因，則依據相關規範並參酌Bonner et al. (1998)將財務報表舞弊之型態區分為12種，將其重編原因區分成︰(1)損益表項目、(2)流動資產或負債科目、(3)長期資產或負債科目及(4)其他。其實證結果分別顯示為︰高階管理團隊異動與重編原因為正向顯著關係，而於重編次數則不顯著。

依上述之結果，當財務報表發生重編即表示該財務報表有重大性錯誤，高階管理團隊就應為此不實財務報導承擔起責任，既為更換。

In this paper that top management team turnover and financial statements restatements. First, we are to measured association between top manager turnover and the restatements by logit regression. We find significant association that CEO and CFO with restatements. Second, that will divides into the restatements reason area (1) income statement items; (2) current assets or liabilities; (3) long-term assets or liabilities; (4) other to used by Bonner et al. (1998) and in accordance with GAAP, that measure the restatements reason and times with top manager turnover by ordinal regression. We find significant association that the top management team turnover and financial statements restatements reason, but insignificant different with restatements times.

On above description result, show material mistake that as announcements for restating firms. The top management team should bear responsibility for this not fair financial report, that is turnover.

中文摘要 I
英文摘要 II
目 錄 III
圖 表 目 錄 V
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的與問題 6
第三節 論文流程 7
第四節 論文架構 8
第二章 文獻探討與假說發展 9
第一節 高階管理團隊異動 9
第二節 財務報表重編 11
第三節 公司治理機制 13
一、公司治理之意函 13
二、董事會職能與結構 14
三、監察人或審計委員會監督能力 14
四、資訊揭露和透明度 15
五、其他治理機制 15
第四節 相關文獻 16
一、經理人異動與財務報表重編 16
二、公司治理機制與財務表重編 18
第三章 研究方法 20
第一節 資料來源及研究架構 20
第二節 變數定義與衡量方式 22
一、依變數 22
二、預測變數 22
三、公司治理環境控制變數 23
第三節 實證方法 26
一、敘述性統計 26
二、相關性分析 26
三、樣本差異性t檢定與Mann-Whitney U(M-WU)檢定 27
四、邏輯斯迴歸分析與次序邏輯斯迴歸分析 27
第四章 實證結果與分析 30
第一節 敘述性統計分析 30
一、敘述性統計 30
二、相關係數分析 32
第二節 差異性分析與M-W U檢定 33
第三節 邏輯斯迴歸與次序邏輯斯迴歸分析 35
第五章 結論與建議 39
一、結論 39
二、貢獻與建議 40
參考文獻 41


圖 表 目 錄
圖一 研究流程圖 7
圖二 研究架構圖 21

表 1 敘述性統計量彙整表 31
表 2 Pearson 相關係數矩陣 32
表 3 差異性檢定 33
表 4 Mann-Whitney U檢定 34
表 5 二元變項邏輯斯迴歸模型實證分析 36
表 6 重編次數與原因敘述性統計量彙整表 38
表 7 次序邏輯斯迴歸模型實證分析 38

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