臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本文建構一理論模型探討有關國營企業的民營化問題。本文發現：當政府沒有辦法藉由監督或是營運的機制阻止經理人在民營化前的掏空行為，則將企業以管理層收購的方式民營化會比以拍賣的方式得到更高的賣價。當政府可以藉由營運的機制阻止經理人的掏空行為，則採用拍賣和管理層收購的方式將無差異。但是當政府訂定管理層收購的價格不具效率時，則採用拍賣可能會比管理層收購的方式得到較高的賣價。
在民營化的討論中，國營企業的經營效率總是比民營企業低。將國營企業民營化確實可以改善經營的效率，但是民營化的過程會遇到經理人掏空企業的代理問題。如果掏空行為的代理問題過於嚴重，民營企業所帶來的經營效率將會被掏空行為所帶來的無謂損失抵銷掉，因此國營企業是否需要民營化必須考慮政府處理民營化的過程是否同樣不具效率。本文認為，只有當經營效率與民營化效率都被確實考量後，執行民營化才能真正發揮民營企業所能帶來的正面功能。

This thesis studies the topics related to the state-owned enterprises and the privatization of the state-owned enterprises. It discovers first that, when the government cannot prevent the manager from hollowing out the assets of the enterprises before the privatization by the mechanism of surveillance or operation, the way of privatization by management buy-out compared to auction will obtain a higher selling price. Second, when the government may prevent the manager from hollowing out the assets of the enterprise by the mechanism of operation, the way of privatization by management buy-out and auction will be indifferent. Finally, when the government is inefficient of deciding the price of the management buy-out, the way of privatization by auction compared to management buy-out will obtain a higher selling price.
In the discussion of privatization, the operation of the state-owned enterprises is thought of much more inefficient than the private-owned ones. The privatization of the state-owned enterprises may effectively improve the operating efficiency, but the process of privatization may run into the agency problem of the manager hollowing out the assets of the enterprises. If the problem of the hollowing out the assets is too serious, it will eliminate the operating efficiency of the private-owned enterprises. Therefore to decide whether the state-owned enterprises need to be privatized, it must be considered if the process of privatization in government is efficient. This thesis finds, only after the operating efficiency and the privatization efficiency are all taken into account, the privatization can show the advantage which the private-owned enterprises can bring.

謝辭 i
中文摘要 ii
英文摘要 iii
目錄 iv
圖目錄 v
第一章、前言 1
第二章、基本模型 5
第一節、民營企業經營模式 5
第二節、國營企業經營模式 7
第三節、民營化過程 8
第三章、模型分析 11
第一節、民營企業經營模式的均衡 11
第二節、國營企業經營模式的均衡 13
第三節、經理人只需決定是否掏空企業 17
第四節、經理人決定是否掏空企業後尚需決定努力程度 23
第四章、模型的延伸 31
第一節、政府具有調整薪資的權力 31
第二節、政府在管理層收購下的定價不具效率 33
第三節、政府是否應該將企業民營化 34
第五章、結論 38
參考文獻 40
附錄 43

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