臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

近年來，由於財務報表舞弊案件頻傳，財會主管在公司中所扮演的角色也開始受到關注。政府與相關機構也開始立法規範財會主管之相關法律責任與懲處規範。財會主管負責公司財務報表編製之工作，其最瞭解公司內部財務資訊。因此，本研究探討在財會主管異動前後，財會主管是否運用其財務報導的裁決權操縱盈餘以獲取私利，並分析不同的異動原因是否也會影響財會主管操控異常應計數之情形。
本研究以2000至2005上市櫃公司為樣本，其中財會主管有異動之公司為381筆，財會主管未異動之公司為2,946筆，總樣本數為3,327筆，本研究以此兩組樣本比較其異常應計數之變化。另外，並進一步區分不同財會主管異動原因為離職、晉升與退休，再探討不同異動原因其對於異常應計數變動幅度的影響是否有所不同。
本研究結果發現，在未區分財會主管異動原因情況下，發現財會主管有異動之公司，其異常應計數減少之幅度與財會主管未異動之公司未有顯著差異。進一步區分財會主管異動原因後，財會主管晉升後其異常應計數變動量有顯著向下減少，但其餘異動原因其異常應計數變動量減少幅度與財會主管未異動之公司無顯著差異。

The role of CFO in the corporate has gained the attentions from academia and regulations because of the fraudulent financial reporting in recent years. CFO is one of the top management in corporations and is responsible for the function of financial reporting. Therefore, in addition to the knowledge about firm’s operations, CFO has discretionary power given by accounting standards over financial reporting. This study investigates whether CFOs use their discretionary power to benefit themselves on the events of CFO turnover.
The sample includes all listed firms in Taiwan over 2000 to 2005, and consists of 381 CFO turnover events, and 2,946 non-CFO turnover events. This study compares the change of abnormal accruals between turnover and non-turnover observations around the year of turnover. In addition, this study further classified the reasons for CFO turnover into dismal, promotion, retire, and categories.
The results show that, the change of abnormal accruals has no difference between turnover and non-turnover observations when the reasons for CFO turnover are not further classified. Once the reasons for turnover are controlled, the change of abnormal accruals reduces significantly after CFO promotion. However, the reduction is not observed in other categories.

目錄
謝　辭 .................................................I
摘　要 .................................................II
Abstract.................................................III
目錄 .................................................IV
圖目次 .................................................V
表目次 .................................................VI

第壹章 緒論 .........................................1
第一節 研究背景與動機.......................................1
第二節 研究目的 .........................................2
第三節 論文架構 .........................................4
第貳章 文獻探討 .........................................6
第一節 高階主管異動與公司經營績效............................6
第二節 盈餘管理 .........................................8
第三節 高階主管異動與盈餘管理之關聯...........................10
第參章 研究方法與設計.......................................13
第一節 研究假說 .........................................13
第二節 研究模型 .........................................15
第三節 變數定義 .........................................17
第四節 研究期間與選樣標準...................................22
第肆章 研究結果與分析.......................................24
第一節 敘述統計量 .........................................24
第二節 多變量分析 .........................................28
第三節 額外測試 .........................................35
第伍章 結論與建議 .........................................45
第一節 研究結論 .........................................45
第二節 研究貢獻 .........................................45
第三節 研究限制與建議...................................... 46
參考文獻 .................................................47

圖目次
圖一 觀念性架構圖 .........................................3
圖二 研究架構圖 .........................................5

表目次
表一 高階主管異動理論.......................................7
表二 高階主管異動對於績效之影響...............................8
表三 高階主管異動原因與盈餘管理動機 .........................12
表四 變數定義與衡量.........................................22
表五 公司財會主管異動原因之分類..............................23
表六 公司財會主管有異動之分佈................................24
表七 樣本敘述統計量 .................................26
表八 相關係數表 .........................................27
表九 財會主管異動與異常應計數之廻歸結果.......................29
表十 區分財會主管異動原因與異常應計數之廻歸結果................33
表十一 財會主管異動前兩年與前三年之廻歸結果....................36
表十二 財會主管異動與異常應計數之廻歸結果......................39
表十三 區分財會主管異動原因與異常應計數之廻歸結果...............42
表十四 公司財會主管異動原因之分類.............................44

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