臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

　　本文以市話網路最適成本模型來估計台灣市話網路的重建成本，並非一般研究所採用的計量成本模型。計量成本模型的時間序列資料本質上是追溯性的，常常需要觀察相對長時間的資料。此資料可能相對於不同的技術時代，因此，成本結構會具有不同的技術特性。應用計量經濟學主要依賴過去，但是對於技術合產業結構發展如此迅速的電信產業，這種方法並不合適。市話網路最適成本模型所計算的成本為前瞻經濟成本其要素投入選擇的彈性較大，更適用於政策建議。實證結果顯示，台灣市話網路具有規模經濟的特性，且市話網路成本和用戶密度成反向關係。可以給政府制定政策作為參考。

　　In this paper, we use the local exchange cost optimization model (LECOM) to estimate the rebuilding costs of Taiwanese local exchange network, but not to use econometric cost models. Time series data on econometric cost models are inherently retrospective. If our goal is to analyze the data-gernerating process that produces significant variations in the cost figures, then we often have to examine relatively long series that correspond to different technological eras, and hence to cost structures with different technological characteristics. Applied econometrics draws heavily on the past and in an industry with such a high speed of evolution of technology and industry structure as the telecommunications industry, such an approach might not be appropriate. In the sections that follow we argue that from a forward-looking perspective, LECOM of the use in this paper may be more suitable for policy advice. The result shows that Taiwanese local exchange network be with economies of scale, and that the costs of Taiwanese local exchange network and user density are the reverse relations.

1 緒論 1
1.1 研究背景 1
1.1.1 電信自由化的潮流 1
1.1.2 固網開放現況 3
1.2 研究動機 5
1.3 研究架構 5

2 文獻回顧 6
2.1 計量成本法 7
2.2 工程經濟學模型（Engineering-economic model） 10
2.3 小結 13

3 研究方法 14
3.1 LECOM模型的建立 14
3.2 構建市話網路成本 23
3.3 最適化過程 24

4 實證結果 25

5 結論 30

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