臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本文係在研究最高行政法院之營利事業所得稅判決是否會因上訴人身分別不同而有不同判決結果，身分別有上訴人為非稽徵機關(法人)、上訴人為非稽徵機關(法人)具政治連結及上訴人聘請訟訴代理人專業背景等三類，本文以2009年至2014年間，司法院法學資料檢索系統中，營利事業所得稅經最高行政法院判決確定者，為研究期間及資料的蒐集。實證結果顯示，上訴人為稽徵機關時，較易獲得有利的判決結果，顯示行政法院和稽徵機關間確實有官官相護之行為，與以往之研究結果相同；上訴人為非稽徵機關(法人)具政治連結時，確實能影響最高行政法院判決結果，首次證實國內的政治連結對租稅行政救濟的影響，也間接證實台灣人民對司法獨立的疑惑，似值司法機關檢討改進。至於上訴人聘請會計師為訟訴代理人時，確實能反應出最高行政法院判決較易獲得有利結果，這代表台灣會計教育的成功，主管機關全面導入國際會計準則並與全球接軌後，應已顯著提升會計專門職業及技術人員的專業水準，這也是本研究首次證實台灣執業會計師對租稅行政救濟的貢獻。

We examine whether Verdicts on the Income Tax of the Supreme Administrative Court are different for the Appellant Characteristics. The Appellant Characteristic include National Taxing Bureau and corporation,corporation with political connection and the professional background of the Litigation Attorney.
The study use the data of Supreme Administrative Court judgment during 2009-2014.The empirical results show when the appellant is National Taxing Bureau, it is easier to achieve victory. It also show the Administrative Court always protect National Taxing Bureau,It was same as the previous literature. When The appellant is corporation with political connection and the litigation attorney is CPAs,it can also gain favorable judgement.It represents the success of Taiwan''s accounting education. As the authorities import IFRSs to compliance with global standards, it should significantly enhance the accounting profession and technical personnel, which is also the first study to examine the contribution of CPAs to tax administrative remedy.

摘要 I
ABSTRACT II
表目次 IV
圖目次 V
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景及動機 1
第二節 研究目的 3
第三節 研究架構 4
第二章 制度探討、文獻回顧與假說建立 5
第一節 制度探討 5
第二節 文獻回顧 7
第三節 假說建立 14
第三章 研究設計 16
第一節 實證迴歸模型 16
第二節 變數定義與衡量 17
第三節 資料來源與樣本選擇 18
第四章 實證結果與分析 21
第一節敘述性統計 21
第二節迴歸結果 26
第三節敏感性分析 29
第伍章結論與建議 31
第一節 結論與限制 31
第二節 貢獻與未來建議 32
參考文獻 33

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