臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

股票購回是近幾年企業經常使用的策略之一，在以往的研究文獻中，都指出股票購回宣告對於公司的股價具有正向的影響，不過管理者與股東之間常常存在資訊不對稱，造成股東很難監督管理者的投資或融資行為；再加上管理者誘因，促使經理人可能會先以自我利益為考量，而犧牲股東權益。本研究主要目的是要證實經理人權力對於股票購回決策是否會產生影響。
本研究以2005至2010年間台灣上市櫃公司之資料為樣本，並用事件研究法進行分析。實證結果顯示：結構性權力對於股票購回策略具有顯著影響，如是否兼任董事長、是否為企業創辦人與是否為董事會董事，對於股票購回之特性較具有影響性。在經理人薪酬部分，則是與股票購回價格特性較有相關性，如價格區間的訂定，並具有顯著負向關係。
本研究所採用的樣本為公司第一次發行股票購回時，實證結果經理人權力指數並沒有大部分都具有影響，所以本研究推論經理人在企業第一次進行股票購回時，可能不是以自利為動機，而是以股票購回宣告來提高被低估的股價，在短期內對公司股價具有正向的影響。

Share repurchase is one of the strategies that firms often use in last few years. Prior research shows that share repurchase announcements are positively related with share price, but there usually exists information asymmetry between firm managers and shareholders. Thus, for shareholders, it is difficult to monitor managers’ investment and financing decisions. In addition, it will sacrifice shareholders'' interest because of management incentive and self-interest consideration. This study is to examine the relationship between CEO power and share repurchase decision.
This study uses the data of the Taiwan listed stocks during 2005-2010. The event study methodology is adopted in this study. The empirical results conclude that, the CEO power has a significant impact on the share repurchase policy. Moreover, whether CEO is the president, whether CEO serves as the founder of the firm, and whether CEO is member of the board, are all significant determinants on share repurchase decisions. Finally, CEO’s pay slice is negatively correlated with stock repurchase price range.
This study only investigates the samples for firm’s share repurchase for the first time. The findings of this study suggest that most CEO power indexes are not significant determinants. So we conclude that, when firm managers adopt the first share repurchase decision, the main reason is to increase the undervalued stock price by share repurchase announcement and thus causes a positive impact on stock price in the short term, instead of self-interest consideration.

摘要 i
Abstract ii
誌謝 iii
目錄 iv
表目錄 v
圖目錄 vi
第一章 緒論 1
1.1 研究背景與動機 1
1.2 研究目的 8
1.3 研究流程 8
第二章 文獻探討 10
2.1 經理人權力對公司績效之影響 10
2.2 股票購回制度之影響 13
2.3 股票購回之動機 15
2.4 小結 19
第三章 研究假說與研究方法 20
3.1 研究假說 20
3.2 研究變數之定義 22
3.3 事件研究法與異常報酬之衡量 23
3.4 控制變數之定義 26
3.5 多元迴歸分析模型 28
第四章 實證結果分析 34
4.1 資料來源 34
4.2 敘述性統計分析 35
4.3 平均與累積異常報酬 38
4.4 相關係數分析 42
4.5 多元迴歸分析 44
一、經理人權力與累積異常報酬 44
二、經理人權力與經營績效 48
三、經理人權力與購回比例 50
四、經理人權力與價格區間 52
五、經理人權力與購回價格 54
第五章 結論 56
參考文獻 58
附錄一 65

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