臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

公司管理階層與投資者之代理問題，使的高審計品質之需求更顯重要。影響審計品質的因素很多，除了查核人員本身學識經驗是否足夠之外，更可能因為會計師本身獨立性與否而影響審計品質。本研究以裁決性應計數衡量審計品質，並探討受查公司更換會計師事務所前後，對於審計品質的影響，是否會因為審計公費下降而不同。實證結果發現當公司的查核會計師事務所，從大型事務所更換至另一大型事務所時，不管審計公費是否下降，其審計品質均變得更差。因此，從大型會計師事務所更換另一大型會計師事務所，對審計品質的影響，並不會因為審計公費是否下降而不同。至於從大型會計師事務所更換至非大型會計師事務所時，當審計公費下降，審計品質並未變得更差，僅有當審計公費未下降時，審計品質會變得更差。進一步檢驗也未發現從大型會計師事務所更換至非大型會計師事務所時，對審計品質的影響，會因為審計公費是否下降而不同。

The agency problem between management and investor makes high audit quality more important. There are several factors influencing audit quality including auditors’ auditing knowledge, experience and independence. This study adopts discretionary accruals to proxy audit quality and investigates whether the effect of switching audit firms on audit quality is different or not when audit fee is reduced. Empirical results indicate that the audit quality is impaired no matter whether audit fee is reduced or not after company switches to big audit firm from another big audit firm. Thus the effect of switching to big audit firm from another big audit firm on audit quality is the same no matter whether the audit fee is reduced or not. In addition, the audit quality is not impaired when switching to non-big audit firm from big audit firm even audit fee is reduced. However, the audit quality is lower when switching to non-big audit firm from big audit firm accompanied by the same audit fee. Furthermore, there is still no evidence that the effect of switching to non-big audit firm from big audit firm on audit quality is different no matter whether the audit fee is reduced or not.

中文摘要………………………………………………………………………………….i
英文摘要…………………………………………………………………………………ii
致謝詞…………………………………………………………………………………..iii
目錄…………………………………………………………………………………….iv
圖目次……………………………………………………………………………………vi
表目次……………………………………………………………………………………vii
第一章 緒論…………………………………………………………………………...1
第一節 研究背景與動機……………………………………………….1
第二節 研究目的…………………………………………………………….3
第三節 研究架構…………………………………………………………….4
第二章 文獻探討與假說發展………………………………………………………...6
第一節 審計品質……………………………………………………………6
第二節 更換會計師事務所對於審計品質之影響………………………….8
第三節 更換會計師事務所對審計品質的影響-審計公費降低之效果.10
第三章 研究方法……………………………………………………………………..14
第一節 實證模型…………………………………………………………...14
第二節 變數定義…………………………………………………………...16
第三節 樣本選取…………………………………………………………...19
第四章 實證結果……………………………………………………………………..22
第一節 敘述性統計………………………………………………………….22
第二節 多元回歸分析……………………………………………………….25
第三節 敏感性測試………………………………………………………….35
第五章 結論與建議…………………………………………………………………..40
第一節 結論與建議……………………………………………………........40
第二節 研究建議與限制……………………………………………………41
參考文獻…………………………………………………………………………………..42

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