臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

中國自 1997 年開始中國共產黨提出十五大從戰略上調整經濟布局和改組國有
企業，目的是為了讓國有企業逐步退出控股股東的腳色，上市公司多由國有企業改
制而來。審計意見是投資人對於一家公司一個重要參考的依據，而中國在 2006 年
修改了對於關聯交易揭露的要求，並在 2007 年實施，故本文想探討在會計準則變
動後，上市公司之關聯方交易是否會對於其公司財務報表之審計意見造成影響。故
本論文對 2009 年到 2017 年中國上市 A 股企業做分析，藉由觀察關聯方交易行為
是否會影響到會計師事務所出具審計意見，再針對不同財務指標及公司治理變數
作細分，藉由迴歸分析的結果去觀察關聯方交易行為是否會影響到會計師事務所
出具審計意見之影響。本研究之目的在於公司採用關聯方交易的目的是為了節省
成本還是掏空公司。
而本論文主要的結果分為三部分：
一、關聯方交易會影響會計師事務所所出具之審計意見。
二、關聯方交易之類型影響審計意見的效果也不同，依類型區分可分成商品、資產、
資金共三類，依交易方向可分為買入及賣出兩類，揭露數量最多的是商品類，其次
為資金類，最後是資產類，而影響效果最高的類型屬於資金類，則影響效果較好的
交易方向是銷售，故最容易被發現且被會計師事務所出具修正式審計意見是關聯
方資金貸入，其次為關聯方商品銷售、關聯方資產銷售與關聯方資金借出，從這可
以發現不良的關聯方交易會先選擇交易類型，其次才是關聯方交易方向。
三、本研究發現加入不同的調節變數，所得之效果也不相同，當兩權分離度越高的公司可採用操作的手法多元，故兩權分離度會弱化其效果；而負債比率越高的公司，
越容易透過關聯方交易來操作，故會強化其效果；以前十二大會計事務所查核之公
司作為區別，可以發現前十二大會計事務所所出具之審計意見較具有公信力及其
專業性，較容易將不良之關聯交易揭露出來，因此前十二大會計事務所所出具之審
計意見能強化其效果；當公司是國有公司或私有公司時，可以發現國有公司較容易
被會計師發現，反而私人公司較善於藏匿，會計師不易察覺；獨立董事比率越高容
易產生修正式審計意見，表示獨立董事在對於關聯方交易並無法發揮獨立監督之
腳色；而不論控制股東質押比率高或低的公司，公司在採用關聯方交易皆容易被會
計師出具修正式審計意見。

Since 1997, the Chinese Communist Party has proposed that the 15th National Congress should strategically adjust the economic layout and reorganize state-owned enterprises. The purpose is to allow state-owned enterprises to gradually withdraw from the controlling shareholder's role. Listed companies are mostly reformed by state-owned enterprises. The audit opinion is the basis for an investor's important reference to a company. In 2006, China revised the requirements for the disclosure of related party transactions and implemented it in 2007. Therefore, this paper would like to discuss after the changes in accounting standards, whether the related party transactions will affect the audit opinion of the company's financial statements. Therefore, this paper analyzes China's listed A-share companies from 2009 to 2017, by observing whether the related party transactions will affect the accounting firm's audit opinion, and then we segment different financial indicators and corporate governance variables by regression. The results of the analysis are to observe whether the related party trading behavior will affect the impact of the auditing opinions issued by the accounting firm. The purpose of this study is to find out the related party transactions will save costs or hollow out the company.
The main results of this paper are divided into three parts:
1. The related party transaction will affect the audit opinion issued by the accounting firm.
2. The types of related party transactions affect the effectiveness of audit opinions, according to the type can be divided into three categories of goods, assets, funds, according to the direction of the transaction can be divided into two categories of buying and selling, the most exposed is the commodity category Secondly, the capital category, and finally the asset class, and the type with the highest impact effect belongs to the capital category. The transaction direction that affects the better effect is sales, so it is the easiest to be discovered and the audited opinion issued by the accounting firm is the related party. Capital lending, followed by related party commodity sales, related party asset sales and related party fund lending, from which it can be found that bad related party transactions will first select the transaction type, followed by the related party transaction direction.
3. This study finds that adding different adjustment variables, the effect is not the same, when the higher the separation of the two powers, the operation method can be diversified, so the separation of the two powers will weaken its effect; and the higher the debt ratio The easier it is for a company to operate through related party transactions, so it will strengthen its effectiveness. The previous 12 major accounting firms have checked the company as a difference, and can find that the audit opinions issued by the top 12 accounting firms are more credible and professional. Sex, it is easier to expose bad related transactions, so the audit opinions issued by the top 12 accounting firms can enhance their effectiveness; when the company is a state-owned company or a private company, it can be found that state-owned companies are more likely to be discovered by accountants. On the contrary, private companies are better at hiding, and accountants are less likely to be aware; the higher the ratio of independent directors, the more likely it is to produce a revised audit opinion, indicating that independent directors are unable to exercise independent supervision in dealing with related parties; regardless of whether the controlling shareholder pledge ratio is high or low. The company, the company is easy to be issued a revised audit by the accountant in the use of related party transactions.

致謝辭 I
摘要 II
Abstract IV
第壹章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景 1
第二節 研究目的 4
第三節 研究流程 5
第貳章 文獻探討與假說建立 7
第一節 中國市場審計之沿革及規範 7
第二節 關聯方交易之簡介 7
一、中國關聯方交易的揭露要求 8
二、中國關聯方交易的類型 8
第三節 關聯方交易之相關文獻 9
第四節 研究假說 11
第參章 研究方法 14
第一節 樣本與資料 14
第二節 研究架構 15
第三節 變數定義 16
一、應變數： 16
二、自變數： 16
三、控制變數 18
第四節 研究模型 22
第肆章 實證結果及分析 25
第一節 敘述性統計 25
第二節 相關係數分析 27
第三節 迴歸分析 31
第伍章 結論與建議 48
參考文獻 50

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