臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

近年來企業舞弊頻傳，使得監督機制有效性格外受到投資人、實務界與學術界的重視。本研究旨在探討(1)企業面臨盈餘衰退的情況下，管理當局是否會透過盈餘管理提昇本期盈餘。(2)企業面臨盈餘衰退的情況下，外部大股東的存在是否能有效監督管理當局。本研究主要以台灣經濟新報資料庫2003年至2005年上市上櫃公司為研究樣本，以產業別橫斷面Modified Jones Model計算裁決性應計項目衡量管理當局盈餘管理的情形。實證顯示，(1)當企業面臨盈餘衰退的情況下，經理人會傾向透過盈餘管理的方式向上操弄盈餘，亦即，企業盈餘之表現與裁決性應計項目呈正相關。(2)當企業面臨盈餘衰退的情況下，外部大股東的存在與裁決性應計項目呈正相關。代表著在不違反一般公認會計原則下，當企業面臨盈餘衰退的情況下，外部大股東的存在仍無法有效監督管理當局。

The reports of business fraud keep pouring in recent year. The monitoring mechanisms become more important. This research examines two views concerning the effect of outside blockholders on earnings management. First, if managers of firms with declining premanaged earnings manage earnings upward. Second, if the existence of outside blockholders would alleviate managers’ earnings management to hide declining premanaged earnings. This research test the two views by examining the association between outside blockholders and earnings management for TEJ firms from 2003 to 2005. Results indicate that the managers of firms with declining premanaged earnings will manage earnings upward, and also found outside block-holders ownership is positively associated with discretionary accruals for firm that face declining premanaged earnings.

內容目錄
中文摘要　．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． iii
英文摘要　．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． iv
誌謝辭　　．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． v
內容目錄　．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． vi
表目錄　　．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． viii
圖目錄　　．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． ix
第一章　　緒論．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 1
　　第一節　　研究動機與目的．．．．．．．．．．． 1
　　第二節　　研究問題．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 4
　　第三節　　論文架構及流程．．．．．．．．．．． 4
第二章　　文獻探討．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 7
　　第一節　　盈餘管理相關文獻探討．．．．．．．． 7
　　第二節　　外部大股東相關文獻探討．．．．．．． 21
第三章　　研究設計．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 26
　　第一節　　研究架構．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 26
　　第二節　　研究假說的建立．．．．．．．．．．． 27
　　第三節　　變數定義與衡量．．．．．．．．．．． 30
　　第四節　　實證模型．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 36
　　第五節　　樣本選取與資料來源．．．．．．．．． 36
　　第六節　　統計分析方法．．．．．．．．．．．． 38
第四章　　實證結果分析．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 40
　　第一節　　敘述性統計分析．．．．．．．．．．． 40
　　第二節　　相關係數分析．．．．．．．．．．．． 41
　　第三節　　複廻歸實證結果與分析．．．．．．．． 42
　　第四節　　單變量分析．．．．．．．．．．．．． 43
第五章　　結論與建議．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 45
　　第一節　　研究結論．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 45
　　第二節　　研究限制與建議．．．．．．．．．．． 46
參考文獻　．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 47

表 目 錄
表 2- 1 舞弊與盈餘管理的區別．．．．．．．．．．． 8
表 2- 2 盈餘管理工具之彙總表．．．．．．．．．．． 16
表 3- 1 本研究樣本數．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 38
表 3- 2 資料來源．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 38
表 4- 1 變數敘述統計量．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 40
表 4- 2 相關係數矩陣．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 41
表 4- 3 盈餘管理門檻誘因與裁決性應計項目之廻歸結果 42
表 4- 4 盈餘績效門檻、外部大股東與裁決性應計項目之二因子變異數分析摘要 表．．．．．．．．．． 43
表 4- 5 二因子變異數分析之細格平均數．．．．．．． 44

圖 目 錄
圖 1- 1 研究流程圖．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 6
圖 3- 1 當期盈餘績效與盈餘管理．．．．．．．．．． 26
圖 3- 2 外部大股東與盈餘管理之關聯性．．．．．．． 27

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