臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

This paper examines relationship of related party transaction on managerial ownership and corporate governance mechanism. Using 91 publicly traded Indonesia firms during 2004-2006. Data were collected from Indonesian Capital Market data (ICMD), firm annual report and financial statement which are published in Indonesia Stock Exchange official website. Regression method and SAS software helped us examine relationship of related party transaction (dependent variable) on managerial ownership and corporate governance mechanism (independent variables).
Our results show that managerial ownership is negatively correlated to related party transaction especially for firms which is the managers hold ownership above 3% in that company. For corporate governance mechanism, our results show that only number of the directors in the board variable has positive relationship with related party transaction. The remaining corporate governance mechanism variables show not statistically significant result with negative coefficient. Our findings remind principal that the manager will be work more effective when their ownership is high

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS III
ABSTRACT IV
TABLE OF CONTENTS V
LIST OF TABLES VII
CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION 1
1.1 Research Background. 1
1.2 Research Objectives. 3
1.3 Research Contribution. 3
1.4 Structure of Research. 3
CHAPTER TWO LITERATURE REVIEW 5
2.1 Prior Literature and Hypotheses. 5
2.1.1 Agency Theory and Managerial Ownership. 5
2.1.2 Board of Directors and Independence of Board of Directors. 7
2.1.3 Audit Committee and Independence of Audit Committee. 9
2.2 Corporate Governance in Indonesia. 9
2.3 Related Party Transaction Background. 11
CHAPTER THREE RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 14
3.1 Data Source and Sample. 14
3.2 Empirical Methodology. 15
3.2.1 Regression Equation of Related Party Transaction on Managerial Ownership. 16
3.2.2 Regression Equation of Related Party Transaction on Managerial Ownership for Two Groups. 17
3.2.3 Regression Equation of Related Party Transaction on Corporate Governance Mechanism. 17
3.2.4 Regression Equation of Related Party Transaction Multiplied by Dummy Variable on Corporate Governance Mechanism. 19
CHAPTER FOUR RESEARCH RESULTS 21
4.1 Sample Description and Characteristics. 21
4.2 Regression Result. 25
4.2.1 Related party transaction and managerial ownership. 25
4.2.2 Related Party Transaction and Managerial Ownership and Corporate Governance Mechanism. 27
CHAPTER FIVE CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS 31
5.1 Conclusion. 31
5.2 Limitation. 32
5.3 Future Research. 32
REFERENCES 34

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