臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

自亞洲金融風暴後，發生一連串重大的財務弊案(如美國安隆、臺灣博達)，使得國際間開始重視公司治理的議題，而公司治理的其中一項重點即為資訊揭露的透明度。此外，由於臺灣上市公司多為家族控制的型態，家族成員普遍有高持股比率、位居管理階層的情況(擔任董事或高階管理者)，因此本研究以家族持股、家族參與以及家族管理為主軸，同時探討此三種家族變數是否會影響公司資訊揭露的程度。
本文以2006至2009年663家臺灣上市公司為研究對象，實證結果發現家族持股對公司的資訊揭露程度呈顯著正相關，當家族成員持股比率愈高，則會揭露較多的資訊，以避免傷害公司的聲譽或股票價值；家族參與對資訊揭露為顯著負相關，當董事會存在愈多的家族成員，其會為了避免外部干預決策，或基於剝削外部小股東的理由，而降低內部資訊的揭露；家族管理對資訊揭露亦呈現顯著負相關，因家族管理者可能為隱瞞侵占非家族股東財富的事實，或基於公司競爭優勢的考量，而較不願揭露太多的資訊。

After the Asian financial crisis, the many financial scandals occurred (such as, the United States of Enron, and the Taiwan of Bardon), that let governments and international organizations to pay attention to corporate governance. And the information disclosure is important for corporate governance. In addition, family firms are an important organization type at listed companies in Taiwan. So we propose three characteristics to begin our study with the question whether the family ownership, family involvement and family management will effects that information disclosure. Our sample consists of 1867 firm-years from 663 listed companies in Taiwan. Empirical results show that family ownership is significantly and positively associated with information disclosure, while the family involvement and the family management are significantly and negatively related to information disclosure.

中文摘要 i
英文摘要 ii
致謝 iii
目錄 iv
表目錄 vi
圖目錄 vii
第壹章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景和動機 1
第二節 研究目的 3
第三節 研究流程 4
第貳章 文獻探討與假說 6
第一節 公司治理 6
第二節 臺灣公司治理發展現況 7
第三節 資訊揭露 9
第四節 家族特性與資訊揭露 12
第參章 研究方法 17
第一節 樣本描述與資料來源 17
第二節 變數定義與衡量 18
第三節 實證模型 24
第肆章 實證結果分析 25
第一節 敘述性統計分析 25
第二節 相關係數分析 27
第三節 迴歸模型實證分析 30
第伍章 結論 32
第一節 結論 32
第二節 研究貢獻 34
第三節 管理意涵 35
第四節 研究限制與建議 37
參考文獻 38

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