臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

隨著台灣市場競爭日益激烈，國際市場不斷開放，企業經營已進入了微利時代，因此公司為了生存不斷地採行多角化活動，但過去文獻卻指出多角化企業中存在著代理成本等因素而導致多角化折價的現象。又近來年不斷有企業弊案爆發，代理成本對企業的衝擊已浮出檯面，引發各界對公司治理的探討，故本文將據此為出發點，探討企業多角化與代理成本和公司治理的關係。
故在本研究中將分別採用Berger and Ofek(1995)之超額價值與資產報酬率來驗證多角化對公司價值的影響。在確認多角化活動對企業價值有負面的影響後，本文進一步探討代理成本與公司治理是否為多角化企業績效不彰、價值減損的主因，進而並提出解決多角化企業績效不彰的解決方法。
實證顯示，部門多角化企業在超額價值與資產報酬率均分別比單一部門企業低4.44%和2.04%，且此現象會隨著多角化程度愈大則愈明顯，意即部門多角化活動會降低企業價值。而在地理多角化方面，實證則發現地理多角化企業在超額價值與資產報酬率均比當地國(domestic)企業來的高，意即地理多角化將可以創造公司價值。故本文將進一步探討部門多角化折價的主因並試圖提出解決方法。
在代理成本方面，本文發現不論是在現金流量的代理成本、管理誘因代理成本和負債的代理成本上，多角化企業在上述三種代理成本上比起單一部門企業來的嚴重，且其中以管理誘因代理問題更為明顯，亦即多角化企業管理者在進行決策之際，往往會有自利(self-interest)的情形發生，因此在決策時通常不會以公司價值極大為依歸，進而做出無效率的決策並對公司價值有負面的影響，因此本文發現代理成本乃是多角化折價的原因之一。
在公司治理評等方面，首先在股權結構變數上，部門多角化企業在總經理持股率、大股東持股率和董(監)事會持股率均比單一部門企業來的低，意即當多角化企業的經理人做出不利於公司的決策時對本身財富的影響較小，且多角化企業的大股東與董(監)會對於經理人監督的能力與意願相對較低，因此總經理在決策時容易產生自利行為進而傷害公司價值。進一步，在全面性的公司治理評等方面，本文發現部門多角化企業之公司治理評等顯著的比單一部門企業差，又實證指出當公司治理不彰將會導致公司績效表現不佳，故本文發現公司治理亦是造成部門多角化折價的主要原因。此外，本文同時發現多角化企業能夠透過改善公司治理來提升公司的價值，且多角化程度愈低，透過公司治理來提升公司超額價值的效果則愈明顯。且本文發現多角化企業可以透過降低最大股東成員擔任董事和監事席位比率、董(監)事質押比率、成立投資公司家數，並提高其他股東擔任監事席位比率、監察人數目等改善企業內部公司治理的方法來解決多角化所導致的績效不彰、價值減損的現象。
綜合以上結果可以看出，部門多角化將導致公司價值下降，其多角化折價的現象主要是來自於多角化企業擁有較大的代理成本和公司治理結構不彰所致。又本文發現多角化企業可以透過改善公司治理來提升公司價值，故公司治理乃是有效解決多角化折價現象的方法，建議多角化企業應該正視公司治理的相關議題。

This study discusses the relationship between corporate diversification, agency cost and corporate governance. First, we examine the effect of diversification type to excess value using Berger & Ofek(1995) procedure and return of asset. To make sure that diversification will result in average valuation discounts. Further, we analyze whether agency cost causes a diversification discount or not. Third, we investigate whether corporate governance structure is different between non-diversified and diversified firms. Finally, we also examine whether diversified firms improve their corporate governance structure solve the situation of value discount or not.
Using a sample of 2560 firm-years between 1994 and 2002, we explore that segment diversification will decrease business value, but geography diversification will increase business value. Further, we find evidence to support that segment diversified firms have more serious agency problem including agency cost of cash flow, managerial incentive, and debt. In addition to, we also use ownership structure and rating system to measure firm’s corporate governance structure. In ownership structure, we find that relative to non-diversified firm, CEOs, block holders, and board of directors in diversified firms have lower stock ownership. Finally, in rating system side we explore that diversified firm enjoys lower corporate governance’s rating. Moreover, we find out that diversified firms can improve business value by corporate governance.
In conclusion, we explore that agency costs and downgrading corporate governance will cause diversified discount. Moreover, we also find that diversified firm urgently requires upgrade of corporate governance to improve this situation.

第壹章 緒論.......................................... 1
第一節 研究背景與動機.............................. 1
第二節 研究目的.................................... 3
第三節 研究流程與論文架構.......................... 4
第貳章 文獻探討...................................... 6
第一節 多角化的定義與衡量.......................... 6
第二節 多角化與公司價值關係之相關文獻..............11
第三節 代理成本理論之探討..........................14
第四節 公司治理相關理論之探討......................17
第參章 研究設計......................................27
第一節 研究假說....................................27
第二節 多角化活動對公司價值之影響..................32
第三節 多角化活動與代理成本的關係..................35
第四節 多角化企業之公司治理........................37
第五節 研究樣本與資料來源..........................43
第六節 研究限制....................................46
第肆章 實證結果與分析................................48
第一節 敘述統計分析................................48
第二節 多角化活動對企業價值的影響..................48
第三節 多角化企業與代理成本的關係..................52
第四節 多角化企業與公司治理的關係..................59
第五節 小結........................................78
第伍章 結論與建議....................................80
第一節 結論........................................80
第二節 建議........................................81
參考文獻..............................................84
附錄..................................................91

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