臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

最近，董監事訴訟案件一直發生，公司裡的董監事及重要職員在執行公務時，可能會因錯誤、疏忽、過失、義務違反、信託違背、不實或誤導性陳述等行為而被其他人提出賠償請求並會有個人法律責任，公司為降低董監事及重要職員的訴訟風險和保障投資人的權益，便替他們投保董監事暨重要職員責任保險 (D&O) 保險) 。
董監事暨重要職員責任險可以吸引學術界與實務界討論外，許多國家也相繼致力在董監事責任險的這部分努力執行，並強制公開知道企業的投保情形；以前，關於董事責任險的研究著重在董事責任險的需求、發展與未來展望，至於企業價值或資訊揭露程度是否因董事責任險保險而改變，倒是文獻很少接觸討論的議題，臺灣證交所要求上市公司在2008年底要將公司的董監事責任險投保情形公開揭露，使公司治理資訊透明化，此研究計畫擬利用我國2009年至2014年之上市公司為研究對象，藉由較完整的財務及會計資訊，周延性探討董事責任險、資訊透明度以及公司價值的關聯性。
公司投保董事責任險對董監事暨重要職員具有激勵誘因的效果，除了能使董監事謹慎經營管理公司，來提升公司的資訊透明度，而且能抑制公司發生舞弊的可能性，進而提昇公司價值。
此研究計畫具有重要政策與投資意涵，除了提供強制要求上市櫃公司需要揭露董事責任險資訊的政策妥適性參考外，也肯定主管機關要求上市櫃投保狀態辨視企業優劣的決策參考。

Recently, the litigations related to the directors and supervisors in Taiwan’s companies have constantly occurred. The directors, supervisors and key staff may be requested compensation because of executing certain behaviors on duty such as mistake making, negligence, breach of duty, trust breach, and unreliable or misunderstanding statements. Further, these behaviors could even result in personal legal responsibility. In order to reduce the litigation risk for directors, supervisors and key staff, and protect the rights of investors, the companies insure Director’s and Officers’ Liability Insurance (D&O) for them.
Director’s and Officers’ Liability Insurance not only attracts the members in the academic and practical fields, but also makes many countries to promote the implementation of D&O, and even more to force the enterprises to disclose their insurances. In the past, the research on D&O focused on needs, development and future prospects of D&O.Whether the corporate value or the extend of information disclosure changed due to D&O is a topic which is rarely touched upon. Taiwan Stock Exchange asks the listed companies to disclose and declare their D&O coverage at the end of 2008 in order to strengthen corporate governance information disclosure. This research plan intends to regard Taiwan’s listed companies in 2009-2014 as research objects. It aims to discuss the relationship among D&O, information closure and corporate value with the complete financial and accounting information.
A company insuring D&O has incentive effect towards the directors, supervisors and key staff. It can not only force the directors and superviors to prudently manage the company for the sake of enhancing the company’s information transparency, but also inhibit the possibility of fraud and thereby promote the corporate value.
This research plan provides important policies and investment implications. In addition to providing policy appropriateness about forcing listed companies to disclose the information of D&O, it affirms the policy appropriateness that the competent authority asks the listed companies to declare D&O. Moreover, this research plan benefits the investors to distinguish the strengths and the weaknesses of a company through examining the state of enterprise insurance.

目錄I
表目錄II
圖目錄III
第一章 緒論1
第一節 研究動機與目的1
第二節 研究流程6
第二章 文獻探討7
第一節 董監事暨重要職員責任保險之相關文獻7
第二節 董監事責任險研究假說13
第三章 研究方法18
第一節 資料來源與研究範圍18
第二節 變數定義與實證模型18
第四章 實證結果分析25
第一節 樣本敘述統計量25
第二節 相關係數分析27
第三節 實證結果31
第五章 結論與建議33
文獻參考34
附錄44
表目錄
表4-1樣本敘述統計量26
表4-2 2009年至2014年相關係數分析28
表4-3 2009年至2014年相關係數分析29
表4-4 2009年至2014年相關係數分析總表30
表4-5實證結果2009年至2014年32
圖目錄
圖1-1 公司及董監事可能遭受賠償請求之訟源2
圖1-2 研究流程6
圖2-1 公司及董監事可能遭受賠償請求之法令9
圖2-2 觀念性架構 (Conceptual Framework) 17

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