臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本論文可粗分為兩部分。第一部（1, 2 章）呈現從1922到1974年間（Tariff Commission），以及1974到2006年間（USITC，本文討論重點）「337條款」所簽發之禁止進口令之歷史與法理的演變。本論文發現美國貿易夥伴透過GATT的法律管道，加上總統體制內的政治壓力，以及國會，迫使USITC透過行政機關制定規則的途徑，演變出一種新型的禁止進口令。第二部（3, 4 章）使用統計學分析支持USITC簽發GEO或是LEO的事實與法理基礎，用以檢定某些因素如何影響USITC的決策。本論文（預設USITC並非獨立於一切影響而運作）利用統計方法檢定法律條文外的因素是否影響USITC的決策過程（見1.1.2節）。本論文同時發現，偏差在USITC的決策過程中並不扮演統計學上顯著的角色。這段建構337條款法律體系的歷史演變，產生了能夠在國際貿易之中更公平、衡平、與保障貿易的保護美國智慧財產權的工具。

This thesis can roughly be divided into two parts. Part One (Chapters 2 and 3) presents the historical and legal evolution of injunctive relief orders issued in "Section 337" unfair importation investigations from 1922 to 1974 (under the Tariff Commission) and from 1974 to 2006 (under the USITC, which is the main subject of this thesis). This thesis finds that extra-governmental legal pressure from the United States' main trade partners via the GATT, in combination with intra-governmental political pressure from the President (via the U.S. Trade Representative's Office) and Congress, forced the USITC to evolve a new form of exclusive order relief through administrative rulemaking processes. Part Two (Chapters 4 and 5) statistically analyzes the factual and legal bases supporting the USITC's historical issuance of General/Limited Exclusion Orders to test for the effects of bias in the USITC's decision-making. This thesis (which assumes that the USITC did not operate in a vacuum) statistically examines USITC's decisions to determine whether non-statutory factors may have affected the agency's decision-making process. (see Section 1.1.2). We also find that bias does not appear to play a statistically significant role in the USITC's decision-making process. This historical evolution in the legal structure of Section 337 created a more balanced, equitable, and trade-friendly enforcement tool to protect U.S. intellectual property rights in international trade.

CHAPTER 1 USITC EXCLUSION ORDER RELIEF AND ORIGINAL THESIS RESEARCH ... 1
1.1 RESEARCH OUTLINE ... 4
1.1.1 Enforcing Intellectual Property Right against Widespread Infringement ... 6
1.1.2 The Legislative History of Limited Exclusion Order Relief ... 8
1.1.3 Congressional Silence on Administrative Agency Rulemaking ... 12
1.2 ON THE HAHN 2007 RESEARCH ... 13
1.2.1 Hahn's Major Findings ... 14
1.2.2 The Differences between This Thesis and Hahn's Paper ... 16
1.2.3 The Hahn Paper's Problems ... 16
1.3 AN OVERVIEW TO THE EVOLUTION OF EXCLUSIONARY RELIEF ... 18
1.3.1 Violation, Settlement and Non-Violation ... 18
1.3.2 General and Limited Exclusion Order Relief ... 21
1.4 WHAT IS THE USITC? ... 23
1.4.1 Permanent Relief ... 24
1.4.2 Policy Changes ... 26
1.4.3 Temporary Relief ... 27
1.4.4 Section 337 Investigation Procedure ... 28
1.4.5 Limited Exclusion Order Relief and Its Growth ... 29
1.5 ON THE PROCEDURES AND REVIEW ... 30
1.6 ON PREDICTABILITY AND BIAS ... 31
1.7 RESEARCH PLAN ... 33
1.7.1 The USITC's Policy Regarding Remaining Patent Life ... 35
1.7.2 The Timeframe of USITC Investigations ... 37
CHAPTER 2 A SHORT HISTORY OF EXCLUSION ORDER RELIEF AVAILABLE FROM THE U.S. TARIFF COMMISSION ... 41
2.1 LEGAL BASIS FOR PRE-1974 EXCLUSION ORDERS ... 42
2.1.1 The "Unhappy" Beginning of the Revenue Act of 1922 ... 42
2.1.1.1 Tariff Commission's Non-Existent Tariff-Setter Role ... 43
2.1.1.2 Further Conflicts Between 1922 and 1974 ... 44
2.1.1.3 The 1970s Conflicts ... 45
2.1.2 From the Tariff Act of 1930 to the Trade Act of 1974 ... 46
2.2 CASE LAW RELATING TO PRE-1974 EXCLUSIONS ... 47
2.2.1 Patent Infringement as a Section 337 Violation ... 49
2.2.1.1 The Constitutionality Attack ... 50
2.2.2 Process Patent ... 51
CHAPTER 3 THE EVOLUTION OF LIMITED EXCLUSION ORDER RELIEF ... 55
3.1 SECTION 337 INVESTIGATION'S EARLIER TROUBLES ... 55
3.1.1 Enforcement Difficulties ... 55
3.2 DOCTRINES ESTABLISHED BETWEEN 1974 AND 1981 ... 58
3.2.1 The In Rem Doctrine for Exclusion Orders ... 59
3.2.2 The Flexibility Doctrine for Cease-and-Desist Orders ... 60
3.2.3 The "Exclusive Or" Doctrine for Remedial Order Issuance ... 60
3.3 ENFORCEMENT WOES ... 63
3.3.1 Product Patent Woes ... 63
3.3.2 Process Patent Woes ... 64
3.3.2.1 Subsequent Exclusion Difficulties ... 66
3.3.2.2 The Unsuccessful First Challenge ... 66
3.3.2.3 The Applicability of Cease-and-Desist Order Relief ... 68
3.4 THE CHANGES OF 1981 ... 68
3.4.1 A Short History of Limited Exclusion Order's Development ... 69
3.4.2 The Legal Basis for General Exclusion Order Relief ... 71
3.4.3 Abolishing the "Exclusive Or" Doctrine ... 72
3.4.4 Towards Limited Exclusion Order Relief ... 75
3.4.5 The Birth of Limited Exclusion Order Relief ... 78
3.5 THE OMNIBUS TRADE AND COMPETITIVENESS ACT OF 1988 ... 80
3.6 THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS ACT OF 1994 ... 82
3.6.1 The Section 337 and the GATT ... 83
3.6.2 The Failed Canadian Challenge ... 84
3.6.3 The Netherlands Challenge ... 84
3.7 THE COMPOSITION OF THE COMMISSION ... 86
3.8 THE DECLINE OF PATENT SURVEY ... 87
CHAPTER 4 SECTION 337 EXCLUSION STATISTICS ... 89
4.1 DETECTING SYSTEMATIC ERRORS ... 89
4.1.1 Unknown Factors ... 89
4.1.2 General Exclusion Order Request Success Rate Errors ... 91
4.1.3 General Exclusion Order Review Model ... 91
4.1.3.1 General Exclusion Order Determination ... 92
4.1.3.2 Presidential Veto ... 92
4.1.3.3 Federal Circuit/Supreme Court Review ... 93
4.1.3.4 GATT/WTO Finding ... 93
4.2 ON THE STATISTIC TESTS ... 93
4.2.1 The Pearson's Chi-Square Tests ... 94
4.2.2 The Three Tests ... 94
4.2.3 Period of Time Test ... 96
4.2.4 Estimated Remaining Terms Test ... 97
4.2.5 The Administrative Law Judge Test ... 101
4.2.5.1 ALJs Then and Now ... 102
4.2.5.2 USITC's Measures to Maintain Conformity ... 105
4.2.5.3 Notes on "Judge Shopping" ... 105
4.2.6 Technological Feature Test ... 106
4.2.7 Apparent Patent Value Test ... 109
4.3 TIME NOT AS A FACTOR ... 111
4.4 FUTURE RESEARCH TOPICS ... 112
CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS ... 115
5.1 THE FACTORS ... 115
5.1.1 Periods of Time ... 115
5.1.2 Estimated Remaining Term ... 115
5.1.3 Administrative Law Judge ... 116
5.1.4 Technical Features ... 117
5.1.5 Apparent Patent Value ... 117
5.2 UNEXAMINED FACTORS ... 117
5.2.1 Respondent Analysis ... 117
5.3 POSSIBLE FUTURE CHALLENGES ... 119
5.3.1 The Future Evolution of Limited Exclusion Order Relief ... 122
CHAPTER 6 APPENDIX ... 129
6.1 BUILDING THE DATABASE ... 129
6.1.1 Unincorporated Data and Possible Errors ... 129
6.1.2 Data Sources ... 131
6.1.3 Data Collection ... 132
6.1.3.1 The Investigational Database ... 132
6.1.3.2 The U.S. Patent Database ... 134
6.1.4 Counting Determinations ... 135
6.1.5 Data Selection ... 137
6.1.5.1 Data Set I ... 137
6.1.5.2 Data Set II ... 138
6.1.5.3 Data Set III ... 138
6.1.5.4 Data Set IV ... 139
6.1.5.5 Data Set V ... 139
6.1.6 What Matters and What Does Not Matter ... 140
6.2 THE LIFESPAN OF A PATENT AND ITS CALCULATION ... 141
6.2.1 Batch Calculation of Patent Terms ... 143
6.2.2 How to Calculate Patent Terms ... 144
6.2.2.1 Patent Term Extension ... 145
6.2.2.2 Patent Term Reduction ... 145
6.2.2.3 Patent Disclaim ... 147
6.2.2.4 The URAA's Enactment Date ... 148
6.2.3 How to Calculate Remaining Patent Terms ... 149
6.2.3.1 ERT Normalization ... 149
6.2.4 Data Source Errors ... 150
6.3 SECTION 337 HISTORICAL STATUTORY TEXTS ... 151
6.3.1 The Revenue Act of 1916 ... 151
6.3.2 The Tariff Act of 1922 ... 158
6.3.3 The Tariff Act of 1930 ... 160
6.3.4 19 U.S.C. sec 1337a (1940) ... 161
6.3.5 The Trade Act of 1974 ... 162
6.4 KNOWN PRE-1974 SECTION 316 AND 337 INVESTIGATIONS ... 167
6.5 A LIST OF EXCLUSION ORDERS ... 171
6.6 A STUDY OF THE IN LIEU OF LANGUAGE IN THE U.S.C. ... 176
6.7 ON CITATION FORMATS ... 178
6.8 A LIST OF THE TARIFF COMMISSION AND THE USITC'S COMMISSIONERS (1935-2007) ... 179
6.9 REFERENCES ... 181

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