臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

摘 要

公司治理(Corporate Governance)議題在金融海嘯爆發後成為顯學，許多機構、學者紛紛提出研究文獻與評等模式。本研究針對公司治理架構之內部機制，參考Chen, Kao, Tsao and Wu (2007)所建構之治理指標，另加入董監事質押比例變數組合成一簡易之臺灣公司治理指標「Taiwan Corporate Governance Index」，從股權結構及董事會特性來探討其與投資績效之關聯性，分析董事會規模、董事長兼任總經理、控制股東持股比例、法人股東持股比例、大股東質押比例等變數對投資績效之影響，以供作為企業於制定公司治理機制時之參考，及法人機構及投資人於投資決策與風險管理之篩選依據。本研究選取 2011年到 2013年共三年的上市「臺灣50」、上櫃「富櫃50」指數成分公司為樣本實證對象。
實證研究結果顯示，公司治理指標與董事會規模及董事長兼任總經理視之公司規模、控制股東持股比例與法人股東持股比例呈正向關係，而大股東質押比例則呈負向關係。「TCGI」指標評等屬高度公司治理公司的投資績效報酬明顯高於低度公司治理。高度公司治理公司可正向解釋投資績效可增加部位買進持有，對於低度公司治理公司則應調整部位配置並加強風險管理 。

ABSTRACT
Corporate Governance has become a prominent issue since the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008, with various organizations and scholars bringing up research papers and evaluation modes. The purpose of this research is to establish a simple standard of Taiwan Corporate Governance Index, based on the inner mechanism of corporate governance structure and the research of Chen, Kao, Tsao and Wu in 2007. It aims to reveal the association of ownership structure and board characteristics with investment performance by analyzing such variables as board size, CEO duality, managerial ownership, block shareholder and pledge. The result of this research will serve as a guide for enterprises to formulate their management strategies or for foundations and investors to decide their investment policy and reduce investment risk. This research gathers the samples from the indexes of FTSE TWSE Taiwan 50 and Gretai 50, with the years ranging from 2011 to 2013 to validate its findings. This research shows that corporate governance index has a positive relation with board size, CEO duality, managerial ownership and block shareholder while the ratio of pledge has a negative impact on the index. As for the investment performance, the corporations with high TCGI gain more profits than those with low TCGI . High TCGI corporations indicate the positive result of investment performance and ownership; in contrast, low TCGI ones have investment risks to consider.
Keywords：Corporate Governance, ownership structure, board characteristics, risk management

目 次

中文摘要 i
英文摘要 ii
誌謝 iii
目次 iv
表目次 v
圖目次 vi
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景 1
第二節 研究問題與目的 4
第三節 研究流程 6
第四節 論文組織架構 7
第二章 文獻回顧與探討 8
第一節 公司治理起源與定義 8
第二節 公司治理評等指標 11
第三節 台灣之公司治理 15
第四節 公司治理要素 17
第五節 臺灣50指數與富櫃50指數 23
第三章 研究設計與方法 25
第一節 研究假說與模型設定 25
第二節 「TCGI指標」Taiwan Corporate Governance Index 26
第三節 變數的衡量與操作性定義 27
第四章 實證結果與分析 32
第一節 敘述性統計量分析 32
第二節 公司治理指標「TCGI」評等 36
第三節 市場模式之投資報酬績效與TCGI指標評等數分析 39
第四節 台灣公司治理指標「TCGI」與Chen’P指標 44
第五章 結論與建議 50
第一節 結論 50
第二節 研究限制 51
第三節 建議 51
參考文獻 52
中文文獻 52
外文文獻 53

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