臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究延伸Pae and Yoo (2001)的模型，以賽局模式探討損害賠償金之分攤比例對於公司內部控制品質以及會計師查核努力的影響。本研究將我國證券交易法第20條之1規定納入模型中，將受查公司與會計師同作為賠償責任主體做討論，亦即，財務報導不實致使投資人受到損害時，由公司的管理者與股東（內部人）以及會計師共同負擔民事損害賠償金給投資人。
主要研究結果為：由於會計師提供的查核努力與內部人提供的內部控制系統品質皆會影響到經查核財務報表的資訊涵量，且兩者之間的邊際替代率為遞減，因此，無論是會計師或是內部人，都應為了維持經查核財務報表的品質與資訊涵量而付出相當的努力。藉由損害賠償金比例分攤制度的建立，會計師的查核努力不致於過高，內部控制系統品質亦不會太低，社會總體福利因而可獲得改善。

This paper extends Pae and Yoo (2001) 's model, studying the impact of damage apportionment on internal control system quality and audit effort by a game-theoretic model. This paper adds the regulations of Article 20-1 of Taiwan Securities Exchange Act into our model, and assumes firm’s owner and auditor as reparation obligors. That is, when misrepresentation statement results in the investors losses, both the owner and the auditor will be the main people who responsible for the losses.
This study’s main conclusions are: Since both the audit effort provided by external auditor and the firm’s internal control system quality provided by owner have an impact on information content of the audited financial statements and their marginal rate of substitution is decreasing. Not only auditor but also firm’s owner should make adequate efforts to maintain the quality and information content of the audited financial statements. As a consequence, by setting up the appropriate damage apportionment system, the audit effort will not be too high and the internal control system quality will not be too low, and social welfare will thus be improved.

內容目錄
第壹章 緒論..........................................................................1
第一節 研究動機...................................................................1
第二節 研究目的...................................................................4
第三節 研究架構...................................................................5
第貳章 文獻探討...................................................................6
第一節 我國財務資訊不實之民事損害賠償責任.....................6
第二節 損害賠償金之相關文獻.............................................11
第三節 內部控制與查核努力之關係......................................16
第參章 模型建立與分析.......................................................20
第一節 基本模型..................................................................21
第二節 社會福利函數與社會最適之均衡分析.......................28
第三節 次佳情況下無損害賠償金分攤比例之均衡分析.........32
第四節 損害賠償金分攤比例之均衡分析..............................36
第肆章 結論與建議..............................................................47
第一節 研究結論..................................................................47
第二節 研究限制與建議.......................................................49
參考文獻...............................................................................50

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