臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

審計委員會成立係為監督公司會計及財務之流程，確保公司財務報導之正確性，進而積極提供管理上之建議，而使公司內部控制更臻健全，制度更加透明完善，實扮演公司治理之關鍵角色。衍生性金融商品具規避風險、低交易成本與高報酬率、高財務槓桿的特性，廣泛地被企業用來分散風險或創造較高收益的理財工具管道之一。本研究以我國2009年至2016年間台灣上市公司為對象，探討公司設立審計委員會與衍生性金融商品使用程度的關聯性，並依使用目的將衍生性金融商品區分為避險與非避險(交易)目的兩種類型進行檢測，旨在瞭解審計委員會是否能發揮監督效果，以保護公司及其他投資人的權益。
實證結果顯示：審計委員會與避險目的衍生性金融商品使用程度，呈現正向關係，達統計顯著水準；而審計委員會與非避險(交易)目的衍生性金融商品使用程度則呈現顯著負相關，意謂審計委員會能發揮監督效果，特別是對非避險(交易)目的衍生性金融商品使用的監督效果較顯著。本研究進行若干敏感性測試，實證結果具穩固性。

The establishment of Audit Committee can supervise a company’s accounting and financial processes to ensure the reliability of financial reports. Moreover, audit committee can play an important role in corporate governance, which in turn, improves the efficiency and effectiveness of internal control system. Financial derivatives are characterized by risk averse, higher leverage and lower transaction costs. Consequently, these financial instruments are widely used by companies to control risks and/or create returns. This study examines the relationship between audit committee and derivatives usage decisions based on Taiwanese listed firms from 2009 to 2016. This study divides firms’ derivatives usage into hedging and non-hedging (trading) purposes and further examines whether audit committee can play a governance role in monitoring firms’ derivatives usage decisions to protect the interests of company and minority shareholders.
The empirical result reveals that the audit committee is positively associated with hedging financial derivative usage, yet, is negatively associated with non-hedging (trading) derivatives usage. It suggests that audit committee can play an important role in corporate governance, then influences firms’ hedging and non-hedging (trading) derivatives usage decisions. This study conducts several sensitivity tests and shows the empirical results are robust to these diagnostic checks.

摘要 i
ABSTRACT ii
誌謝 iii
目錄 iv
表目錄 v
圖目錄 vi
第壹章、 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 4
第三節 研究架構 5
第貳章、 文獻探討 7
第一節 審計委員會 7
第二節 衍生性金融商品 12
第參章、 研究設計 16
第一節 研究假說 16
第二節 研究期間與樣本篩選 17
第三節 變數定義 20
第四節 實證模型 23
第肆章、 實證結果分析 25
第一節 敘述性統計與相關性分析 25
第二節 實證結果 29
第伍章、 敏感性測試 33
第一節 以混合資料衡量衍生性金融商品之使用程度 33
第二節 適用避險會計衍生性金融商品使用程度之檢測 36
第三節 控制獨立監察人之影響 39
第陸章、 研究結論與限制 43
參考文獻 44

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