臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本篇論文探討配對市場之中，勞動的雙邊契約商議藉由不對稱談判力與外生的市場摩擦對社會福利所造成之影響。此外，還加上僱用關係的情況跟對稱夥伴關係和不對稱夥伴關係做比較。
資產所有者經由配對市場，包括先決定投資水準，使用那許談判力訂定勞動契約，以約束雙方的行為，並經由雙方的努力程度，而產生出配對市場所需的報酬。當外生的市場摩擦水準在最適值時，每一種配對市場，都有其相同的社會福利水準。本文發現，當市場摩擦水準沒有達到最適值時，僱用關係的社會福利水準將會大於對稱夥伴關係和不對稱夥伴關係。

The paper investigates the welfare effects of bilateral contracts with asymmetric bargaining power and exogenous market frictions. In addition, I also compare the welfare effects between partnership and employer-employee relationship.
In the model, asset owners meet in a matching market and the matched parties determine investments, contract negotiation and the choice of effort levels to produce output. When the exogenous market friction is at the optimal level, all cases of market structures have the same welfare level. However, when the exogenous market friction is not at the optimal level, the welfare of employment relationship is greater than that of partnership.

第一章 前言 1
第二章 文獻回顧 3
第三章 模型 6
第一節 不對稱夥伴關係和配對市場
(Asymmetric Partnership and Matching Market) 6
第二節 不對稱夥伴間的生產關係 7
第三節 不對稱夥伴關係之程序 10
第四章 　均衡的穩定狀態 12
第一節 不對稱夥伴關係對公司投入努力的選擇 (Effort Choice) 12
第二節 勞動契約商議 13
第三節 投資的均衡 15
第四節 不對稱夥伴關係的均衡狀態 25
第五章 　市場摩擦與福利 28
第一節 不對稱夥伴關係的價值 28
第二節 市場摩擦對社會福利的影響 35
第六章 　比較靜態分析 38
第一節 對稱夥伴關係模型(Symmetric Partnership) 38
第二節 談判力 的變動對不對稱夥伴關係的影響 45
第三節 不對稱夥伴關係和對稱夥伴關係的比較 48
第七章 　僱用關係 56
第一節 僱用關係間的生產關係 56
第二節 僱用關係的均衡穩定狀態 58
第三節 僱用關係的市場摩擦與福利 59
第四節 談判力 的變動對僱用關係的影響 61
第五節 僱用關係和對稱夥伴關係的比較 64
第六節 配對市場的比較 66
第八章 　結論 69
參考文獻 72

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