臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究主要探討台灣上市櫃之家族企業是否比非家族企業更容易有肥貓現象的發生，以2014年至2018年台灣上市(櫃)公司為觀察對象，共4933筆觀察值。實證結果顯示，家族企業比非家族企業更容易出現肥貓。因此，本研究再將企業屬家族者獨立抽出，進一步探討家族企業之公司治理、董事長兼任總經理以及薪酬委員會人數對肥貓現象的影響。實證結果發現下列現象：(1)家族企業中公司治理好壞，沒有顯著影響家族企業肥貓的現象；(2)家族企業中若董事長兼任總經理，可以抑制家族企業之肥貓發生；(3)家族企業中薪酬委員會規模愈大愈能發揮其監督功能，愈不會有肥貓的發生。

The purpose of this study mainly explores whether the family business of Taiwan listed companies is more likely to have a fatcat phenomenon than non-family businesses. This study is based on the Taiwan listed companies from 2014 to 2018, with a total of 4,933 firms/years. Empirical result reveals that family businesses are more likely to have fat cats than non-family businesses. Therefore, this study chooses family business as subsample, and further explores the impact of corporate governance, duality of chairman and CEO, and the number of compensation committees on family businesses’ fatcat phenomenon. The empirical results found the following phenomena: (1) good corporate governance in a family business doesn't affect the phenomenon of fat cats in family businesses; (2) when the chairman of the family business is also the CEO, it can inhibit the occurrence of fat cats in the family business; (3) the larger the size of the remuneration committee, the lesser fatcat phenomenon is in the family business.

摘要…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………I
ABSTRACT………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..II
致謝……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….III
目錄……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….IV
表目錄……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………V
圖目錄…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….V
第壹章 緒論……………………………………………………………………………………………………………1
第一節 研究動機與目的…………………………………………………………………………..1
第二節 研究架構……………………………………………………………………………………….5
第貳章 文獻探討與假說發展…………………………………………………………………………………7
第一節 家族企業……………………………………………………………………………………….7
第二節 超額報酬………………………………………………………………………………………8
第三節 公司治理………………………………………………………………………………………9
第四節 董事長兼任CEO…………………………………………………………………………..11
第五節 薪酬委員會…………………………………………………………………………………12
第參章 研究方法…………………………………………………………………………………………………14
第一節 資料來源……………………………………………………………………………………14
第二節 研究模型……………………………………………………………………………………16
第三節 變數定義……………………………………………………………………………………17
第肆章 實證結果…………………………………………………………………………………………………..22
第一節 敘述性統計…………………………………………………………………………………22
第二節 實證結果…………………………………………………………………………………….26
第伍章 額外分析……………………………………………………………………..…………………………….36
第陸章 結論與建議………………………………………………………………………………………………39
第一節 結論…………………………………………………………………………………………….39
第二節 研究限制與建議………………………………………………………………………….39
參考文獻………………………………………………………………………………………………………………41

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