臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本論文探討高階主管薪酬與盈餘管理之關聯性，研究樣本為台灣2013年至2015年上市及上櫃公司，參考Albuquerque (2014)所提出之高階主管薪酬模型、Kothari et al. （2005）衡量應計盈餘管理之方法及Roychowdhury（2006）與Cohen et al.（2008）衡量實質盈餘管理之方法，為了測試出高階主管同時使用應計盈餘管理和實質盈餘管理的狀況，以及考慮高階主管薪酬與盈餘管理之內生變數的問題，建立兩階段最小平方法(2SLS)之迴歸模型。探討我國自2013年起實施國際財務報導準則後，高階主管在薪酬及工作保障等自利動機的誘因下，可能會進行盈餘管理，高階主管是否為了自身薪酬，有向上操縱盈餘的情形，只研究單一管理工具可能無法解釋完整的盈餘管理活動，故本研究探討高階主管如何同時採用不同種的管理工具進行盈餘管理的行為，分析其與高階主管薪酬間之關聯性。

高階主管採用盈餘管理工具時，實證結果發現高階主管薪酬與應計盈餘管理為不具顯著相關；反之，高階主管薪酬與實質盈餘管理呈現負相關，顯示高階主管薪酬越高，實質盈餘管理程度越低。

This paper examines the relationship between executive compensation and earnings management. The research sample includes all listed firms in Taiwan capital markets between year 2013 to 2015. The measures of the executive compensation, the accrual earnings management and the real earnings management follow the method developed by Albuquerque (2014), Kothari et al. (2005) and Roychowdhury (2006) and Cohen et al. (2008). In order to test the executives using both accrued earnings management and real earnings management and considering the problem of endogenous variables in executive compensation and earnings management, a regression model of two-stage least squares (2SLS) is established. It is difficult to explain the complete earning management activities with only one single management tool
to know whether the executives will manipulate the surplus for their own salary. Therefore, this study explores how the executives use different kinds of management tools for earnings management, and analyzes their relationship to the executives.

When the executives use the earnings management tool, the empirical results show that the executive compensation and accrued earnings management are not significantly related. On the other hand, executive compensation and real earnings management showed a negative correlation, showing higher-level executive compensation higher, the lower the degree of real earnings management.

摘要 I
Abstract II
目錄 III
圖目錄 IV
表目錄 V
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機 1
第二節 研究目的 2
第三節 研究架構及流程 3
第二章 文獻探討 5
第一節 高階主管薪酬相關文獻 5
第二節 盈餘管理相關文獻 9
第三節 高階主管薪酬與盈餘管理關聯性之相關文獻 15
第三章 研究方法及假說建立 17
第一節 研究假說 17
第二節 實證模型與各項變數衡量 19
第三節 研究期間與資料來源 29
第四章　實證結果及分析 30
第一節　敘述性統計分析 30
第二節　相關性分析 33
第三節　迴歸結果分析 37
第五章　結論與建議 42
第一節　研究結論 42
第二節　研究限制與建議 44
參考文獻 45

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