臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究欲檢視績效衡量指標、獎酬誘因與公司未來績效之間的關係。並預期績效指標與獎酬誘因呈正相關，且進一步探討獎酬誘因可以提昇公司未來績效。本研究發現非財務績效指標對獎酬誘因呈顯著正相關。此外，短期激勵誘因的現金紅利和長期激勵誘因的股票紅利在個別的激勵誘因下，不一定可以提昇員工未來的績效。而現金紅利和年資的交互作用下，並不一定可以提昇公司未來績效，而股票紅利和年資的交互作用下，可以提昇公司未來的績效。最後現金紅利和股票紅利的交互作用下可以提昇公司未來績效。

This study was to examine the relationship between performance measure, the compensation incentives and the future performance. The results show that the expected performance measure was positively correlated with compensation incentives, and compensation incentives could enhance the company's future performance. The study found that non-financial performance measure was positively correlated with the compensation incentives. Besides, short-term cash incentive bonus and long-term stock incentive could not necessarily enhance the staff’s future performance. Although the interactions between short-term cash incentive bonus and the tenure of the employee were not necessary to enhance the future performance, the interactions between long-term stock incentive and the tenure of the employee could enhance the future performance. Finally, the interactions between short-term cash incentive bonus and long-term stock incentive could increase the future performance.

目　　錄　　
中文摘要……………………………………………………………………I
英文摘要……………………………………………………………………II
謝辭…………………………………………………………………………III
目錄…………………………………………………………………………IV
圖目錄………………………………………………………………………V
表目錄………………………………………………………………………VI
第一章 前言……………………………………………………………01
第一節 研究動機……………………………………………………..01
第二節 研究目的……………………………………………………..04
第二章 文獻探討與假說發展…………………………………………05
第一節 主觀性獎酬與績效指標之關連性………………….…….…05
第二節 主觀性獎酬與未來績效之關連性……….……………….…08
第三節 主觀性獎酬間的交互作用與未來非財務績效的關連性…..10
第三章 研究方法…………………………………………….…………12
第一節 個案公司背景與資料來源……………………………….….12
第二節 變數衡量………………………………………………….….17
第三節 模型建立………………………………………………….….20
第四章 實證結果分析………………………………………….………23
第五章 結論與建議………………………………………….…………38
第一節 研究結論………………………………………………….….38
第二節 研究貢獻………………………………………………….….39
第三節 研究限制與建議………………………………………….….40
參考文獻………………………………………………………………….41


圖目錄
圖一 個案公司薪資制度結構圖…………………………………………13
圖二 個案公司組織結構圖………………………………………………18


表目錄 　 　　　　　　 　
表一 個案公司實際職能分配……………………………………………16
表二 變數定義……………………………………………………………19
表三 敘述統計量表………………………………………………………24
表四 Pearson及Spearman 相關係數表…………………………………26
表五 非財務績效指標對股票股數的影響………………………………29
表六 非財務績效指標對現金紅利的影響..……………….…………….32
表七 主觀性獎酬隨著員工年資增加對未來非財務績效的影響……....34
表八 主觀性股票與現金的交互作用對未來非財務績效的影響…...….37

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