臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本文採兩階段方式探討台灣上市櫃公司租稅規避與利益輸送(企業對關係企業放款)的關係，以及企業利益輸送行為及租稅規避對企業市值的影響。首先，企業進行租稅規避與利益輸送，Desai and Dharmapala (2006) 提出互補理論，認為租稅規避創造資訊透明度低的環境，隱藏利益輸送行為，租稅規避與利益輸送為互補關係；其次，企業租稅規避對其市值的影響有兩種解釋，傳統觀點認為企業租稅規避能提升企業市值。互補理論認為企業租稅規避，在沒有良好監督的情況容易隱藏利益輸送，租稅規避提升企業市值的效果降低。本文分析給定企業有利益輸送行為，企業租稅規避對於企業市值的影響。
本文採用2005年至2015年台灣的上市櫃公司為樣本進行分析。實證結果指出，首先，企業租稅規避與利益輸送指標關係人交易呈負相關，表示企業並非採用租稅規避隱藏利益輸送行為，不支持Desai and Dharmapala (2006) 的互補理論，反之，租稅規避與利益輸送指標關係人交易為替代關係；企業租稅規避與企業市值呈正向關係，支持租稅規避將財富移轉到企業會增加企業市值的傳統觀點。企業的關係人交易係數為顯著負相關，關係人交易會造成企業市值下降。企業利益輸送指標關係人交易與租稅規避交乘項的迴歸係數為負，亦即給定企業進行租稅規避，且企業進行關係人交易，會降低企業市值。

This paper use two-stage approach to focus on the relationship between tax avoidance and tunneling of listed corporations, and how tax avoidance and tunneling of listed corporations affect firm value. First, Desai and Dharmapala (2006) think tax avoidance can create a less transparent environment to hide the tunneling which means that tax avoidance and tunneling stay in a complementary relationship. Second, there are two explanations about how tax avoidance affects firm value. Traditionally, tax avoidance can enhance firm value. However, based on the complementary view, tax avoidance can't enhance firm value without good supervision. This paper analyzes how tax avoidance affects firm value when tunneling happen.
This paper analyzes data from Taiwan-listed corporations from 2005 to 2015 and has some results. First, tax avoidance is negatively related to tunneling variables related party transactions doesn't support the complementary view of Desai and Dharmapala (2006). On the other hand, tax avoidance and tunneling variables related party transactions are in a substitutive relationship. Tax avoidance is positively related to firm value. This result supports the traditional view that tax avoidance can enhance firm value. Related party transactions are significantly negatively related to the firm value which means related party transactions decrease firm value. The interaction of related party transactions and tax avoidance is negatively related to firm value. It means that when corporations have tax avoidance and related party transactions at the same time, the firm value will decrease.

第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與目的 1
第二節 研究流程 4
第二章 文獻探討及假說發展 5
第一節 利益輸送 6
第二節 租稅規避 9
第三節 租稅規避與利益輸送 11
第四節 租稅規避與企業市值 13
第五節 研究假說發展 15
第三章 研究方法 17
第一節 資料來源與樣本篩選 17
第二節 租稅規避指標 18
第三節 研究模型 19
第四章 實證結果與分析 28
第一節 租稅規避與利益輸送 28
第二節 利益輸送對企業市值的影響 39
第三節 租稅規避與利益輸送對企業市值的影響 44
第四節 敏感性分析 47
第五章 結論與建議 48
第一節 結論與建議 48
第二節 研究限制及未來研究方向 50
參考文獻 51
附錄 57

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