臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

近期金融危機的發生，學者開始重視或有可轉債此種新金融商品。造成金融危機的原因有很多種，高階經理人的薪酬是其中很重要的一個因素。本篇論文提供一個架構去分析債權薪酬與或有可轉債對於資本結構的影響。主要的研究著重於分析發行債權薪酬與或有可轉債對於代理人問題的影響。本研究發現，若是銀行經理人與股東可以決定投資時機，高階經理人與股東會傾向盡可能的舉很多或有可轉債進而造成代理人問題。此外，若是將債權薪酬作為高階經理人薪酬的一部分，債權薪酬可降低經理人的涉險程度。

The recent financial crisis leads researchers to focus on contingent capital. There are a lot of reason caused financial crisis. Managers’ wealth is one of the important element caused financial crisis. In this paper, we provide a framework to analysis firm’s capital structure with the presence of inside debt and contingent convertible bonds. Our main analysis focus on the agency problem when issue contingent convertible bonds and inside debt. We show that if managers and shareholders can make investment decision, they will raise more fund from CoCo bonds rather than straight debt and result in agency problem. The presence of inside debt will reduce the incentive of managers to take risk.

中文摘要 ……………………………………………………………….……………II
Abstract ………………………………………………………………………...……III

1. Introduction 1
2. Model 2
3. Valuation 4
3.1. Period after conversion 4
3.1.1. Debt 5
3.1.2. Equity 6
3.1.3. Manager’s wealth 6
3.1.4. Bankruptcy 7
3.2. Period before conversion 8
3.2.1. Equity: 8
3.2.2. Debt 8
3.2.3. CoCo bond 9
3.2.4. Manager’s wealth 9
3.2.5. Bankruptcy 10
4. Optimal capital structure 11
4.1. Default trigger 11
4.2. Conversion trigger 11
4.3. Investment trigger 11
4.3.1. Manager-Best 12
4.3.2. Equity-Best 13
4.3.3. Firm-Best 14
5. Agency cost 15
6. Comparative static analysis 16
6.1. b and m1 16
6.1.1. Leverage ratio 16
6.1.2. Spread 20
6.1.3. Triggers 20
6.1.4. Agency cost 21
6.2. Volatility 21
7. Conclusions 24
References 25

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