臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本文以聲譽考量模型（Effinger and Polborn (2001)）為基礎，透過修改變數的設定，提出探討分析師行為的完整模型，期望能對分析師行為有更深入之瞭解。本文模型推導結果發現當分析師領先發佈訊息所增加之風險能夠控制在一定範圍內，且市場給予唯一成功者的薪酬夠高時，分析師才會領先發佈訊息。而在分析師重視未來聲譽甚於當期結果的假設下，無論市場相信分析師會據實建議，或是市場對分析師的行為具預期，影響分析師策略選擇最重要的因素為市場給予唯一能力強的分析師的續期薪酬高低。不論兩位分析師所觀察到的訊息是否相同，市場給予唯一能力強的分析師的續期薪酬與分析師的離眾傾向呈正向關係，與分析師的從眾傾向則呈反向關係；另本文發現當市場對分析師的從、離眾行為具預期時，落後發佈訊息者的最適策略中，據實建議的區間會比市場相信分析師會據實建議時縮小，表示當市場對分析師的從、離眾行為具預期時，落後發佈訊息的分析師愈傾向採取從、離眾策略。

In this paper, we modify the settings in the reputation-oriented model in Effinger and Polborn (2001), and propose a comprehensive model for analysts’ behavior. We find that analysts would announce their forecasting first only when the risk is limited in a certain range and the market offers substantially higher wage to the sole winner. Under the assumption in reputation-oriented model, the most important factor determining analysts’ strategies is the future wage that market offers to the sole winner, regardless of market’s belief on analysts’ behavior. The wage that market offers to the sole winner is positively related to the analyst’s anti-herding propensity, and negatively related to the analyst’s herding propensity, no matter whether the information the analysts observed is identical or not. Moreover, we find that when the market expects analysts might not report truthfully, the follower analyst is more likely to report deceptively.

第一章、緒論 1
第一節、研究背景與動機 1
第二節、研究目的 3
第三節、研究內容與架構 4
第二章、文獻回顧 5
第一節、分析師從眾行為文獻回顧 5
第二節、分析師離眾行為文獻回顧 5
第三節、分析師行動順序文獻回顧 6
第三章、模型設定 7
第四章、分析師的最適策略分析 11
第一節、定義策略 11
第二節、市場認為分析師會據實建議之策略分析 11
第三節、市場具預期之策略分析 16
第四節、分析師行動順序之策略分析 23
第五章、結論與建議 27
第一節、結論 27
第二節、建議 28
參考文獻 29
中文文獻 29
英文文獻 29

中文文獻
1.邵詩婾 (2010)，「台灣證券股票市場證券分析師從眾現象之研究」，未出版碩士論文，國立台灣科技大學財務金融研究所。
2.李春安、唐明曦(2011) ，「聲譽、訊息模糊與分析師從眾、離眾行為之研究」財務金融學刊。
3.張鈺湖（2005），「全美研究團隊獲獎人與其預測發佈時間早晚關聯之研究」，未出版碩士論文，國立台灣大學國際企業學研究所。
4.劉鎮銘（2003），「從眾與反從眾行為之探討：一個完美貝氏均衡之例子」，未出版碩士論文，國立雲林科技大學財務金融研究所。
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