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研究生:林希璇
研究生(外文):Xi-Xuan Lin
論文名稱:經理人過度自信與銀行貸款利率關係:以台灣企業為例
論文名稱(外文):Overconfident CEOs and the Cost of Bank Loans: Evidence from Taiwan
指導教授:王志瑋王志瑋引用關係
指導教授(外文):Chih-Wei Wang
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立中山大學
系所名稱:財務管理學系研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:財務金融學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2018
畢業學年度:106
語文別:英文
論文頁數:46
中文關鍵詞:董事會規模借貸利差行為財務家族企業經理人過度自信
外文關鍵詞:board sizefamily firmsloan spreadCEO overconfidenceBehavioral finance
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:0
  • 點閱點閱:290
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  • 下載下載:13
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:0
本篇研究根據2000年到2016年台灣上市非金融產業公司之資料,檢視銀行和經理人過度自信公司之間貸款利率的關係。我們證實以下四點:第一,過度自信的公司相較於非過度自信的公司擁有較低的貸款利率。其次,過度自信的公司若為家族企業,相較於非家族企業的過度自信公司,亦享有較低的借貸成本。最後,本篇論文同時探討董事會規模的大小是否會影響過度自信公司的貸款利率。論文實證結果為董事會規模較大的過度自信公司會面臨較高的貸款利率。除此之外,過度自信的家族企業,其董事會規模越大,將會負擔較高的貸款利率。
We aim to investigate the relationship between banks and firms with overconfident CEOs. By examining the loans from 2000 to 2016 in the Taiwan market, we first find that firms with overconfident CEOs enjoy lower loan spread than the firms without overconfident CEOs after using firm characteristics and loan characteristics variables, and industry and year fixed effects. It also shows that overconfident family firms enjoy lower loan spread than overconfident non-family firms. In addition, we further document that overconfident firms with more board members on the board encounter higher bank loan spread. Finally, this paper implies that overconfident family firms with large board size also pay higher loan spread.
摘要 i
Abstract ii
Table of Contents iii
List of Tables iv
1. Introduction 1
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 5
2.1. Overconfident firms and bank loan spread 5
2.2. Overconfident family firms and bank loan spread 7
2.3. Overconfident firms and board size 8
3. Data Description 11
3.1. Sample construction 11
3.2. Variable construction 11
3.2.1. Overconfidence measure 11
3.2.2. Founding family firms measure 12
3.3. Descriptive statistics 14
3.4. Variable correlation 15
4. Regression Model and Empirical Results 16
4.1. Regression model 16
4.2. Overconfident firms and bank loan spread 16
4.3. Overconfident family firms and bank loan spread 18
4.4. Overconfident firms and board size 19
4.5. Overconfident firms, board size and the effect of founding family on bank loan spread 21
5. Conclusion 22
Reference 24
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