臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究主要在探討2008年到2014年台灣上市櫃公司董監事(Directors’and Officers’; 以下簡稱D&O)責任險與企業財務報表重編及財務風險間之關聯性。在D&O責任險與企業財務報表重編之關聯性方面，本研究利用相同產業、樣本年度及相似的公司規模並採一比二的方法作為配對基礎來配對財務報表重編的樣本。實證結果發現，D&O責任險與企業財務報表重編之間並無顯著正相關。至於D&O責任險與財務風險關聯性的部分，本研究使用Heckman (1979)兩階段迴歸分析法以調整企業投保D&O責任險可能發生的樣本選擇性偏誤的問題。實證結果發現，相較於未投保D&O責任險的公司，投保D&O責任險的公司，其面臨的企業財務風險較高；此外，當D&O責任險投保的保額愈高時，公司所面臨的財務風險也愈高。綜合言之，本研究結果支持董監事責任險使企業管理階層存在著道德風險的機會主義，並進而導致企業面臨較高的財務風險。

The purpose of this article is to investigate the relationships between Directors’ and Officers’ (hereafter D&O) liability insurance and corporate financial restatements and risk for firms listed in Taiwan for the period from 2008 to 2014. This study forms one-to-two matched-pairs by matching each firm that disclosures a financial restatement (restatement firm) with a firm that does not (non-restatement firm) based on industry, time, and size to examine the effect of D&O insurance on corporate financial restatements. The results show that D&O insurance coefficients are all positive but not significant and do not provide evidence in support of the hypothesis. As to the impact of D&O insurance on corporate financial risk, this study conducts the two-stage estimation approach in Heckman (1979) to mitigate the sample selection-bias problems. The empirical evidence demonstrates that D&O liability insurance purchasers are more likely to face more financial risk than non-purchasers. Further, the empirical evidence reveals a significantly positive association between the D&O liability insurance limits and financial risk and provides evidence in support of the managerial opportunism argument and implies that a firm may raise the financial risk by purchasing D&O insurance.

目錄
摘要 i
ABSTRACT ii
誌謝 iii
目錄 iv
圖目錄 vi
表目錄 vii
第一章 緒論 1
1.1 前言 1
1.2 研究動機與目的 6
1.3 研究架構 7
1.4 研究流程 8
第二章 相關文獻及假說發展 9
2.1 董監事責任險文獻 9
2.1.1 D&O責任險需求構面之研究 10
2.1.2 投保D&O責任險後的影響 12
2.2 財務報表重編相關文獻 17
2.3財務風險相關文獻 20
第三章 研究方法 23
3.1 實證模型 23
3.2相關變數定義 25
3.2.1 D&O責任險與財務報表重編間之關聯性 25
3.2.2 D&O責任險與財務風險間之關聯性 26
3.2.3 相關控制變數之衡量 27
3.3 樣本選取、資料來源及研究期間 32
第四章 實證結果與分析 34
4.1敘述性統計量及相關係數 34
4.2迴歸結果分析 40
4.3額外測試及敏感性分析 49
4.3.1 D&O責任險取自然對數(LOGADO) 49
4.3.2 D&O責任險對次年度財務風險之影響 49
第五章 結論與建議 54
參考文獻 56
中文文獻： 56
英文文獻： 56
圖目錄
圖 1 研究流程圖 8
表目錄
表1 變數定義 31
表2 樣本篩選過程 32
表3 各年度樣本的分佈及D&O責任險比例 33
表4 敘述性統計量 36
表5 T檢定及Z檢定檢定表 37
表6 相關係數檢定 38
表7 投保D&O責任險之迴歸結果 43
表8 D&O責任險對財務報表重編之迴歸結果-是否投保 44
表9 D&O責任險對財務報表重編之迴歸結果-投保金額 45
表10 D&O責任險與當年度財務風險ZFC之迴歸結果 46
表11 D&O責任險與當年度財務風險MZ-score之迴歸結果 47
表12 D&O責任險與當年度財務風險Z-score之迴歸結果 48
表13 D&O責任險與次年度財務風險ZFC之迴歸結果 51
表14 D&O責任險與次年度財務風險MZ-score之迴歸結果 52
表15 D&O責任險與次年度財務風險Z-score之迴歸結果 53

參考文獻
中文文獻：
李書行，2007，訴訟風險，董監事責任險，與公司經營績效研究成果報告，行政院國家科學委員會專題研究計畫。
林宜勉、呂惠民與盧其群，2010，會計師審計品質與財務報表重編之關聯性，中山管理評論，第18卷第2期，407-445頁。
邱秀清、李慕萱與劉仲凱，2009，董監事專業性與財務報表重編，文大商管學報，第14卷第1期，1-18頁。
陳彩稚與龐嘉慧，2008，董監事暨重要職員責任保險之需求因素分析，臺大管理論叢，第18卷第2期，171-196頁。
温哲嘉，2011，董監事責任險保險金額與會計盈餘品質之關聯性研究，臺灣大學國際企業學研究所未出版碩士論文，1-38頁。
廖秀梅、李建然與湯麗芬，2014，董監事暨重要職員責任保險對管理階層盈餘管理行為之影響，經濟論文，第42卷第3期，331-368頁。
劉若蘭、劉政淮與簡溥銘，2015，董監事暨重要職員責任保險與資訊揭露品質及企業舞弊關係之研究，中華會計學刊，第11卷第1期，79-114頁。
劉嘉雯、王泰昌與賴信蒼，2009，訴訟風險與大型會計師事務所之客戶財務風險可接受水準，臺大管理論叢，第20卷第1期，1-40頁。
盧榮和，2005，董監事暨重要職員責任保險的公司治理角色實證研究-以台灣上市上櫃電子業為例，國立中央大學企業管理研究所博士論文。
薛敏正、林嬋娟與林秀鳳，2008，董事會特性與財務報告重編，交大管理學報，第28卷第2期，73-103頁。
英文文獻：
Abbott, L. J., S. Parker, and G. F. Peters. 2004. Audit committee characteristics and restatements: A study of the efficacy of certain blue ribbon committee recommendations. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 23(1): 69-87.
Altman, E. I. 1968. Financial ratios, discriminant analysis and the prediction of corporate bankruptcy. Journal of Finance, 23(4): 589-609.
Baber, W. R., S. H. Kang, and L. Liang. 2006. Strong boards, external governance, and accounting restatement. Working Paper, George Washington University.
Barton, J. 2001. Does the use of financial derivatives affect earnings management decision? The Accounting Review, 76(1): 1-26.
Beasley, M. S. 1996. An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition and financial statement fraud. The Accounting Review, 74(4): 443-465.
Becker, C., M. DeFond, J. Jiambalvo, and K. Subramanyam. 1998. The effect of audit quality on earnings management. Contemporary Accounting Research, 15(1): 1-24.
Bhagat, S., J. A. Brickley, and J. L. Coles. 1987. Managerial indemnification and liability insurance: The effect on shareholder wealth. The Journal of Risk and Insurance, 54(4): 721-736.
Boyer, M., and M. Delvaux-Derome. 2002. The demand for directors’ and officers’ insurance in Canada. CIRANO Working Paper, 2002s-72.
Brook, Y., and R. Rao. 1994. Shareholder wealth effects of directors’ liability limitation provisions. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 29(3): 481-497.
Cadbury, A. 1992. Committee on the financial aspects of corporate governance. Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance: The Code of Best Practice, Gee & Co, London.
Campa, D., and M. Camacho-Miñano. 2015. The impact of SME’s pre-bankruptcy financial distress on earnings management tools. International Review of Financial Analysis, 42: 222-234.
Cao, Z., and G. S. Narayanamoorthy. 2011. The effect of litigation risk on management earnings forecasts. Contemporary Accounting Research. 28(1): 125-173.
Cao, Z., and G. S. Narayanamoorthy. 2014. Accounting and litigation risk: Evidence from Directors’ and Officers’ insurance pricing. Review of Accounting Studies, 19(1): 1-42.
Carcello, J. V., D. R. Hermanson, and H. F. Huss. 1995. Temporal changes in bankruptcy-related reporting. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, 14(2): 133-143.
Carcello, J. V., and T. L. Neal. 2003. Audit Committee independence and disclosure: choice for financially distressed firms. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 11(4): 289-299.
Chalmers, J. M. R., L. Y. Dann, and J. Harford. 2002. Managerial opportunism? Evidence from directors’ and officers’ insurance purchases. The Journal of Finance, 57(2): 609-636.
Chen, Z. l., Y. L. Cheung, A. Stouraitis, and A. W. S. Wong. 2005. Ownership concentration, firm performance, and dividend policy in Hong Kong. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 13(4): 431-449.
Chi, H. Y., T. C. Weng, and C. H. Liou. 2011. Accounting restatements and managerial legal liability coverage. Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences, 25: 147-158.
Chi, H. Y., and T. C. Weng. 2014. Managerial legal liability and Big 4 auditor choice. Journal of Business Research, 67(9): 1857-1869.
Chin, C. L., and H. Y. Chi. 2009. Reducing restatements with increased industry expertise. Contemporary Accounting Research, 26(3): 729-765.
Chung, H. H., and J. P. Wynn. 2008. Managerial legal liability coverage and earnings conservatism. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 46(1): 135-153.
Chung, H. H., J. P. Wynn, and H. Yi. 2013. Litigation risk, accounting quality, and investment efficiency. Advances in Accounting, Incorporating Advances in International Accounting, 29(2): 180-185.
Chung, H. S. H., S. A. Hillegeist, and J. P. Wynn. 2015. Directors’ and officers’ legal liability insurance and audit pricing. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 34(6): 551-577.
Core, J. 1997. On the corporate demand for directors’ and officers’ insurance. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 64 (1): 63-87.
Core, J. 2000. The directors’ and officers’ insurance premium: An outside assessment of the quality of corporate government. Journal of Law Economics and Organization, 16 (2): 449-477.
Daniels, R. J., and S. M. Hutton. 1993. The capricious cushion: The implications of the directors’ and officers’ liability insurance crisis on Canadian corporate governance. Canadian Business Law Journal, 22(2): 182-230.
Dechow, P. M., R. Sloan, and A. Sweeny. 1996. Causes and consequences of earnings manipulation: An analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC. Contemporary Accounting Research, 13(1): 1-36.
DeFond, M. L., and J. Jiambalvo. 1991. Incidence and circumstances of accounting errors. The Accounting Review, 66(3): 643-655.
Elloumi, F., and P. J. Gueyle. 2001. Financial distress and corporate governance: An empirical analysis. Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society, 1(1): 15-23.
Faccio, M., L. H. Lang, and L. S. F. Young. 2001. Dividends and Expropriation. American Economic Review, 91(1): 54-78.
Gutiérrez, M. 2003. An economic analysis of corporate directors'' fiduciary duties. Rand Journal of Economics, 34(3): 516-535.
Habib, A., H. Jiang, M. B. U. Bhuiyan, and A. Islam. 2014. Litigation risk, financial reporting and auditing: A survey of the literature. Research in Accounting Regulation. 26(2): 145-163.
Hay, D. C., R. F. Baskerville, and T. H. Qiu. 2007. The association between partnership financial integration and risky audit client portfolios. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 26(2): 57-68.
Heckman, J. J. 1979. Sample selection bias as a specification error. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 47(1): 153-161.
Henry, D. 2008. Corporate governance structure and the valuation of Australian firms: Is there value in ticking the boxes? Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 35(7)&(8): 912-942.
Holderness, O. G. 1990. Liability insurers as corporate monitors. International Review of Law and Economics, 10(2): 115-129.
Jensen, M. C., and R. S. Ruback. 1983. The market for corporate control: The scientific evidence. Journal of Financial Economics, 11(1): 5-50.
Jensen, M. C. 1993. The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems. Journal of Finance, 48(3): 831-880.
Kim, I. 2006. Directors’ and officers’ insurance and opportunism in accounting choice. Working Paper, George Washington University.
Kinney, W. J. and L. S. McDaniel. 1989. Characteristics of firms correcting previously reported quarterly earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 11(1): 71-93.
Li, K. F., and Y. P. Liao. 2014. Directors’ and officers’ liability insurance and investment efficiency: Evidence from Taiwan. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 29: 18-34.
Lin, C., M. S. Officer, R. Wang, and H. Zou. 2013. Directors’ and officers’ liability insurance and loan spreads. Journal of Financial Economics, 110(1): 37-60.
Liyu, H., E. Elaine, and W. Sue. 2007. Does better corporate governance result in lower earnings management? Keeping Good Companies, 59(6): 330-334.
McLaughlin, R., A. Safieddine, and G. K. Vasudevan. 1996. The operation performance of seasoned equity issuers: Free cash flow and post-issue performance. Financial Management, 25(4): 41-53.
Miglani, S., K. Ahmed, and D. Henry. 2015. Voluntary corporate governance structure and financial distress: Evidence from Australia. Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, 11(1): 18-30.
Miller, G. S., and D. J. Skinner. 1998. Determinants of the valuation allowance for deferred tax assets under SFAS No. 109. The Accounting Review, 73(2): 213-233.
Myers, J. N., L. A. Myers, and Z. V. Palmrose. 2005. The length of auditor-client relationships and financial statement restatements. Working Paper, Texas A&M University.
Ohlson, J. 1980. Financial ratios and the probabilistic prediction of bankruptcy. Journal of Accounting Research, 18(1): 109-131.
O’Sullivan, N. 1997. Insuring the agents: The role of directors’ and officers’ insurance in corporate governance. The Journal of Risk and Insurance, 64(3): 545-556.
O’Sullivan, N. 2002. The demand for directors’ and officers’ insurance by large UK companies. European Management Journal, 20(5): 574-583.
Priest, G. L. 1987. The current insurance crisis and modern tort law. Yale Law Journal, 96(7): 1521-1590.
Richardson, S., I. Tuna, and M. Wu. 2002. Predicting earnings management: The case of earnings restatements. Working Paper, University of Pennsylvania.
Romano, R. 1991. The shareholder suit: Litigation without foundation. The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 7(1): 55-87.
Schloetzer, J. D. 2007. Arthur Andersen, SOX section 40 and auditor turnover: Theory and evidence. Working Paper, University of Pittsburgh.
Tylvová , T., and M. Borell. 2012. Do private equity owners increase risk of financial distress and bankruptcy? Journal of Corporate Finance, 18(1): 138-150.
Watts, R. L., and J. L. Zimmerman. 1983. Agency problems, auditing, and the theory of the firm: Some evidence. Journal of Law and Economics, 26(3): 613-633.
Zmijewski, M. E. 1984. Financial ratio and the probabilitistic prediction of bankruptcy. Journal of Accounting Research, 22: 59-86.
Zou, H., S. Wong, C. Shum, J. Xiong, and J. Yan. 2008. Controlling-minority shareholder incentive conflicts and directors’ and officers’ liability insurance: Evidence from China. Journal of Banking and Finance, 32(12): 2636-2645.