臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

董事會與小股東間的代理問題 (Board to minority equity holders)在文獻中少有提及，本篇論文探討CEO的經營能力，是否能影響董事會開除CEO的個人成本。本文將分別使用Demerjian (2012)中估計的CEO能力指標MA-Score及Chen, Liao, Chen (WP)中以Taylor (2010)的模型為基礎而設計出的董事會個人成本的指標Cpers來進行實證研究。結果顯示，能力較高的CEO及CEO確實會造成更嚴重的代理問題，使得公司表現不好時較難開除其CEO。同時，本篇研究也指出，CEO能力的波動性將影響董事會與小股東間的代理問題，波動性高的CEO將使代理問題嚴重程度下降。

This study explores the relation between the managerial ability and the agency problems between boards and minority equity holders (later denoted as B-E agency problem) by employing CEO turnover data in the past 20 years. We employ Demerjian (2012) to estimate CEO ability and Chen, Liao, Chen (2012) to estimate the cost of B-E agency problem.The empirical results of this study show that, CEO’s ability significantly affects the firm’s B-E agency problem. The higher a firm''s CEO''s ability, the more serious the firm''s B-E agency problem. Furthermore, we find that the instability in a firm''s CEOs’ ability also significantly affect the firm''s B-E agency problem.

摘要 i
ABSTRACT ii
圖表 iii
I. 簡介 6
II. 文獻回顧 8
III. 假說 11
IV. 資料及研究方法 12
A. 董事會與小股東間的代理問題:Cpers 12
B. CEO能力的代理變數:MA-Score 13
C. 控制變數簡介 14
V. 敘述統計量及實證結果 16
A. 敘述統計量 16
B. 董事會與小股東間的代理問題與CEO能力 17
C. 董事會與小股東間的代理問題與CEO能力波動性 18
VI. 結論. 19
參考資料 v

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