臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究主要探討XBRL實施對於薪酬與管理者績效敏感度的影響。本研究推論XBRL將改善外部監督環境進而增強薪酬與績效敏感度。 實證研究顯示，無論市場績效指標或會計績效指標，其與薪酬之敏感度在XBRL實施後皆增加。此外，本研究發現公司在XBRL採行後傾向給予更多權益基礎薪酬。此研究亦證實XBRL改善監督環境的效果在小公司較為明顯。並且在動態分析（dynamic analysis）中，建立了XBRL會影響薪酬設計之因果關係。

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of the XBRL mandate on pay-performance sensitivity. I posit that XBRL improves external monitoring and in turn strengthens the link between pay and performance. Irrespective of market-based or accounting-based performance measures, the empirical results reveal that pay-performance sensitivity increases after XBRL adoption. Moreover, I find that firm is likely to give more equity-based compensation after XBRL mandate. I also provide evidence that XBRL reporting improves the monitoring environment to a greater extent for small firms. In dynamic analysis, the result provide evidence to support the causal inferences about the relationship between XBRL implement and compensation contract design.

CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION 1
2. LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 3
2.1. BACKGROUND OF THE XBRL MANDATE AND RECENT
RESEARCH ON XBRL 3
2.2 RECENT RESEARCH ON PAY-PERFORMANCE SENSITIVITY 5
2.3 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 6
3. DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN 8
3.1 MODEL 8
3.2 DATA 10
4. RESULTS 11
4.1 DESCRIPTIVE DATA 11
4.2 SENSITIVITY OF COMPENSATION TO PERFORMANCE 14
4.3 ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 16
4.3.1 Sensitivity between CEO compensation components and
performance. 16
4.3.2 The impact of XBRL adoption on sensitivity of large
firms and small firms. 18
4.3.3 Dynamic analysis of the relation between XBRL adoption
and pay- performance sensitivity 20
4.3.4 Excluding CEO-year observations from 2007 to 2009 23
5. CONCLUSION 23
REFERENCES 24
APPENDIX: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 29
 

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