一、中文文獻
1. 丁秀儀(2010)，公司獨立董事為何忙碌，管理學報，第27卷第3期：291-318。
2. 古佳育(2012)，董事會特性與公司價值攸關性之研究，國立中興大學高階經理人碩士在職專班碩士論文。3. 吳怡葶(2016)，董事會多樣性與績效之關聯-以臺灣銀行業為例，國立彰化師範大學財務金融技術學系研究所碩士論文。4. 李建然，賴秀梅與韓愷時(2015)，董監事與重要職員責任保險需求及投保金額之決定因素，風險管理學報，第17卷第2期：93-117。
5. 林雅滋(2016)，審計委員會成員忙碌性與公司績效及風險的關聯性，國立彰化師範大學財務金融技術學系研究所碩士論文。6. 邱筱茜(2009)，董事會監督強度決定性因素之實證研究，國立政治大學會計研究所碩士論文。7. 風傳媒，2018.10.16，公司法大翻修後這個職務要讓董事不能再推諉。
8. 徐珮娟(2017)，公司董監事暨重要職員責任保險對財務報表盈餘品質的影響－財務危機之調節效果，國立彰化師範大學會計學系研究所碩士論文。9. 涂婉真(2012)，董事長與總經理任期對公司績效之影響，國立政治大學會計研究所碩士論文。10. 祝繼高、葉康濤與嚴冬(2012)，女性董事的風險規避與企業投資行為研究—基於金融危機的視角，財貿經濟，第4期：50-58。
11. 張元與王筱瑩(2016)，董事會及高階管理階層的性別多樣性與企業社會責任的關聯，亞太經濟管理評論，第20卷第1期：1-44。
12. 張元與陳虹羽(2015)，董監事責任險公司信用評分，兩岸金融季刊，第3卷第3期：73-112。
13. 張文武與賴靜美(2017)，企業生命週期對董監事暨重要職員責任保險需求之影響，管理與系統，第24卷第2期：215-257。
14. 現代保險雜誌，2018.04.03，19家上市(櫃)銀行保險公司誰沒保董監責任險。
15. 粘季為(2016)，董事會多樣性對公司風險之影響，國立彰化師範大學財務金融技術學系研究所碩士論文。16. 粘季為、張元與許敏政(2017)，公司董事會多樣性是否有助於降低公司風險？，兩岸金融季刊，第5卷第3期：69-111。
17. 許雅閔(2012)，公司治理機制與代理成本之關聯性，國立彰化師範大學會計學系研究所碩士論文。18. 陳怡廷(2018)，投資者人格特質與風險管理之關係研究-以某產業之投資為例，亞洲大學經營管理學系碩士在職專班碩士論文。19. 陳明秀(2016)，性別多樣性與銀行績效/風險的關聯性，國立彰化師範大學財務金融技術學系商業教育學研究所碩士論文。20. 陳虹羽(2013)，董監事責任險與公司信用評等，國立彰化師範大學財務金融技術學系研究所碩士論文。21. 陳彩稚與龐嘉慧(2008)，董監事暨重要職員責任保險之需求因素分析，臺大管理論叢，第18卷第2期：171-196。
22. 湯麗芬、廖秀梅與李建然(2014)，董監事暨重要職員責任保險對管理階層盈餘管理行為之影響，經濟論文，第42卷第3期：331-368。
23. 湯麗芬、廖秀梅與李建然(2017)，董監事暨重要職員責任保險對企業信用評等之影響， 臺大管理論叢，第27卷第4期：75-104。
24. 黃長安(2011)，董監事獨立性與適任性、董監事責任保險與財務報表重編之研究，國立彰化師範大學會計學系研究所碩士論文。25. 黃美娟(2015)，中國企業之董事會多樣性、企業社會責任與盈餘管理的關聯性研究，淡江大學會計系研究所碩士論文。26. 黃聆毓(2013)，董事會教育程度與公司財務特性之關連性，國立雲林科技大學財務金融系研究所碩士論文。27. 詹素嬌、蘇淑慧與劉政淮(2014)，投保董監事責任險與保險金額於審計公費之影響，會計審計論叢，第4卷第1期：25-51。
28. 鉅亨網，2018.10.29，上市(櫃)公司明年起強制投保董監責任險保額不足成隱憂https://news.cnyes.com/news/id/4227321。
29. 廖秀梅(2004)，董事會結構特性與公司績效關係之研究-探討台灣家族控制企業因素的影響，國立臺北大學會計學系博士班博士論文。30. 劉若蘭、劉政淮與簡溥銘(2015)，董監事暨重要職員責任保險與資訊揭露品質及企業舞弊關係之研究，中華會計學刊，第11卷第1期：79 -114。
31. 蔡佳芬(2016)，董事會與CEO性別多樣性、投資效率與股利政策，國立彰化師範大學財務金融技術學系研究所碩士論文。32. 蔡羿帆(2016)，董事會結構與創新活動關聯性之研究-以台灣電子業為例，國立彰化師範大學會計系研究所碩士論文。33. 盧榮和(2005)，董監事暨重要職員責任保險的公司治理角色實證研究-以台灣上市(櫃)電子業為例，中央大學企業管理博士班博士論文。34. 賴思蓉(2015)，董事會任期與公司績效—論外部競爭之角色，國立高雄應用科技大學財富與稅務管理系研究所碩士論文。35. 謝銀霞(2017)，董事會特性、審計委員會與企業價值攸關之研究，國防大學財務管理學系研究所碩士論文。36. 謝錦堂(2009)，董事會功能理論模型之驗證:台灣上市公司董監事的觀點，管理學報，第26卷第2期：127-144。
二、英文文獻
1. Abbott, L. J., Parker, S., and T. J. Presley. (2012). Female board presence and the likelihood of financial restatement. Accounting Horizons 26(4): 607-629.
2. Adams, R. B., and D, Ferreira. (2009). Women in the boardroom and their impact on governance and performance. Journal of Financial Economics 94(2): 291-309.
3. Alison C., and G. Christy. 2015. Above the glass ceiling: when are women and racial/ethnic minorities promoted to CEO?. Quantitative Empirical Analysis in Strategic Management 35(7): 949-1101.
4. Baker, T., and S. J. Griffith. 2007. The missing monitor in corporate governance: The directors’ and officers’ liability insurer. Georgetown Law Journal 95(6):1795-1842.
5. Barua, A., L. F. Davidson, D. V. Rama, and S. Thiruvadi. 2010. CFO gender and accruals quality. Accounting Horizons 24(1): 25-39.
6. Bhagat, S., J. Brickley, and J. Coles. 1987. Managerial indemnification and liability insurance: The effect on shareholder wealth. Journal of Risk and Insurance 54(4): 721-736.
7. Boubakri, N., and L. Bouslimi. 2016. Directors’ and officers’ liability insurance and analyst forecast properties. Finance Research Letters 19(11): 22-32.
8. Boyer, M. M., and M. Delvaux-Derome. 2002. The demand for directors’ and officers’ insurance in Canada. Working paper, Centre for Interuniversity Research and Analysis of Organizations (CIRANO).
9. Burnett J. J., and B. A. Palmer. 1984. Examining life insurance ownership through demographic and psychographic characteristics. The Journal of Risk and Insurance 51(3): 453-467.
10. Cadbury, A. 1992. Report of the committee on the financial aspects of corporate governance, (1): Gee.
11. Campbell, K., and A. Minguez-Vera. 2008. Gender diversity in the boardroom and firm financial performance. Journal of Business Ethics 83(3): 435-451.
12. Canavan, J., B. Jones, and M. J. Potter. 2004. Board tenure: How long is too long?. Directors and Board-American Edition 28(2): 39-42.
13. Carpenter, M. A., and J. D. Westphal. 2001. The strategic context of external network ties: examining the impact of director appointments on board involvement in strategic decision making. Academy of Management Journal 44(4): 639-660.
14. Cashman, G. D., S. L.Gillan, and J. Chulhee. 2012. Going overboard? On busy directors and firm value. Journal of Banking and Finance 36(12): 3248-3259.
15. Celikyurt,U., M. Sevilir, and A. Shivdasani. 2014. Venture capitalists on boards of mature public firms. Review of Financial Studies 27(1): 56-101.
16. Chalmers, J., L. Dann, and J. Harford. 2002. Managerial opportunism? Evidence from directors＇and officers＇ insurance purchases. The Journal of Finance 57(2): 609-636.
17. Chen, T. J., and S. H. Li. 2010. Directors’ and officers’ insurance, corporate governance and firm performance. International Journal of Disclosure and Governance 7(3): 244-261.
18. Chiang, H.T., and L.J. He. 2010. Board supervision capability and information transparency. Corporate Governance: An International Review 18(1): 18-31.
19. Chung, H. H., and J. P. Wynn. 2008. Managerial legal liability coverage and earnings conservatism. Journal of Accounting and Economics 46(1): 135-153.
20. Cook, A., and C. Glass. 2015. Do minority leaders affect corporate practice? Analyzing the effect of leadership composition on governance and product development. Strategic Organization 13(2): 117-140.
21. Cook, A., and C. Glass. 2017. Women on corporate boards: Do they advance corporate social responsibility? . Human relations 71(7): 1-28.
22. Core, J. E. 1997. On the corporate demand for directors’ and officers’ insurance. The Journal of Risk and Insurance 64 (1): 63-87.
23. Core, J. E. 2000. The directors＇and officers＇insurance premium: An outside assessment of the quality of corporate governance. Journal of Law Economics and Organization 16(2): 449-475.
24. Core, J. E., R.W. Holthausen, and D. F Larcker. 1999. Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance. Journal of Financial economics 51(3): 371-406.
25. Daniels, R. J., and S. M. Hutton. 1993. The capricious cushion: the implications of the directors’ and officers’ insurance liability crisis on Canadian corporate governance. Canadian Business Law Journal 22(2): 182-230.
26. Darmadi, S. 2013. Board members’ education and firm performance: Evidence from a developing economy. International Journal of Commerce and Management 23(2): 113-135.
27. DeZoort, F.T., and S. E. Salterio. 2001. The effects of corporate governance experience and financial reporting and audit knowledge on audit committee members. Judgments Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 20(2): 31-47.
28. Fama, E. F. 1980. Agency problems and the theory of the firm. The Journal of Political Economy 88(2): 288-307.
29. Fama, E., and M. Jensen. 1983. Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics 26(2): 301-326.
30. Ferris, S., M. Jagannathan, and A. Pritchard. 2001. Too busy to mind the business? Monitoring by directors with multiple board appointments. The Journal of Finance 58(3): 1087-1111.
31. Fich, E. M., and A. Shivdasani. 2006. Are busy boards effective monitors?. The Journal of Finance 61(2): 689-724.
32. Fluck, Z., D. Holtz-Eakin, and H. S. Rosen. 1998. Where does the money come from? The financing of small entrepreneurial enterprises. New York University Working Paper.
33. Francis, B., I. Hasan, J. C. Park., and Q. Wu. 2015. Gender differences in financial reporting decision making: Evidence from accounting conservatism. Contemporary Accounting Research 32(3): 1285-1318.
34. Hampel, R. 1998. Committee on corporate governance: Final report, London, gee publishing.
35. Hanson, R. C., and M. H. Song. 2006. Corporate governance and asset sales: the effect of internal and external control mechanisms. The Financial Review 41(3): 361-386.
36. Hillman, A. J., and T. Dalziel. 2003. Boards of directors and firm performance: Integrating agency and resource dependence perspectives. Academy of Management Review 28(3): 383-396.
37. Holderness, C. G. 1990. Liability insurers as corporate monitors. International Review of Law and Economics 10(2): 115-129.
38. Huang, J., and J. K. Darren. 2013. Gender and corporate finance: Are male executives overconfident relative to female executives. Journal of Financial Economics 108(3): 822-839.
39. Ingley, C. B., and N. T. Van der Walt. 2003. Board configuration: building better boards. Corporate Governance 3(4): 5-17.
40. Jensen, M. C., and R. Ruback. 1983. The market for corporate control: The scientific evidence. Journal of Financial Economics 11(1-4): 5-50.
41. Jensen, M., and W. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the Firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3(4): 305-360.
42. Johnson, S., R. L. Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes and A. Shleifer. 2000. Tunneling. The American Economic Review 90(2): 22-27.
43. Kaltchev, G. 2004. The demand for directors’ and officers’ liability insurance by us public companies, Southern Methodist University.
44. Kaltchev, G. 2006. Dynamic panel model with directors’ and officers’ liability insurance data, Panel Data Econometrics, 351-360.
45. Kesner, I. F. 1987. Directors stock ownership and organization performance: an investigation of fortune 500 companies. Journal of Business Research 13(3): 235-249.
46. Lin, C., M. S. Officer, and H. Zou. 2011. Directors’ and officers’ liability insurance and acquisition outcomes. Journal of Financial Economics 102(3): 507-525.
47. Liou, C. H., J. L. Liu, P. M. Jian, and C. C. Tsai. 2017. Effects of director and officer liability insurance coverage on information disclosure quality and corporate fraud. Emerging Markets Finance and Trade 53(4): 806-818.
48. Lipton, M., and J. W. Lorsch. 1992. A modest proposal for improved corporate governance. The Business Lawyer 48(1): 59-77.
49. Mayer, R. C., R. S. Warr, and J. Zhao. 2018. Do pro‐diversity policies improve corporate innovation?. Financial Management 47(3):617-650.
50. McConnell, J. J., and H. Servaes. 1990. Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value. Journal of Financial Economics 27(2): 595-612.
51. McDaniel, L., R. Martin, and L. Maines. 2002. Evaluating financial reporting quality: The effects of financial expertise vs. financial literacy. The Accounting Review 77(1): 139-167.
52. Mehran, H.1995. Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics 38(2): 163-184.
53. Morck, R., A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny. 1988. Management ownership and market valuation: An empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics 20(1-3): 293-315.
54. Nielsen, S., and M. Huse. 2010. The contribution of women on boards of directors: Going beyond the surface. Corporate Governance: An International Review 18(2): 136-148.
55. O＇Sullivan, N. 2002. The demand for directors＇and officers＇insurance by large UK companies. European Management Journal 20(5): 574-583.
56. Pfeffer, J., and G. R. Salancik. 1978. The external control of organizations: A resource dependence perspective. Stanford, CA, Stanford Business Classics.
57. Reeb, D. M., and W. Zhao. 2010. Director capital and corporate disclosure quality. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 32(4): 191-212.
58. Ryan, M. K., and S. A. Haslam. 2005. The glass cliff: Evidence that women are over-represented in precarious leadership positions. British Journal of Management 16(2): 81-90.
59. Scarborough, S., J. Haynie, and C. Shook. 2010. Board composition, process and activism: Evidence within American firms. Management and Marketing 5(1): 3-18.
60. Shalley, C. E. 1991. Effects of productivity goals, creativity goals, and personal discretion on individual creativity. Journal of Applied Psychology 76(2): 179-185.
61. Singh H., and F. Harianto. 1989. Top management tenure, corporate ownership structure and the magnitude of golden parachutes. Strategic Management Journal 10(1): 143-156.
62. Vafeas, N. 2003. Length of board tenure and outside director independence. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 30(7/8): 1043-1064.
63. Wan, D., and C. H. Ong. 2005. Board structure, process and performance: Evidence from public-listed companies in Singapore. Corporate Governance 13(2): 277-290.
64. Westphal, J. D., and L. P. Milton. 2000. How experience and network ties affect the influence of demographic minorities on corporate boards. Administrative Science Quarterly 45(2): 366-398.
65. Wu, M.W., and C. H. Shen. 2013. Corporate social responsibility in the banking industry: Motives and financial performance. Journal of Banking & Finance 37(9): 3529-3547.
66. Zhao Y., J. Hu, and X. Shu. 2016. Litigation risk, judicial transparency and directors’ and officers’ liability insurance. Journal of Financial Risk Management 15(4): 213-228.
67. Zou, H., S. Wong, C.Shum, J. Xiong, and J. Yan. 2008. Controlling-minority shareholder incentive conflicts and director’ and officers’ liability insurance: Evidence from china. Journal of Banking & Finance 32(12): 2636-2645.
68. Bear, S., Rahman, N., and C. Post. 2010. The impact of board diversity and gender composition on corporate social responsibility and firm reputation. Journal of Business Ethics 97(2): 207-221.
69. Werbel, D., Erhardt, N. L. and C. B. Shrader. 2003. Board of director diversity and firm financial performance. Corporate Governance 11(2): 89-154.