臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

過去的研究指出，許多因素都能夠影響公司財務預測的準確性，例如公司是否曾經陷入法律糾紛、內部人交易、公司的財務狀況等。過去文獻也證明經理人的預測經驗及預測發佈的頻率也會影響預測的正確性。但過去文獻較少討論公司的曝光度是否也會施加壓力於經理人身上，使他們發佈較為準確的財務預測。因此，此研究延伸過去的實證，利用自1993年到2015年的美國樣本，發現這些被吸引的投資者會對經理人的財務預測準確性產生更強的監督效果，讓我們能夠更了解影響財務預測準確度的因素。

There are lots of factors that will affect management earnings forecast accuracy. For instance, studies provide evidence that litigation environment, insider trading behavior, financial status, and concentration of the industry will affect managers’ forecast quality. Also, managers’ forecast experience, disclosing frequency are other variables that proved to affect managers’ forecast quality. However, none of the literature discuss whether the firms with higher visibility will put pressure on managers and make their forecast more accurate. Thus, the objective of this study is to examine how the change in advertising expense will affect investor attention, which is measured by abnormal trading volume of the firm, and further affect the management earnings forecast accuracy. With the sample of management earnings forecast announced by U.S. firms from 1993 to 2015, we find that the firms which spend more on advertising will attract more investors. It will further make the managers’ earnings forecast more accurate due to the increase in investors’ monitoring.

I. Introduction ………………………………………………………………………………………1
II. Literature Review ………………………………………………………………………4
2.1 Management Forecast …………………………………………………………………4
2.2 Marketing and Investor Attention ………………………………5
2.3 Hypothesis Development …………………………………………………………5
III. Research Design …………………………………………………………………………6
3.1 Sample ……………………………………………………………………………………………………6
3.2 The Description and Measurement of Variables…6
3.3 Methodology ………………………………………………………………………………………12
IV. Empirical Result …………………………………………………………………………13
4.1 Summary Statistics ……………………………………………………………………13
4.2 Regression Results ……………………………………………………………………13
4.3 Industry Adjusted Analysis ………………………………………………15
4.4 Sample Adjustment ………………………………………………………………………17
V. Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………………………………22
5.1 Conclusion and Discussion …………………………………………………22
5.2 Managerial Implication …………………………………………………………22
5.3 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research……………………………………………………………………………………………………………23
References ……………………………………………………………………………………………………24
Appendix A: the Measurement of the Variables…………………………………………………………………………………………………………27
Appendix B: Correlation Matrix of the Variables…………………………………………………………………………………………………………28

Ajinkya, B., Bhojraj, S., ＆ Sengupta, P. (2005). The association between outside directors, institutional investors and the properties of management earnings forecasts. Journal of accounting Research, 43(3), 343-376.

Atiase, R. K. (1985). Predisclosure information, firm capitalization, and security price behavior around earnings announcements. Journal of Accounting Research, 21-36.

Baginski, S. P., Conrad, E. J., ＆ Hassell, J. M. (1993). The effects of management forecast precision on equity pricing and on the assessment of earnings uncertainty. Accounting Review, 913-927.

Baginski, S. P., ＆ Hassell, J. M. (1997). Determinants of management forecast precision. Accounting Review, 303-312.

Barber, B. M., ＆ Odean, T. (2008). All that glitters: The effect of attention and news on the buying behavior of individual and institutional investors. Review of Financial Studies, 21(2), 785-818.

Chemmanur, T. (2009). Advertising, attention, and stock returns. School of Business Administration, Fordham University.

Chen, S. (2004). Why do managers fail to meet their own forecasts. Paper presented at the 14th Annual Conference on Financial Economics and Accounting (FEA).

Dastgir, M., Sajady, S. H., ＆ Sabet, H. (2007). Factors Affecting Bias in Management Earnings Forecasts.

Dempsey, S. J. (1989). Predisclosure information search incentives, analyst following, and earnings announcement price response. Accounting Review, 748-757.

Fama, E. F., ＆ French, K. R. (1996). Multifactor explanations of asset pricing anomalies. The Journal of Finance, 51(1), 55-84.

Hassell, J. M., ＆ Jennings, R. H. (1986). Relative forecast accuracy and the timing of earnings forecast announcements. The Accounting Review, 58-75.

Gong, G., Li, L. Y., ＆ Xie, H. (2009). The association between management earnings forecast errors and accruals. The Accounting Review, 84(2), 497-530.

Graham, J. R., Harvey, C. R., ＆ Rajgopal, S. (2005). The economic implications of corporate financial reporting. Journal of accounting and economics, 40(1), 3-73.

Imhoff Jr, E. A. (1978). The representativeness of management earnings forecasts. Accounting Review, 836-850.
Irani, A. J. (1999). Ex post bias in management earnings forecasts: A study of potential determinants.

Johnson, M. F., Kasznik, R., ＆ Nelson, K. K. (2001). The impact of securities litigation reform on the disclosure of Forward‐Looking information by high technology firms. Journal of Accounting Research, 39(2), 297-327.

Kasznik, R. (1996). On the association between voluntary disclosure and earnings management.

Karamanou, I., ＆ Vafeas, N. (2005). The association between corporate boards, audit committees, and management earnings forecasts: An empirical analysis. Journal of Accounting Research, 43(3), 453-486.

Lee, S., Matsunaga, S. R., ＆ Park, C. W. (2012). Management forecast accuracy and CEO turnover. The Accounting Review, 87(6), 2095-2122.

Lou, D. (2014). Attracting investor attention through advertising. Review of Financial Studies.

Madsen, J. M., ＆ Niessner, M. (2016). Is investor attention for sale? The role of advertising in financial markets.

Osinga, E. C., Leeflang, P. S., Srinivasan, S., ＆ Wieringa, J. E. (2011). Why do firms invest in consumer advertising with limited sales response? A shareholder perspective. Journal of Marketing, 75(1), 109-124.

Rogers, J. L., ＆ Stocken, P. C. (2005). Credibility of management forecasts. The Accounting Review, 80(4), 1233-1260.

Skinner, D. J. (1994). Why firms voluntarily disclose bad news. Journal of Accounting Research, 32(1), 38-60.

Trueman, B. (1986). Why do managers voluntarily release earnings forecasts? Journal of accounting and economics, 8(1), 53-71.

Yang, H. I. (2012). Capital market consequences of managers' voluntary disclosure styles. Journal of accounting and economics, 53(1), 167-184.

Zamora, V. L. (2009). Do Managers Benefit from Superior Forecasting?

Zhang, L. (2012). The effect of ex ante management forecast accuracy on the post-earnings-announcement drift. The Accounting Review, 87(5), 1791-1818.