臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究，採用非平衡追蹤資料型態(unbalanced panel-data)，以我國1996年至2014年之間台灣上市上櫃公司為對象，探討家族企業、機構投資人與會計盈餘管理的關聯性，旨在瞭解家族企業是否存在掠奪小股東之核心代理問題，而機構投資人是否能發揮監督效果，以保護本身及其他投資人的權益。實證結果發現：家族企業與會計盈餘管理呈現正相關，與本研究之預期一致，表示家族企業存在掠奪小股東之核心代理問題；而機構投資法人，無論是外國專業投資機構(Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor；QFII)或國內機構投資人，對家族公司的會計盈餘管理，並無顯著抑制效果，意謂著對於家族企業的掠奪行為無法發揮監督效果。本研究進行若干敏感性測試，發現實證結果具備相當穩固性。

Note that family-controlled firms may expropriate the interests of minority shareholders through financial reporting. This study firstly uses the unbalanced panel data to examine the relationship between family-controlled firms and accrual-based earnings management based on the listed firms in Taiwan stocks market from 1996 to 2014. Moreover, this study further tests whether institutional investors can play an active monitoring role to mitigate this agency problem resulted from family-controlled firms in protecting the interests of minority shareholders.
The empirical results show that family-controlled firms are positively associated with accrual-based earnings management and support the family-controlled firms’ expropriation hypothesis. Further testing documents that both the qualified foreign and domestic institutional investors do not effectively mitigate the core agency problem resulted from the concentrated ownership, which in turn, triggered the higher accrual-based earnings management of family-controlled firms. This study conducted a number of sensitivity tests and found that the results are robust to the various specifications.

目錄
摘要 i
ABSTRACT ii
誌謝 iii
目錄 iv
表目錄 v
圖目錄 vi
第壹章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 1
第三節 研究架構 3
第貳章 文獻探討與假說發展 5
第一節 代理理論及盈餘管理 5
第二節 家族企業代理問題之相關文獻 8
第三節 機構投資人之相關文獻 9
第四節 研究假說 11
第參章 研究設計 13
第一節 資料來源、研究期間與樣本選取 13
第二節 變數定義 16
第三節 實證模型 21
第肆章 實證結果 23
第一節 敘述性統計及相關性分析 23
第二節 相關係數分析 25
第三節 實證結果分析 26
第伍章 額外測試 29
第一節 DA不同估計模式之測試 29
第二節 不同機構投資人之測試 31
第三節 DA正、負值不同之測試 34
第陸章 研究結論、限制與建議 39
第一節 研究結論 39
第二節 限制與建議 40
參考文獻 41

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