臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

隨著時代更迭，曾經撐起台灣經濟的企業創辦人們，如今也紛紛邁入退休的階段，然而家族企業的獨特之處在於他們可以透過正式與非正式的治理機制影響企業的決策和績效，而完善的接班計劃，接班人選的薪酬設定尤其重要(Steve Seelig 2014)，且繼位者接班後的薪酬制度將會與財務績效有著裙帶關係，目前國內外文獻較多是探討家族企業與非家族企業CEO之薪酬差別，並且實證結果亦相當分歧，而國內以接班為研究主軸，從家族企業代際傳承視角，瞭解創辦人轉移經營權之激勵誘因佈局模式的研究更是付之闕如。
本研究以台灣公司，在1998年至2017年上市、上櫃、下市、下櫃經歷創辦人退位後接班之企業為樣本，研究期間為創辦人接班前一年，與接班後三年。採用普通最小平方法(Ordinary Least Squares)進行實證結果分析，比較後代子孫或專業經理人接班後之薪酬水準、薪酬比率，更進一步的使用結構方程模式(SEM)，探討接班人薪酬對企業財務績效的中介效果，觀察創始企業的接班採取的繼位者之薪酬佈局方式對於接班後的企業績效影響。
研究結果發現，後代子孫接班與薪酬水準為顯著正相關，且後代子孫接班與權益類別薪酬結構比率為顯著負相關，意即家族企業創辦人退位後，繼位者為後代子孫接班之薪酬水準會高於專業經理人，且權益類別薪酬比率會少於專業經理人。在公司績效方面若是以薪酬結構當中介效果，專業經理人繼位之權益類別薪酬績效動因優於後代子孫接班之固定薪酬績效動因，然而在市場績效方面，若是以薪酬結構為中介效果，本研究並未發現有影響。

As time changes, the founders of family business who once have propped up Taiwan’s economy are entering the retirement stage now. The compensation system outlined in a succession plan is particularly important (Steve Seelig 2014) , and the compensation system after succession will have a nepotism with financial performance. At present, domestic and foreign literatures focus on the difference of CEO compensation between family and non-family firms. Yet, the difference and the empirical results are quite divergent. In Taiwan, taking the succession as the main axis of research, the research on the compensation incentive of the successor from the perspective of intergenerational inheritance of family business is even urgent.

This study is based on Taiwanese companies that went public from 1998 to 2017.The research period was the year before the founder took over and three years after the succession. Ordinary Least Squares(OLS) was employed analyze the empirical results, compare the compensation level and compensation ratio of the founders’ descendants or professional managers after they took over. SEM was further used to examine the impact of the meditation effect on the the successor to the financial performance of the companies.

The results of the study demonstrated that the succession of the founders’ descendants and the compensation level were significantly positively correlated, while significantly negatively correlated with the compensation structure of the equity-based compensation. In the aspect of company performance, if the compensation structure is used as an intermediary effect, the motivation of the professional managers' equity-based compensation is better than the motivation of the the descendants’ fixed compensation. However, in terms of marketing performance, nothing was found in this study.

第壹章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 3
第貳章 文獻回顧 4
第一節 家族企業接班 4
第二節 家族企業薪酬與企業績效 8
第參章 研究設計 12
第一節 觀念性架構圖 12
第二節 假說發展 13
第三節 變數衡量 17
第四節 研究模型 22
第五節 樣本選取與資料來源 24
第肆章 實證結果 25
第一節 敘述性統計 25
第二節 迴歸結果分析 29
第三節 敏感性測試 38
第伍章 研究結論與建議 40
第一節 研究結論 40
參考文獻 42

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