臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究探討國家與企業層面公司治理對股利政策之影響。其次，有鑑於成長機會將影響到公司治理對股利政策的關係，因此，本研究進一步探討在考量企業成長機會、國家經濟成長性後，國家與企業層面公司治理對股利政策之影響。另外，針對國家與企業層面之公司治理何者對於股利政策較具重要性？以及考量國家經濟成長性與企業成長機會後，何者對於股利政策較具影響性等議題，本研究亦進行更深入的探討。
依La Porta et al. (2000)，公司治理對其股利政策的影響具有「結果模式」(Outcome model)或「替代模式」(Substitution model) 的關係。本文以美國及中國股市為分析對象，研究結果發現，在探討企業層次公司治理對股利政策之影響方面，中國企業符合替代模式，而美國企業則較傾向結果模式。在國家層次的公司治理對股利政策之影響方面，實證結果則不明顯符合替代模式。其次，在考量企業成長機會後，企業公司治理對股利政策之影響，研究發現中國企業符合結果模式，美國企業則不明顯符合非結果模式，即在考慮企業成長機會後，若中國企業的公司治理機制愈強健，則股利支付將會愈少。在考量國家經濟成長性後，國家層次公司治理對股利政策之影響方面，實證結果顯示符合替代模式，即在考慮國家經濟成長性後，中國企業的股利支付大於美國的企業。最後，在檢視國家與企業層次之公司治理機制對於企業制定股利政策的重要性方面，實證結果顯示企業層次之公司治理機制較具重要性，以及企業成長機會對於企業股利政策的制定較具有影響性。

The objective of this study is to investigate the effects of country and corporate governances on dividend policy. Moreover, the thesis studies that growth opportunity affects the relationship between governance and dividend policy. Therefore, the effects of country and corporate governances on dividend policy also are discussed, when considered company and country growth opportunity. Besides, we also have the interests in that country governance whether is more important to the dividend policy, and which growth opportunity is more important to the dividend policy.
According to the study of La Porta et al. (2000), there are two agency models of dividends. One is outcome model and another is substitute model. We apply the data from United States and Chinese stock markets to analyze above issues. From the effect of corporate governance on dividend policy, we found that the Chinese firms’ dividend policy consists with the substitute model and the United States firms’ dividend policy more tends to the outcome model. From the effect of country governance on dividend policy, the regression result shows that it was not apparent consisted with the substitute model. In additional, we consider the company growth opportunity on the effect of corporate governance to dividend policy. The result shows that the Chinese firms consist with the outcome model, but the United States firms are not. The substitute model is considered if country growth opportunity is included into the model. It means that considering the country growth opportunity, the dividend payout of Chinese firms is greater than United States firms. Finally, the empirical result found corporate governance is more important than country governance, and company growth opportunity is more significant regarding to dividend policy.

學位論文授權書……………………………………………………………….……Ⅰ
學位考試委員審定書……………………………………………………………….Ⅱ
摘要……………………………………………………………………….…………Ⅲ
Abstract……………………………………………………………….……………..Ⅳ
謝詞……………………………………………………………….…………………Ⅴ
目錄……………………………………………………………….…………………Ⅵ
表目錄………………………………………………………….……………………Ⅶ
圖目錄………………………………………………………….……………………Ⅷ
第一章 緒論………….……………..……………………………………….…1
第一節 研究背景……………………………..………………………………1
第二節 研究動機……………………………..………………………………2
第三節 研究目的與論文架構……………………………..…………………4
第二章 文獻回顧………………………..…………………….………………7
第一節 股利政策之理論………………………………..……………………7
第二節 公司治理與股利政策之關係……………………………..…………8
第三節 成長機會與股利政策之關係……………………………..…………9
第三章 研究方法……………………………..………………………………11
第一節 假說的設立……………………………………..……………………11
第二節 實證模式與變數定義……………………………..………………...13
第三節 資料來源與樣本…...………………………..………………………19
第四章 實證分析………………………...……………………….......……...21
第一節 敘述性統計分析………..…………………..………………………21
第二節 公司治理對股利政策之實證分析…………………………….……28
第三節 成長性對股利政策之影響……………………………..…………...42
第五章 結論……………………………………………………….…………59
參考文獻…………………………………………………………………….…………61

一、中文部分：
王吟華 (2005)，「公司治理與經理人異動對股東財富的影響」，高雄大學經濟管理研究所碩士論文
王麗亭 (2005)，「公司治理、股利政策及應計品質與公司價值之關係」，輔仁大學會計學系研究所碩士論文
吳宗輔 (2005)，「台灣上市公司股權結構、董事會組成特性對公司經營績效及股利政策影響之研究」，國立中正大學財務金融學系研究所碩士論文
邱垂泰、鄒建中 (2006)，「中國大陸公司法修正初窺–大陸公司治理問題剖析」，展望與探索月刊，第4卷第10期
許逸驥 (2006)，「公司治理與股利政策–長期驗證」，輔仁大學財務金融學系研究所碩士論文
許博渝 (2006)，「公司治理機制與資訊揭露透明度」，中原大學會計研究所碩士論文
陳姿妤 (2003)，「從盈餘管理與投資人保護探討各國股利發放行為」，銘傳大學國際企業學系研究所碩士論文
葉春岑 (2000)，「成長機會、資訊不對稱與可支配現金流量對股利政策影響之研究」，朝陽科技大學企業管理學系研究所碩士論文
黃翊竹 (2003)，「公司特性、現金股利與現金流量投資報酬率關係之研究」，中正大學企業管理研究所碩士論文
曾昭玲、周小玲 (2007)，「企業成長機會之於融資政策及股利政策影響之多期性研究」，東吳經濟商學學報，第57期
趙文衡 (2003)，「大陸經濟發展前景與對世界經濟的影響」，台灣經濟研究月刊，第26卷第6期
黎明淵、林俞廷 (2005)，「股利政策決定因素再探討」，財金論文叢刊，第2期
賴坤助 (2006)，「機構投資人與股利政策關連性之研究」，東海大學會計學系研究所碩士論文
謝祁淩 (2000)，「從代理理論觀點探索公司股利政策與經營績效關聯性」，東吳大學會計學系研究所碩士論文
戴正雄 (2005)，「公司治理對股利政策與庫藏股決策之影響」，輔仁大學會計學系研究所碩士論文
二、英文部分：
Amihud, Y. and K. Li (2002), “The declining information content of dividend announcements and the effect of institutional holdings, ” FIN Working Paper, 2-061.
Baker, M. and J. Wurgler (2004), “A catering theory of dividends, ” The Journall of Finance, 59(3), 1125–1165.
Chen, L. H. and J. J. George (2001), “The determinants of Dutch capital structure choice, ” University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM, 1-27.
Collins. D. and S. Kothari (1989), “An analysis of intertemporal and cross-sectional determinants of earnings response coefficients.” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 11, 143-181.
DeAngelo, H., L. DeAngelo, and RM. Stulz (2006), “Dividend policy and the earned/contributed capital mix: a test of the life-cycle theory, ” Journal of Financial Economics, 81, 227-254.
Dittmar, A. and J. Mahrt-Smith (2007), “Corporate governance and the value of cash holdings,” Journal of Financial Economics, 83, 599–634.
Easterbrook, F. H. (1984), “Two agency-cost explanations of dividends, ” The American Economic Review, 74, 650–659.
Eckbo, B. E. and S. Verma (1994), “Managerial shareownership, voting power, and cash dividend policy,” Journal of corporate finance, 1, 33–62.
Farinha, J. (2003), “Dividend policy, corporate governance and the managerial entrenchment hypothesis: an empirical analysis, ” Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 30, 1173-1209.
Fenn, G. and N. Liang (2001), “Corporate payout policy and managerial stock incentives, ” Journal of Financial Economics, 60, 45–72.
Frankfrter, G. M. and B. G. Wood (2002), “Dividend policy theories and their empirical tests, ” International review of financial analysis, 11, 111-138.
Garrett, I. and R. Priestley (2002), “Dividend behavior and dividend signaling, ” The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 35, 173–189.
Garver, J. J. and K. M. Gaver (1993), “Additional evidence on the association between the investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend and compensation policies,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 16, 125-60.
Gillan S. L., J. C. Hartzell, and L. T. Starks (2006), “Tradeoffs in corporate governance : evidence from board structures and charter provisions, ” USC FBE Finance Seminar, University of Texas.
Gordon, M. J. (1963), “Optimal investment and financing policy,” Journal of Finance, 264-272.
Gugler, K. and B. B. Yurtoglu (2003), “Corporate governance and dividend pay-out policy in Germany, ” European Economic Review, 47, 731–758.
Jensen G. R., D. P. Solberg, and T. S. Zorn. (1992), “Simultaneous determination of insider ownership, debt and dividend policies, ” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 27(2), 247–263.
Jiraporn, P. and Y. Ning (2006), “Dividend policy, shareholder rights, and corporate governance, ” Working Paper Series.
Kathryn, L. D. and A. W. Vincent (1998), “Dividend, asymmetric information, and agency conflicts：evidence from a comparison of the dividend policies of Japanese and U.S. firms, ” The Journal of Finance, 53, 879–904.
Kenneth, A. B., K. R. Brunarski, Y. Harman, and J. B. Kehr (2005), “Dividend, corporate monitors and agency costs, ” The Financial Review, 40, 37–65.
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny (2000), “Agency problems and dividend policies around the world, ” The Journal of Finance, 55, 1–33.
Leora, F. K., and L. Inessa (2002), “Investor protection, and performance in emerging markets, ” Policy Research Working Paper, 2818, The World Bank Development Research Group, New Work.
Lintner, J. (1956), “Distribution of incomes of corporations among dividends, retained earnings and taxes,” American Economic Review, 97-113.
Mancinelli, L., and A. Ozkan (2006), “Ownership structure and dividend policy：evidence from Italian firms, ” The European Journal of Finance, 12, 265–282.
Micah, S. O. (2006), “Dividend policy, dividend initiations, and governance, ” Working Paper(October), University of Southern California.
Miller, M., and F. Modigliani (1961), “Dividend policy, growth, and the valuation of shares,” Journal of Business, 34, 411-433.
Miller, M. H., and K. Rock (1985), “Dividend policy under asymmetric information, ” Journal of Finance, 40, 1031-1051.
Mitton, T. (2004), “Corporate governance and dividend policy in emerging markets, ” Emerging Markets Review, 5, 409–426.
Moh’d M. A., L. G. Perry, and J. N. Rimbey (1995), “An investigation of the dynamic relationship between agency theory and dividend policy, ” The Financial Review, 30, 367–385.
Morck, R. and B. Yeung (2005), “Dividend taxation and corporate governance, ” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19, 163–180.
Noronha, G. M., D. K. Shome, and G. E. Morgan (1996), “The monitoring rationale for dividends and the interaction of capital structure and dividend decisions, ” Journal of Banking and Finance, 20, 439–454.
Renneboog, L. and P. G. Szilagyi (2006), “How relevant is dividend policy under low shareholder protection？, ” ECGI-Finance Working Paper, 128.
Rozeff, M. S. (1982), “Growth, beta and agency costs as determinants of dividend payout ratios, ” Journal of Financial Research, 5(3), 249–259.
Schellenger, M. H., D. D. Wood, and A. Tashakori (1989), “Board of director composition, shareholder wealth, and dividend policy, ” Journal of Management (15), 457–467.
Schooley, D. K. and L. D. Barney (1994), “Using dividend policy and managerial ownership to reduce agency costs, ” Journal of Financial Research, 363–373.
Short H., H. Zhang, and K. Keasey (2002), “The link between dividend policy and institutional ownership, ” Journal of Corporate Finance, 8, 105–122.
Smith, C. W. and R. L. Watts (1992), “The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend and compensation policies, ” Journal of Financial Economics, 32, 263–292.