臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

鑒於日新月異的科技發展太過迅速，對於自然生態和生活環境時常造成毀滅性的破壞，在過去幾十年來不斷地鼓吹綠色產品之推廣，各領域的企業主趨之若鶩、蔚為趨勢。故以綠色供應鏈的綠色產品做為討論基礎、存貨加以研究，並以賽局理論做為製造商經營策略模式之主軸。
本研究旨在考慮三階層的綠色供應鏈中各成員的存貨情況，以賽局理論中的史坦柏格市場討論製造商分別在面對不同需求的情境之下，能夠採取較優的策略模式；由於各製造商會有不同的企業目標，例如: 成本最低，最高利潤，或高報酬率等等，能夠藉此研究去選擇到對於製造商最有利的策略合作方式；而在各策略聯盟間的利潤分配在本研究中不納入討論。最後會針對本研究所提出的模型進行數值分析與討論。

With the highly-rapid changes of technology, the environment damages and the disturbances of our lives are extremely dramatic. Fortunately, lots of enterprises are putting more efforts on the environmental protection as producing their products. Therefore, we take the green supply chain as our fundamental base, then consider inventory and take game theory as strategies.
In this study, we propose a three-level green supply chain, take inventory management into account and choose a better strategy for manufacturer in game theory, includes cooperative decision-making model, non-cooperative game model, the Stackelberg game I model and Stackebrg game II model. Try to show the best strategy in different scenarios in order to reach the goal of enterprise.

摘　要 i
ABSTRACT ii
致謝 iii
CONTENTS iv
LIST OF FIGURE vi
LIST OF TABLE vii
Chapter1 INTRODUCTION 1
1.1　Research Background and Motivation 1
1.2 Research objectives 5
1.3　Research Scope and Framework 6
Chapter2 LITERATURE REVIEW 9
2.1　Green Supply Chain Management 9
2.2　Game theory and Stackelberg game 12
2.2.1　Bases of Stakckelberg game 13
2.2.2　Solutions for solving Stackelberg games 14
2.2.3　Applications of Stackelberg game 15
2.3　Basic Inventory Model 18
Chapter3 FUMDEMENTAL MODEL 21
3.1　Assumptions and Limitations 21
3.2　Notations 23
3.3　The Fundamental model 24
3.4　Problem Solved Process 27
Chapter4 MODEL 29
4.1 Cooperative-Decision Model 29
4.2 Non-cooperative game model 30
4.3 Stackelberg game model I 32
4.4 Stackelberg game model II 33
4.5 Discussion on markup rate 34
4.5.1 Order quantity 36
4.5.2 The price of green product 37
4.5.3 The total cost 38
4.5.4 The total profit 39
4.5.5 Return on Investment 39
Chapter5 NUMERICAL EXPERIEMNT & SENSITIVITY ANALASIS 41
5.1 The markup rate 41
5.1.1 Customer- oriented 42
5.1.2 Production-oriented 44
5.1.3 Compare the sensitivity of p to γ’s 47
5.2 Perform numerical experiment 50
5.2.1 Cooperative decision model 51
5.2.2 Non-cooperative decision model 51
5.2.3 Stackelberg game I 52
5.2.4 Stackelberg game II 52
5.2.5 Discussion 53
Chapter6 CONCLUSION 56
Reference 59

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