臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本文採用三國兩廠商模型來探討存在網路外部性與產品相容性的情況下，比較單一關稅制度與差別關稅制度之間全球福利水準的大小。結果發現，(a) 在沒有網路外部性與產品為同質性的情況下，單一關稅的全球福利大於差別關稅的全球福利。(b) 在沒有網路外部性時，當產品相容愈小時，則單一關稅的全球福利小於差別關稅，當產品相容愈大時，則結果會相反。(c)當產品相容愈小且網路外部性愈小時，則單一關稅的全球福利小於差別關稅的全球福利，當產品相容愈大且網路外部性愈小時，或者當網路外部性大且產品為不完全相容性時，則結果會相反。

This paper uses the three-country two-firm model to explore the global welfare level between the unified tariff system and the differential tariff system in the case of network externalities and product heterogeneity. It is found that (a) without network externalities and homogeneity of products, the global welfare of uniform tariffs is greater than that of differential tariffs. (b) In the absence of network externalities, when the product is different from the product, the greater the product difference, the global welfare of the unified tariff is smaller than the differential tariff, and the smaller the product difference, the opposite result will be obtained. (c) In the case of network externalities and product heterogeneity, the greater the product differences and the smaller the network externalities, the smaller the global welfare of uniform tariffs than that of differential tariffs. The smaller the product differences and the smaller the network externalities, or the greater the network externalities and the heterogeneity of products, the opposite result will be obtained.

摘要 i
Abstract iii
1. 前言 1
2. 單一關稅 4
2.1廠商的決策問題 5
2.2政府的決策問題 6
3.差別關稅 8
3.1廠商的決策問題 8
3.2政府的決策問題 9
4. 關稅制度的比較 12
5. 擴充模型 19
6. 結論 22
參考文獻 23

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