臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

自2008年9月世界金融危機後，突顯出監理制度與措施對銀行經營影響的重要性。無論是中央銀行的獨立性、或是監理一元化，監理制度對銀行經營效率影響如何？為近年來備受關注之課題。此外，私人監管、政府監管權力、活動限制、資本要求等監理措施，是否有助於提升銀行效率呢？為本研究探討之另一重點。
本文究針對亞洲區域內的銀行，以27個國家、968家銀行為研究對象，研究期間為2003年至2015年。本研究發現央行獨立性愈高的國家有助於提高銀行成本與收益效率，監理一元程度愈高的國家反會降低銀行收益效率。當加強監管權力會使收益效率降低，而強化市場紀律和私人監督則會提升銀行收益效率。
本文也發現，在交叉作用方面，強化市場紀律和私人監督，在央行獨立性愈強的國家，會降低銀行之成本及收益效率；在監理一元化的國家，則使成本效率上升。此外，央行獨立性愈高，同時又強化監理權力措施或限制業務，可提高銀行收益效率；監理一元化國家提高限制業務，則使銀行成本效率上升。

The world financial crisis in September 2008 highlighted the importance of su-pervision system and supervisory regulations on the operation of banks. The issues of the independence of the central bank, unified financial supervision, and how the su-pervision system affect the bank operational efficiency are gaining greater concerns. Another focus of this study is whether supervisory regulations such as private moni-toring, government supervisory power, bank activity restrictions, capital requirements, etc. can help improving bank efficiency.
This study focuses on 968 banks in 27 countries of Asia from 2003 to 2015, this study shows that countries with higher central bank independence help to increase bank cost and revenue efficiency, and that countries with higher unified financial su-pervision would reduce the revenue efficiency of banks. When Asia countries strengthening supervisory power would reduce the revenue efficiency of banks, strengthening market discipline and private supervision would increase revenue effi-ciency of banks.
This study also finds that in terms of interactions, it strengthened market disci-pline and private supervision in countries with more independent central banks would reduce the cost and revenue efficiency of banks, in the countries of unified supervision would increase cost efficiency. In addition, the higher the independence of the central bank, and at the same time strengthen the supervisory power measures or activity re-striction, can increase the revenue efficiency of banks. The countries of supervision unified improve the activity restriction would increase the cost efficiency of banks.

中文摘要　．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． iii
英文摘要　．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． iv
誌謝辭 ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． v
內容目錄　．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． vi
表目錄 ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． vii
圖目錄 ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． viii
第一章　　緒論．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 1
　　第一節　　研究背景與動機．．．．．．．．．．． 1
　　第二節　　研究目的．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 3
　　第三節　　研究流程．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 4
第二章　　文獻探討．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 7
　　第一節　　金融監理制度．．．．．．．．．．．．． 7
　　第二節　　金融監理措施．．．．．．．．．．．． 9
第三章　　研究方法．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 14
　　第一節　　資料來源與樣本．．．．．．．．．．．． 14
　　第二節　　模型設定．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 15
　　第三節　　變數定義．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 20
第四章　　實證分析．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 32
　　第一節　　New-Cost-DEA及New-Revenue-DEA．． 32
　　第二節　　Tobit迴歸分析．．．．．．．．．．．． 40
　　第三節　　穩健性測試．．．．．．．．．．．．． 49
第五章　　結論與建議．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 53
　　第一節　　結論．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 53
　　第二節　　建議．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 54
參考文獻 ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 56

一、中文部分
郭照榮，李宜熹，陳勤明(2013)，BaselⅢ對金融穩定及貨幣政策之影響，中央銀行季刊，35(2)，11-59。
二、英文部分
Abrams, R. K., & Taylor, M. W. (2001). Assessing the Case f-or Unified Sector Supervision. Paper presented at the 2001 Risk Management and Insurance International Conferen-ce, Taipei, Taiwan.
Agoraki, M. E. K., Delis, M. D., & Pasiouras, F. (2011). Regu-lations, competition and bank risktaking in transition coun-tries. Journal of Financial Stability, 7(1), 38-48.
Arnone, M., Laurens, B. J., Segalotto, J. F., & Sommer, M. (2009). Central bank autonomy: Lessons from global trends. IMF Staff Papers, 56(2), 263-296.
Barth, J. R., Caprio, G. Jr., Levine, R. (2001). The regulation and su-pervision of banks around the world: A new database. In: R.E Litan & R. Herring (Eds.), Integrating Emerging Market Countries into the Global Financial(pp. 83-250).Washington, District of Columbia: Brookings Institution.
Barth, J. R., Caprio, G., & Levine, R. (2004). Bank regulationand supervision: What works best? Journal of Financial I-ntermediation, 13(2), 205-248.
Barth, J. R., Caprio, G., & Levine, R. (2006). Rethinking bankregulation: Till angels govern. New York: Cambridge Uni-versity Press.
Barth, J. R., Caprio, G., & Levine, R. (2008). Bank regulationsare changing: For better or worse? Comparative EconomicStudies, 50(4), 537-563.
Barth, J. R., Dopico, L. G., Nolle, D. E., & Wilcox, J. A. (2002). Bank safety and soundness and the structure of bank supervi-sion: A cross‐country analysis. International Review of Fi-nance, 3(3‐4), 163-188.
Barth, J. R., Lin, C., Ma, Y., Seade, J., & Song, F. M. (2013). Do bank regulation, supervision and monitoring enhance or im-pede bank efficiency? Journal of Banking & Finance, 37(8), 2879-2892.
Barth, J. R., Nolle, D. E., Phumiwasana, T., & Yago, G. (2003).A cross‐country analysis of the bank supervisory framewo-rk and bank performance. Financial Markets, Institutions &Instruments, 12(2), 67-120.
Beck, T., Demirguc-Kunt, A., & Levine, R. (2006). Bank supervision and corruption in lending. Journal of Monetary Economics 53, 2131-2163.
Bennaceur, S., & Goaied, M. (2008). The determinant of commercial bank interest margin and profitability: Evidence from Tuni-sia. Frontiers in Finance and Economics, 5(1), 106-130.
Berger, W., & Kißmer, F. (2013). Central bank independence and fi-nancial stability: A tale of perfect harmony? European Journal of Political Economy, 31, 109-118.
Besanko, D., & Thakor, A. V. (1992). Banking deregulation: Alloca-tional consequences of relaxing entry barriers. Journal of Banking & Finance, 16(5), 909-932.
Bikker, J. A., & Hu, H. (2002). Cyclical patterns in profits, pr-ovisioning and lending of banks and procyclicality of the new Basel capital requirements. Banca Nazionale del Lavo-ro Quarterly Review, 55(221), 143-175.
Bodea, C., & Hicks, R. (2015). Price stability and central bank inde-pendence: Discipline, credibility, and democratic institu-tions. International Organization, 69(1), 35-61.
Briault, C. (1999). The rationale for a single national financial ser-vices regulator (No. 1999.2). London Financial Services Au-thority Occasional Paper.
Caprio, Jr, G., D’Apice, V., Ferri, G., & Puopolo, G. W. (2014). Macrofinancial determinants of the great financial crisis: Im-plications for financial regulation. Journal of Banking & Fi-nance, 44, 114-129.
Chortareas, G. E., Girardone, C., & Ventouri, A. (2012). Bank super-vision, regulation, and efficiency: Evidence from the European Union. Journal of Financial Stability, 8(4), 292-302.
Cihák, M., (2010). Price Stability, Financial Stability, and Central Bank Independence. In Oesterreichische National-Bank (ed.) Central Banking after the Crisis (pp. 44-55). Vienna: Oester-reichische National-Bank.
Cordella, T., & Yeyati, E. L. (2002). Financial opening, deposit-insurance, and risk in a model of banking competition. E-uropean Economic Review, 46(3), 471-485.
Cukierman, A. (2008). Central bank independence and monetary policymaking institutions-past, present and future. European Journal of Political Economy, 24(4), 722-736.
Cukierman, A., Web, S. B., & Neyapti, B. (1992). Measuring the in-dependence of central banks and its effect on policy out-comes. The World Bank Economic Review, 6(3), 353-398.
Demaestri, E., & Guerrero, F. (2005). Financial supervision: Int-egrated or specialized? The case of Latin America and theCaribbean. Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments, 14(2), 43-106.
Dincer, N. N., & Eichengreen, B. (2012). The architecture and governance of financial supervision: Sources and implicate-ons. International Finance, 15(3), 309-325.
Doumpos, M., Gaganis, C., & Pasiouras, F. (2015). Central bank in-dependence, financial supervision structure and bank sound-ness: An empirical analysis around the crisis. Journal of Banking & Finance, 61, 69-83.
Fernández, A. I., & González, F. (2005). How accounting and audit-ing systems can counteract risk-shifting of safetynets in bank-ing: Some international evidence. Journal of Financial Stabil-ity, 1(4), 466-500.
Francis, F. (2004). State-building, Governance and World, order in the 21st century (Vol. xiii). New York: Cornell University Press.
Gaganis, C., & Pasiouras, F. (2013). Financial supervision regimes and bank efficiency: International evidence. Journal of Bank-ing & Finance, 37(12), 5463-5475.
Ghosh, S., Nachane, D. M., Narain, A., & Sahoo, S. (2003). C-apital requirements and bank behaviour: An empirical ana-lysis of Indian public sector banks. Journal of Internation-al Development, 15(2), 145-156.
Haque, F., & Brown, K. (2017). Bank ownership, regulation and ef-ficiency: Perspectives from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region. International Review of Economics & Fi-nance, 47(C), 273-293.
Herring, R., & Carmassi, J. (2008). The structure of cross-sectorfinancial supervision. Financial Markets, Institutions & Ins-truments, 17(1), 51-76.
Kalyvas, A. N., & Mamatzakis, E. (2014). Does business regulation matter for banks in the European Union? Journal of Interna-tional Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 32, 278-324.
Klomp, J., & de Haan, J. (2009). Central bank independence and fi-nancial instability. Journal of Financial Stability, 5(4), 321-338.
Kosmidou, K., Pasiouras, F., & Tsaklanganos, A. (2005). Fact-ors influencing the profits and size of Greek banks operating abroad: A pooled time-series study. Applied Financial Economics, 15(10), 731-738.
Lee, T. H., & Chih, S. H. (2013). Does financial regulation affect the profit efficiency and risk of banks? Evidence from China's commercial banks. The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, 26, 705-724.
Lee, C. C., & Hsieh, M. F. (2013). The impact of bank capital on profitability and risk in Asian banking. Journal of Interna-tional Money and Finance, 32, 251-281.
Levine, R. (2004). The microeconomic effects of different appro-aches to bank supervision(No. 237). Unpublished Manuscr-ipt, Stanford Center for International Development.
Llewellyn, D. T. (1999). Introduction: The institutional structure of regulatory agencies. In Courtis, Neil (Ed.), How countries supervise their banks, insurers and securities markets. London: Central Bank Publications.
Masciandaro, D., & Quintyn, M. (2009). Reforming financial super-vision and the role of the central banks: A review of global trends, causes and effects (1998-2008). Centre for Economic Policy Research, Policy insight, 30, 1-11.
Melecky, M., & Podpiera, A. M. (2013). Institutional structures of financial sector supervision, their drivers and historical benchmarks. Journal of Financial Stability, 9(3), 428-444.
Pasiouras, F. (2008). International evidence on the impact of regula-tions and supervision on banks’ technical efficiency: An ap-plication of two-stage data envelopment analysis. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 30(2), 187-223.
Pasiouras, F., Tanna, S., & Zopounidis, C. (2009). The impact of banking regulations on banks' cost and profit efficiency: Crosscountry evidence. International Review of Financial Analysis, 18(5), 294-302.
Pellegrina, L.D., & Masciandaro, D. (2007). Politicians and financial supervision architectures. Trends and the Italian case. Un-published manuscript, Bocconi University at Milano.
Quintyn, M., & Taylor, M. W. (2003). Regulatory and supervis-ory independence and financial stability. CESifo Economic Studies, 49(2), 259-294.
Tone, K. (2002). A strange case of the cost and allocative efficiencies in DEA. Journal of the Operational Research Society, 53(11), 1225-1231.
Shehzad, C. T., & De Haan, J. (2013). Was the 2007 crisis really a global banking crisis? The North American Journal of Eco-nomics and Finance, 24, 113-124.
Shiller, R. J. (2009). The new financial order: Risk in the 21st centu-ry. New Jersey: Princeton University.
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (2002). The grabbing hand: Govern-ment pathologies and their cures. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Smirlock, M. (1985). Evidence on the (non) relationship between concentration and profitability in banking. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 17(1), 69-83.
Short, B. K. (1979). The relation between commercial bank profit rates and banking concentration in Canada, Western Europe, and Japan. Journal of Banking & Finance, 3(3), 209-219.
YanZhong, X., & Tao, S. (2009). Empirical study on determinants of Chinese commercial banks' efficiency. Journal of Financial Development Research, 1, 015.